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Abstract 
This thesis examines transcripts from the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), asking, what can the application of cognitive linguistic 
methods to ICTY transcripts reveal about social processes within the courtroom? 
Aiming to broaden the application of these methods, this thesis uses a type of 
cognitive linguistics called Discourse Space Theory (DST) to highlight significant 
patterns of interaction within ICTY testimonies, and a combination of social 
psychology and discourse analysis to explain them further. The multi-layered 
methods employed here allow for the transcripts to be at their most revealing, and 
provide essential connections to the existing body of work on transitional justice. 
This project examines two types of testimonies – that of victims, and that of 
accused. Results of this analysis demonstrate that underlying the exchanges at the 
ICTY are power relationships functioning in ways that change relative to 
identifiable sets of circumstances, such as the ways in which agents of the court 
address witnesses. Patterns revealed through the analysis of victim testimony 
demonstrate two important contested subjects at stake - memory and emotion. 
Analysis of accused testimony has shown a stronger focus on personal power, both 
within the courtroom and within narratives on the past, and demonstrates that this 
changes according to status and rank. The overall results of this study have shown 
that language in the courtroom not only contains within it evidence of underlying 
social processes, but that these processes reveal issues of power significant to the 
changing nature of how the functions of tribunals such as the ICTY are understood 
generally.  
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Chapter One - Introduction 
1 Introduction 
Processes of international criminal justice, often referred to by scholars (to some 
degree of contestation) as ‘transitional justice’ (Bevernage 2010; Brants 2013; 
Campbell 2012; Leebaw 2008; Roht-Arriaza 2006) have been the subject of various 
waves of attention in the past twenty years. The legal issues surrounding post-
conflict tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) continue to be discussed, and there is consistent focus on the 
social and political ramifications on the ICTY’s various decisions and practices in 
terms of how these might impact post conflict reconstruction. Absent from the 
discussion, however, is attention paid to the social processes occurring within the 
courtroom, and how these processes both shape and are shaped by relations of 
power found in this highly specialised space. This project asks, what sociological 
patterns exist within the ICTY transcripts, and what do these patterns mean? Or, 
more specifically, what can the application of cognitive linguistic methods to ICTY 
transcripts reveal about social processes within the courtroom? 
The main objective of this research is to widen the scope of research on transitional 
justice, calling for an inclusion of studies on courtroom interactions as evidence to 
the ways speech can change the nature of the justice process. More specifically, this 
project aims to highlight the fact that through the mechanism of tribunals, new 
information is available about how people interact when recounting violent pasts, 
explaining actions, making sense of histories, and understanding their own 
memories. An added layer of insight is possible when looking at how the court as 
an evaluative body governs and responds to this information as it is recounted. This 
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shows that there is not only an intersection between the ways individuals interact 
with their own experiences and those of others, but an additional intersection 
between the ways individuals interact with their experiences and how this is 
managed by the court. Additionally, this project hopes to bring emphasis to the 
merits of using cognitive linguistic methods to analyse court data, and to call for a 
broadening of how court data is defined, approached and understood.  
The importance of doing this lies in the need to discover more about the social 
aspects of transitional justice, which at present is being regarded as something one 
can only learn about through research in the affected communities. While this is 
certainly true (and no less important), I argue that the social aspect of the courtroom 
itself is being overlooked, and that the best way to truly understand more about this 
is through the language used there. The exchanges that occur within courtrooms 
therefore offer a unique opportunity for the researcher. The court space is a 
privileged one – it contains hierarchies, upholds legal traditions that reflect (often 
competing) histories of political thought, and it exists on an evaluative platform 
based on a collection of agreements on what constitutes accepted behaviour. 
Because of this, asking sociological questions about courtroom interactions allows 
for research into the subtle exchanges between people that are so often side-lined by 
competing attention to legal procedure. When language is the unit of analysis, 
understandings of how individuals recount and explain conflict experiences can be 
added to challenge common understandings of why research into courtroom 
behaviours is important, if not essential. 
International Criminal Tribunals, through the overwhelming importance of the 
issues they deal with alongside the fact that they are relatively new institutions, 
bring additional potential to the research of courtroom interactions. They deal with 
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crimes of a wider reach, on a much greater scale. The international nature of the 
courts themselves means that larger ideas sit alongside common courtroom 
practices, allowing for a mixture of politics, human relationships, and international 
legal procedure. As such, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) is a body that brings together unique competing versions of 
history, interpretations of law, questions of language and identity, and groups of 
people (victims, experts, accused, judges, and prosecutors, among others) whose 
voices are heard nowhere else in this context. 
The digital archive of transcripts from the ICTY contains within it over one million 
pages of court records, which have been added to continuously since the creation of 
the Tribunal in 1993. Transcripts from all sessions open to the public are available 
in English through the Tribunals website (www.icty.org), with a selection being 
translated into Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (B/C/S), Albanian, and Macedonian. The 
issues of using these transcripts as a data set will be discussed in Chapter 2, but it is 
important to highlight here that transcripts from the ICTY can be perceived in a 
variety of ways. They can be viewed as an archive of legal data, as has been the 
primary category assigned to them since the Tribunal’s inception, allowing them to 
function as evidence of procedure and precedence that has irrevocably impacted 
international criminal and human rights law. They can also be viewed as a set of 
stories, existing as a place where victims, accused, and experts contributed to a 
lasting discussion of the events occurring during the ten year period from 1991 to 
2001, allowing the transcripts to function as a tool to bring issues of suffering, 
conflict, politics and marginalisation to light. Finally, transcripts can be viewed in a 
fundamentally different way – as a unique record of exchanges occurring within the 
courtroom which, while they may also include the former legal and descriptive 
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categories, have the potential to contain evidence of socially significant processes. 
These interactions occurring within the courtroom demonstrate that issues of power, 
memory, emotion, and politics can function in previously unidentified ways. 
It is this perception of the transcripts as representations of social processes that has 
informed this project, ultimately allowing for a broad question to be posed in an 
effort to undertake a new avenue of research. Namely, what can the ICTY 
transcripts reveal when perceived as a record of interactions, occurring within a 
highly specific space? Using a twofold application of cognitive linguistic (CL) 
theory and broader insights from social psychology and discourse analysis, this 
project examines testimonies from two types of individuals at the ICTY – victim 
and accused - to determine what patterns occur within exchanges of language and 
how these patterns shape the nature of the sociological aspects of the trials.  
2 Background  
This project arose from the intersection of two common complaints made by 
scholars when seeking to understand the broader aims of the ICTY. The first 
complaint is that there is a gap between expectation and practice. Several aims of 
the Tribunal were seen to be far from the reality of its workings, such as the 
assumptions about what it would do for the prosecution of war crimes globally, its 
role in shaping the future perceptions of these types of atrocities during conflict, 
and the contribution made to the post-conflict healing of those affected by the 
crimes committed during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia.1 This generated a 
basic question for my particular approach – what evidence might exist within the 
                                                          
1
 There is a wide variety of sources that describe the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, many of 
which bear publication dates from the early and mid-nineties (Bennett 1995; Thomas 2003), which, 
while useful, can give only part of the picture.  For a more recent set of discussions, see Bieber et al. 
(Bieber 2014).   
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courtroom that could give insight into what happens when war crimes are discussed 
in a legal environment? As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there are 
studies looking to understand these issues from the perspectives of communities 
and from legal viewpoints, but analyses of courtroom interactions are noticeably 
absent. This absence matters a great deal – to ignore this line of enquiry is to 
assume that the court space is one exclusive to issues of law, and that outside it is 
the only place that social processes might occur. At best, it assumes that the social 
aspects of courtroom communications are not there (which this research disproves), 
and at worst it implies that even if these aspects are present, that they do not really 
matter. The latter is to suggest that the people taking part in the processes of 
transitional justice – both victims and accused – have functions that relate only to 
the court space, rather than individual lives intricately connected to communities 
recovering from the traumas of conflict. This project, in highlighting and 
contributing new information to the way data from the ICTY is understood, seeks to 
change this. 
The second, less common but nonetheless significant complaint, is that there is an 
erroneous perception of the Tribunal as dealing with processes that, once recorded 
in transcript, remain static. The legal assessment of courtroom interaction tends to 
be one that assigns a linear aspect to proceedings, and as such many trials, once 
finished, are considered exactly this - finished. While decisions may be revisited, 
appeals discussed and decided, there is, ultimately, an end to proceedings. The 
primary disciplines concerned by this are fields applying sociology, anthropology, 
and linguistics to legal studies. This body of work, discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 3, can incorporate the work undertaken by scholars of sociolinguistics as 
well as forensic linguistics, and from these platforms has grown the assumption that 
22 
 
records of past trials are records of social processes, and therefore have a dynamic 
aspect to them.  
Because of the way these studies perceive courtroom interactions, there are strong 
benefits to pairing them with analysis of transcripts from the ICTY – they have 
shaped the discussion and made new understandings of court data possible, but 
have not yet taken on what this study has done. The pairing of these studies 
however, focuses the initial question, asking what ICTY transcripts can reveal 
about social process within the courtroom. A theory then emerges: these processes 
are reflections of the larger environment in which these crimes took place, and have 
now come to interact with the institutions that are trying to address them. While this 
refines the approach used in this study, it also introduces a larger problem. With 
such a volume of unexplored data, insights from the sociology of law, in addition to 
broader sociological and social psychological approaches, gave explanations of 
what certain evidence within the ICTY transcripts might mean, but did not help to 
find this evidence in the first place. Essentially, in asking about social process as 
evidence in transcripts, I was asking about language, and its functions in the legal 
environment. It became necessary to employ linguistic methods in the first instance 
(discussed in greater detail in section 3 below, as well as chapter 3), to locate 
patterns in the data, which could then be explained using insights from social 
psychology and discourse analysis, respectively.  
2.1 Scope and relevance 
While the context of this project is explained briefly in section 4 of this chapter 
(which discusses literature), there are two broader topics that relate to the 
background of this study that bear mentioning. The first is scope - the time period 
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examined, volume of data, regions, and limitations are all dealt with in depth in 
chapter 2 - but what drove the choice of the scope of this project is relevant here. 
The first thing to be refined was the amount of data examined. To examine all 
transcripts from the ICTY was neither a feasible nor desirable endeavour. The 
choice was made at the beginning to limit the transcripts analysed to those that 
concerned Bosnia and Herzegovina only, as this area provided the most diverse set 
of data. This region contained the greatest mixture of ethnic groups, the frequencies 
and types of conflicts varied, and as such the types of testimonies given 
surrounding the crimes committed in this region would allow for the largest 
variation of findings.  
The second topic is relevance. There is always a caveat with research that applies a 
new approach to new data: the fact that a particular approach has not been 
undertaken before does not offer a justification for its application. What assurance 
exists, therefore, that the patterns sought in this project would be in the first 
instance present, and in the second, significant? Once located and determined to be 
of significance, why would they be relevant? The first question is answered through 
the acceptance of several assumptions made by discourse analysis and cognitive 
linguistics. Primarily, if one defines ICTY transcripts as discourse, as this project 
does (taking Conley and O’Barr’s (Conley 2005) dual definition of discourse 
described in Chapter 3 of this thesis), then the ICTY transcripts contain within them 
the same evidence of struggles for dominance over ideas, relationships and histories 
that are present in interaction and speech generally. That is, to accept that discourse 
itself is worthy of study is to accept that the ICTY environment would give rise to 
interactions that, when analysed, reveal not only patterns of dominance, 
marginalisation, story, and memory, but that these patterns can provide new 
24 
 
perspectives in understanding the functions of international legal atmospheres and 
processes.  
3 Methods 
The demands of this data set required a two-fold approach. In the first instance, a 
method was needed that was dedicated to the analysis of language to ensure an 
investigation that could delve into the more specific aspects of language creation as 
a reflection of mental process. Cognitive linguistic (CL) methods, specifically the 
Discourse Space Theory (DST) of Paul Chilton (Chilton 2004, 2005) discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 3, provided the tools with which to do this. To use this 
method is to make several assumptions about language, the primary assumption 
being that when you examine language, you examine something that had its origins 
within the mind, or cognitive space. A secondary assumption made is that because 
of this, it is, in fact, possible to use language as evidence of the processes occurring 
within this cognitive space. While the more detailed reasons for the choice of this 
method are discussed in several subsequent chapters (namely chapters 2 and 3), the 
broader appeal for using these methods is that they deal with transcript data in a 
way that places primary importance on the individual – his or her mental processes 
as expressed in language, and how they place themselves relative to things outside 
this space, such as other people, histories, events, and sets of ideas. These issues are 
the broader points that sociology grapples with, and when looking at courtroom 
interactions concerning crimes of war, the way an individual articulates these issues 
indicates how they might be prioritised, understood, or contested. When these 
insights are placed into the context of research on the communities affected by this 
conflict, it is possible to see that patterns of interaction outside the courtroom may 
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be reflected, intentionally argued, or might even originate within the courtroom 
itself.  
The DST alone provides an excellent space in which to determine what patterns 
might be occurring in courtroom speech, and to analyse what this speech could 
mean for the individual uttering it. However, the nature of the legal environment 
differs from other speech events in that it is not only constantly interactive, but its 
functions depend on these interactions. The basic format of trials at the ICTY takes 
an adversarial model (though this is a matter of some debate in terms of actual 
practice (Danner 2005; Robinson 2000), with procedures allowing for interjection, 
cross-examination, and additional questions posed to witnesses by judges as well as 
lawyers. In this way, individuals encounter other individuals as well as institutional 
representatives, and these encounters then form the social processes highlighted by 
this research. As such, a second level of analysis was required to properly connect 
the insights from the DST analysis to the wider issues of the study of legal 
transcripts.  
Two disciplines in particular become relevant to placing the patterns highlighted by 
the DST approach into wider perspective: social psychology and discourse analysis. 
It is helpful to briefly explain the evolution of this project in greater detail, to 
reassert the claim that this project does not apply multiple methods on an impulsive 
basis, but employs a selected number of approaches with clear purpose. The initial 
organisation of this research paired only two methods – DST and social 
psychology. It took the same format as articulated above, namely that the DST 
methods would be deployed to locate significant patterns within the transcripts and 
explain them within the CL perspective. Social psychological applications would 
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add a layer of analysis that placed these findings within the broader scope of 
knowledge on ethnic conflict.  
I found that this approach worked well for analysis of victim testimony, but became 
less helpful when looking at testimonies of accused. This points to a significant 
conclusion on its own – if testimonies of victims paired more naturally with 
existing theories of groups and violence, and testimonies of accused did not easily 
relate to this body of work, then differences must exist between the two types of 
testimony that go beyond simple subject matter. When examining testimonies of 
accused, relationships between the individual and the court more plainly involved 
three subjects not commonly focused on by victims – power, politics, and the self. 
As such, the broader examination lent itself more readily to discourse analysis, 
where these types of relationships could be more thoroughly deconstructed. 
While the choice of these two schools of thought and the ways in which they are 
used will be discussed more fully in chapters 2 and 3, a basic description is helpful 
here in order to fully communicate the wider approach of the project. Social 
psychology is an effective bridge between the DST analysis and conflict studies 
generally, as many studies of ethnic conflict lean heavily on ideas such as group 
theory, placing emphasis on things like decision making patterns, identities, 
conflicting histories, and the mental states common to conflict. The use of social 
psychology in this research has therefore made it possible to take, for example, the 
DST analysis of expressions of self/other and the environments these expressions 
are described in, and explain them relative to theories of group violence. What this 
has meant, is that current social psychological understandings of certain aspects of 
ethnic conflict have been extended by this project, and some of their conclusions 
tested and refined. 
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Examining the DST results from a discourse perspective allows for interactions 
governed by power to be better analysed, and for larger ideas (such as how a 
speaker frames subjects of politics or war) interacting within the linguistic space to 
be examined alongside the effectiveness of explanations of behaviour when aimed 
at a court (or wider, political) audience. Subjects of self, while still relevant to 
discourse theory, make way for the trial of larger histories, with the individual as 
spokesperson rather than participant. Discourse theory allows for conceiving this 
type of language as more than just description, but as attempts to transmit power in 
the face of international evaluation, ultimately making statements on the way 
information is received, accepted, or rejected, and on whose terms this enterprise is 
undertaken. The use of phrases in this thesis such as ‘courtroom interaction’ and 
‘social process’ does not set limitations on the language used – that is to say, this is 
not speech that is simply between one individual and another, or even between 
multiple groups. The discussion occurs on this level in the first instance, but 
ultimately reaches larger legal and political structures, allowing for it to impact 
international political space well beyond the times and places of utterance. 
4 Literature review 
The ICTY was created as an ad hoc tribunal in 1993 by the United Nations Security 
Council as a response to wartime atrocities that were still ongoing in the region of 
the former Yugoslavia. It held a unique position in international politics as the first 
tribunal for crimes of war since the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials, and as such was 
subject to many issues in its infancy that its predecessors had not had to face. 
Among these problems were administrative and logistical problems in 
apprehending indictees across borders and effectively bringing them before the 
Tribunal, issues relating to what the scope and expectations for international justice 
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truly meant, and a constant re-defining of the crimes themselves and the evidence 
necessary for a guilty verdict (Akhavan 1998; Kerr 2004; Meernik 2003; Ramet 
2012; Robinson 2000; Scharf 1997; Williams 2002).  
The dialogue on issues the ICTY has faced and continues to face is ongoing and 
important (and relevant elements of it will be discussed in greater detail throughout 
this thesis), but this research aims to place itself in a new position relative to this 
discussion. While engaging with the existing literature, this project takes the view 
that there are additional insights in disciplines that have been previously left outside 
the scope of the study of legal transcripts. This, however, is not simply a call for 
interdisciplinarity. Care has been taken to ensure that the ideas brought together for 
this project are not only relevant to the study of these transcripts, but work with 
complementary sets of assumptions on the importance of language in the study of 
social process. The use of the literature for this project was in essence about finding 
and maintaining an effective balance in approach in order to allow information to 
frame and guide analysis, while still managing to engage with the platform from 
which it came. But more than this, this research has pointed out the necessity of 
creative thought to the more uncharted aspects of analysis. 
This has meant that the review of the literature has been undertaken in a way that 
best suits the intricacies of the analysis. Rather than as a stand-alone chapter, 
relevant literature is discussed in an integrated fashion, as the patterns each chapter 
highlights benefit most from being situated alongside important conclusions in 
related fields. Social psychological and discourse literature are discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3, but in-depth discussions of some of the more detailed concepts 
dealt with under these headings are found within the empirical chapters themselves. 
Chapter 4 explores expressions of remembering and forgetting, and therefore 
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engages with literature on memory studies, under the broader umbrella of social 
psychology. Chapter 5, which examines expressions of emotion within victim 
testimony, places this analysis among literature on emotion and courtroom 
testimony, discussing definitions of emotion and making space for the ever-growing 
discussion on the role emotion plays in courtroom storytelling. The literature 
examined in these chapters sits primarily under the heading of social psychology, as 
it situates the analysis drawn from this field within previous discussion and 
research. Chapter 6, which compares statements made in court by Slobodan 
Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj, includes a review of literature on self-representation 
before the ICTY, due to the fact that these two individuals chose to represent 
themselves. Biographical literature on the two accused is also discussed, but much 
of the focus is on discussion of discourse literature that defines audience, political 
speech, subjects of ‘self,’ and narrative power. Chapter 7, which compares the 
testimonies of three low ranking accused with three high ranking accused, discusses 
literature on language and accountability in courtroom discourse to better situate 
findings within the parameters of the goals of transitional justice.  
5 Outline 
The structure of this project is carefully designed to allow for the methods to be as 
revealing as possible without overwhelming the study. A certain amount of freedom 
is tempting, for example, to fully explore everything that might be present in the 
speech of the individuals in court, but this is limited for this project to fit a structure 
that is logical. The most straightforward way to structure testimony analysis as it 
applies to this project is therefore by acknowledging the adversarial nature of the 
court itself and assuming a similar format of giving equal space to two opposing 
parties. Before this is undertaken, a chapter defining the data itself forms the 
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beginning of the study. Key to examining these transcripts is a thorough 
understanding of what the data is and what it is not, how processes like translation 
and procedure influenced its creation, and how things like conceiving the court as a 
speech community change how data is perceived after its creation. Following this is 
the chapter on methods, which gives a more in-depth account of how analysis was 
conducted, and why it was done in this way. The first section of data analysis is 
undertaken in chapters 4 and 5, and examines testimonies of victims brought before 
the court by prosecution to testify to their experiences during the conflict. The 
second section, chapters 6 and 7, examine the speech of accused, both those 
representing themselves and those taking the stand as witnesses in their own 
defence.  
 5.1 Victim testimony 
The chapters concerning victim testimony analyse two phenomena found to be 
recurring when victims spoke in court. First, references to remembering and 
forgetting occurred frequently during interactions between these individuals and the 
court, which ultimately demonstrated that there are challenges occurring at the 
ICTY surrounding who has propriety over memories. In this chapter, testimony 
from four individuals is examined – two protected witnesses, named Witness B and 
Witness 87, and two witnesses appearing without protective measures, Emir 
Beganović and Edin Mrkalj. Witness B and Emir Beganović both experience 
different versions of forgetting being recommended to them, and placed in 
symbolic and collective language, suggesting that a witness’ own memories were 
seen by agents of the court as barriers for reconciliation. Related to this are the 
experiences of Witness 87 and Edin Mrkalj, whose testimonies are both marked by 
struggle of control over memory. These findings point to gaps in the study of 
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memory within the courtroom, demonstrating that control over remembering and 
forgetting is a contested concept when one is defined as ‘witness’.  
Chapter 5 also examines testimony from Edin Mrkalj, but compares the testimony 
of Amir Delić and Sifeta Susić, as well as protected witnesses, Witness D and 
Witness P. This chapter highlights expressions of emotion related during victim 
testimony as markers of struggles for power over narrative. Expressions of 
frustration, fear and difficulty are examined alongside us/them groupings, revealing 
that emotions like fear embedded within a memory often coincided with strong 
needs to express categories like time as well as ethnic boundaries. Ultimately, 
expressions of frustration and confusion surrounding interactions with agents of the 
court were found to be common, demonstrating that there are competing goals for 
witnesses and interrogators within the courtroom that act as evidence to the failure 
of expectations on the part of both. Again, problems with the definition of ‘witness’ 
are found to underlie several exchanges.  
 5.2 Accused testimony 
One large factor made the testimonies of accused stand out from the beginning of 
this research. The amount of power, either politically or militarily, changed the 
nature of testimony greatly. It would therefore be difficult, for example, to look at 
the testimony of someone who was a guard at a detention camp alongside the 
testimony of someone like Slobodan Milošević. As well as differing in personal 
power within the courtroom, the subjects of testimony would be vastly different. 
This is not to say, however, that a comparison between testimonies from individuals 
of high and low rank would be fruitless, and indeed this comparison yielded several 
significant insights. Statements made by Milošević are also important to analyse, 
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especially as these statements indicate that Milošević is not an outlier in the ways 
he approached the Tribunal – others have followed his lead.  
In Chapter 6 statements made in court by Slobodan Milošević are compared with 
those of Vojislav Šešelj, another accused who was also in a position of political 
influence, and who was also connected to crimes in the region in an indirect 
manner. Both also chose to represent themselves. Comparing these statements has 
demonstrated that two types of power were commonly expressed by these 
individuals – power over historical narrative, and power over court process. There 
are, however, significant differences in the ways in which these two express these 
types of power, and these differences ultimately demonstrate how the symbolic 
strength of the ICTY has changed in the eight years between the trials of these two 
men.  
Chapter 7 compares the statements of three accused of low rank with three accused 
of higher rank, looking at how explanations of one’s role in a conflict situation can 
vary when different amounts of power over others was held during the event in 
question. The concept of accountability is discussed, as it is often cited by the 
Tribunal as one of its aims, but is difficult to fully define. As yet, no studies of the 
in-court speech of accused have been presented to better understand how the 
concept of accountability functions in this setting, and this chapter aims to provide 
a starting point to this conversation. Comparisons show that low-ranking accused 
made categorisations regularly, but each did so differently, allowing insights into 
how these accused understood their own actions when held accountable. The 
speech of high-ranking accused had several interesting commonalities. Each was 
framed in a political or historical space, as compared to the self/other framing found 
among speech of low-ranking accused. The three high-ranking accused examined 
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also all use the same argument (that rank was their primary constraint in the 
decision-making process) but in slightly different ways that conformed to their 
respective roles. These findings are important in that they demonstrate that 
differences exist in how accountability is understood among accused, and that these 
differences tend to be found alongside differences in individual power, both past 
and (in the case of the high ranking accused) present.  
 5.3 Implications 
There are undoubtedly more significant patterns of interaction to be found in the 
transcripts analysed for this project, as there are certainly other transcripts left 
outside the scope of analysis that contain additional information that could add to 
understandings of courtroom interactions at the ICTY. Placing importance on these 
patterns is not to claim that other potential findings not covered here could be less 
significant, nor is it to insist that these analyses would transfer to other transcripts 
seamlessly. One key point to keep in mind when addressing the limitations of this 
type of research is that while similarities may exist across speech events, these 
similarities are in a broad sense only – they are useful for drawing comparisons 
across testimonies categorically, but testimonies are ultimately as unique as the 
individual giving them. This research does not claim that throughanalysis of 
utterance the experience of an individual is elucidated – this type of claim is 
assigned to research outside the reaching of this project, in the realm of interview. 
What is ultimately examined here is contained within the courtroom, and as such 
many might see this as a limitation for its usefulness. The court space, however, 
reflects such competing ideas of history, morality, and judgement that limiting 
studies to this environment and this environment only, allows for an emphasis to be 
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placed on the processes within that simply do not occur anywhere else, a fact that 
makes them all the more important to explore.  
6 Conclusion 
The importance of this type of study lies not only in expanding approaches to how 
we conceive courtroom speech, but also in the priority placed on the sociology of 
the court space. Transcripts from the ICTY can reveal a wealth of information 
about individuals and communities, giving the researcher a unique look at how 
things like memory, emotion, power, and concepts of ‘self’ function in the face of 
international judicial procedure. While trials themselves ultimately do have an end, 
emphasising the role archives can play in understanding the relationships and 
histories of those present during these trials will bring necessary attention to the fact 
that through recorded language, the processes of interaction within the courtroom 
are, in fact, ongoing.  
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Chapter Two - ICTY transcripts as data: Parameters, definitions, and issues 
1 Introduction 
The application of cognitive linguistic theories to transcripts from the ICTY, 
understood through theories of social psychology and discourse analysis, places 
high emphasis on the transcripts as data. As was explained earlier, examining in-
court communications in this way has highlighted significant patterns of interaction 
and explanation associated with the trials; most notably power relationships 
between the court, the accused, and the victims. It also demonstrates how people 
involved in situations of ethnic violence defined their boundaries and perceived 
threat, and how they make sense of their actions post-conflict. These are, of course, 
ideas that have been examined before that are frequently discussed in literature on 
ethnic violence relating to the former Yugoslavia, as well as on the ICTY in 
particular, which will be discussed in greater detail below. This research differs in 
that it applies methods in a new way to a new set of evidence, to re-examine 
concepts that other literature has defined and discussed previously.  
There are two reasons for an in-depth discussion on the data itself, rather than 
simply describing it while discussing methods. First, at the present time the ICTY 
transcripts have not yet been analysed in this way, and to undertake something so 
new on survey of unexplored data in a responsible fashion requires, in the first 
instance, detailed efforts to understand it – from the circumstances of its creation, to 
the politics of its existence and its place among other types of transcripts. While this 
is quite possibly a thesis on its own, my endeavour here is merely for clarity of 
approach and will therefore only focus on how these issues relate to the type of 
analysis I am undertaking. Therefore, the first half of this chapter will focus on the 
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ICTY transcripts as a data set, focusing on how the data is defined for this project 
(examining what it is, and what it is not), how cases were selected for this research, 
and examining the legal influences on the origins of the data. 
The second reason for a separate detailed discussion of the data is that there are 
discursive elements to these transcripts that need to be explored. Essentially, to 
examine in-court language and how it relates to people, histories, and the political 
court space is to examine its role in constructing post-conflict knowledge. This 
research, however, is only concerned with this construction of knowledge as it 
relates to the courtroom, asking how processes of in-court interaction contribute to 
the construction of post-conflict knowledge at the ICTY. This knowledge is not 
inert (as knowledge in a discourse sense never truly is), but is an active element in 
the way justice is not only fashioned, but perceived. Therefore, the second half of 
this chapter will focus on examining the data as discourse, looking at the court as a 
speech community, the narrative aspects of the data, the impact of power and the 
court space on testimonies, and what processes of translation at the ICTY mean for 
ICTY transcript analysis.  
It may seem that there is a large part of the discussion missing from these efforts to 
understand the data - namely, a description of the conflict that led to the creation of 
the tribunals, and thus the creation of the archives. This description is not missing, 
but has been undertaken in a way that is more complementary to the analyses 
offered by this research. As this project is not using the transcripts to determine 
regional histories, explore truth and falsehood relating to events, or to construct a 
general overview of the ICTY’s record of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, an 
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intensive recounting of the conflict itself (and subsequent review of the literature 
relating to it) would distract from the purposes of this research.
2
  
2 The ICTY and court literature: Bridging gaps 
Analyses of courtroom communications are both frequent and varied, particularly 
when it comes to psychological understandings of the way victims of trauma are 
treated in courtrooms (Barry 1991; Cotterill 2002, 2003; Edkins 2003; Ehrlich 
2001; Galatolo 2006; Wodak 1981; Woodbury 1984). There has been interesting 
work done to determine whether or not victim testimony is reliable in 
circumstances of trauma (Bollingmo 2008; Fujii 2010; Kaufman 2003), and 
expansive work done on the connection between trauma, individual memory, and 
collective memory (Bollingmo 2008; Caruth 1995, 1996; Christianson 1996; 
Halbwachs 1992; Kaufman 2003; Savelsberg 2007). There are also several 
interesting studies of power and language in court discourse (Barry 1991; Bennett 
1981; Cotterill 2003; Danet 1980; Gumpertz 1982; Wodak 1981). This body of 
literature reveals several significant things that concern this project. First, it 
signifies that there are quite a few studies of legal transcripts looking to understand 
one or two specific concepts (for example, trauma and memory), and second, that 
the platform developed by previous research is ready to be expanded upon by 
opening up the study of legal transcripts and adding to it the study of international 
criminal tribunal transcripts.  
The majority of ICTY literature examines the court’s political, functional, legal and 
symbolic nature, as well as past military and diplomatic strategy. There are several 
                                                          
2
 For different understandings of the events leading up to and during the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, see Oberschall, Silber and Little, Thomas, Williams (Oberschall 2000; Silber 1996; 
Thomas 2003; Williams 2004).    
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useful studies that take a surveying look at the evolution of the ICTY and its 
contribution to new understandings of justice, such as Rachel Kerr’s book on the 
ICTY (Kerr 2004), and David Hirsh’s book that takes a more comparative look at 
international criminal tribunals and their relationship to what he terms a more 
‘cosmopolitan’ justice (Hirsh 2003). There is also a large body of literature that 
successfully navigates problems the ICTY has had during its lifetime, such as 
issues with completing trials in a timely fashion (many trials have lasted several 
years), issues allowing accused to represent themselves, problems of corruption and 
how these were dealt with, and the challenges faced by an ambitious completion 
strategy (Barasin 2011; Boas 2011; Gibson 2008; Gordy 2012; Gow 2014; 
Olusanya 2005; Peskin 2006; Raab 2005; Ramet 2012; Tournaye 2003). This 
literature demonstrates that studies of the ICTY have moved on from the more 
simplistic debates on concepts like victor’s justice and ‘show trials’, and have 
advanced a more intricate set of discussions as to what processes of international 
criminal justice are realistically capable of, and how they should be aiming to 
change.  
More than this, there is an important list of works that tackle the complicated 
relationship the court has with the fragmented societies struggling to place 
themselves within conflicted histories, rhetoric, and political spaces that are still 
under dispute (Campbell 2012; Gordy 2003, 2013) as well as significant research 
on the intersection between the ICTY and politics (Akhavan 1998; Bass 2000; 
Ivković 2006; Steflja 2010). Missing from this literature, however, are studies that 
look at testimonies at the ICTY, as well as studies that look at ICTY archives as a 
source of data for understanding a great deal more about the processes of justice 
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there. As mentioned before, this project seeks to draw attention to these gaps, while 
adding to this literature.  
3 Defining the data 
The ICTY transcripts are a digital public record of proceedings, witness testimony, 
and exhibits relating to cases of individuals tried before the court for crimes relating 
to violations of the laws and customs of war, crimes against humanity, grave 
breaches of the Geneva Convention, and genocide. The court was established in 
1993 by a resolution passed by the UN Security Council (Resolution 827, UN 
Security Council, 1993), the legality of which was tested repeatedly through 
appeals brought before the ICTY (Akhavan 2008; Hirsh 2003; Kerr 2004), and 
ultimately upheld.  
The Tribunal has sought from the beginning to place emphasis on the public nature 
of these trials, while still undertaking protective measures for witnesses when 
necessary and therefore closing the court to the public at times it deems appropriate. 
This emphasis on public record has been the driving factor behind the accessible 
nature of the documents related to the tribunals, which is an important element in 
the definition of this data. The court’s contribution to historical narrative becomes 
much more solid when the open elements of the data are reflected upon. The 
transcripts are accessible through the internet, and through the website members of 
the public can browse not only summaries of court proceedings and transcripts, but 
video of the tribunals, copies of photos and maps submitted to evidence, and 
summaries of histories of the atrocities region by region in an interactive map, all in 
English, French, B/C/S (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian), Albanian, and Macedonian. 
Members of the public can and often do attend court proceedings in The Hague, and 
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their presence is actively encouraged. The data at the ICTY is not a passive archive, 
but has evolved to fit itself into social media (such as Twitter and Facebook) to 
continue to emphasise its public role, with live updates provided constantly. This 
changes the resonance of the narrative, as the approach of the ICTY seems to be 
one where atrocities are not simply addressed, decided, and closed, but an on-going 
discussion, regardless of case status.  
This nature of the data has changed several things that are relevant to the study of 
court discourse. The concept of audience has become less definable, as the ICTY 
data can now speak to an internet audience directly, making the traditional 
communication through press and other media a parallel but different mouthpiece. 
The spectator is not limited to the courtroom, and not limited to those connected to 
the cases at hand, but stretches to include those in the public who are simply 
interested. In some ways, this behaviour incorporates the philosophies behind 
international humanitarian law into the daily workings of the ICTY – it operates on 
a global responsibility to be interested in the human element of conflict, assigning 
the upkeep of justice to everyone, and communicates its power through this 
outreach to the wider global community. The ICTY has not articulated the aims of 
its internet presence in this way specifically, so one might conclude that the benefits 
and drawbacks of this type of communication simply parallel the ways international 
institutions are evolving in the digital age. The fact remains that the ‘audience’ (a 
concept to be more fully explored in chapter 6) of the ICTY has not remained static 
since its creation in 1993. 
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3.1 Case selection 
This project will not examine every case before the ICTY. I am seeking out 
patterns, and looking for new understandings to add to the study of ethnic violence, 
and this can be done without examining every document produced by the court. As 
I am not proposing that my findings are the only relevant patterns in these 
transcripts, merely facets of human interaction that I believe require further study in 
this context, it is not presumptuous to state that a sampling of a variety of cases is 
enough to demonstrate whether or not my findings have anything new to add to this 
discussion. Therefore, this project focuses on cases relating to Bosnia, and will only 
venture into data related to other regions when the actions of the individual being 
tried have been linked to multiple regions. Although other regions in the former 
Yugoslavia might benefit from further study along these lines, it would be too large 
a data set to deal with responsibly. The choice to focus on transcripts relating to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was made due to the fact that violence there involved a 
mixture of ethnic groups, the types of violence differed, and the periods in which it 
occurred varied. In short, the types of violence that occurred in other parts of the 
former Yugoslavia during the wars also happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
whereas there were other areas in which it did not vary to this degree.  
One significant factor in looking exclusively at court data for this type of study is 
that the corpus of text being analysed exists as the result of a specific legal process. 
The cases brought before the ICTY are not tried simply because incidences 
occurred, nor are all incidences of violence brought or recorded before the ICTY. 
Whether or not a case comes to trial depends on a variety of circumstances, 
including strategic and evidentiary availabilities, as well as precedent, to simply 
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name a few.
 3
 The study of these transcripts is not assuming that all events in these 
conflicts have been addressed by the court, or that the court’s record is the 
exclusive reality of all incidences of crimes against humanity, violations of the laws 
and customs of war, and genocide in the region. This study accepts that the court’s 
record of events contributes to the transitional justice narrative, rather than creates 
it. 
This is not a problem that should impact findings in any large way. Though one 
might argue that cases brought before the ICTY for strategic or procedural reasons 
might all have specific similarities (and indeed, some of these similarities may also 
be in the type of data that they lack), the focus here is on sociological and linguistic 
issues that previous research has proven exist in all speech regardless of how or 
why it came into existence (Chilton 2005; Croft 2004; Evans 2006; Zlatev 2007).
4
  
The mechanics of case selection for this project were relatively straightforward, 
with many of the cases chosen at random (the exceptions being the comparison of 
Slobodan Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj - the list of those representing themselves 
is relatively small - at the time of writing the cases of many other self-representers, 
like Radovan Karadžić, were still ongoing). I took the simple idea of comparing 
testimonies of victims and accused, and before expanding it to the more detailed 
structure the thesis now contains, I chose a test case. The case chosen was that of 
Kvočka et al, which was chosen at random from a list of completed cases in which 
the accused was included as one of the witnesses. I conducted a manual reading of 
testimonies, again selected at random (though admittedly the selection was made 
slightly less random due to the fact that I was using a list of only public testimonies, 
                                                          
3
 For a discussion of charging strategy at the ICTY, see Coté, Danner (Côté 2005; Danner 2005).  
4
 This is not to say that materiality is not important, however.  Issues related to these ideas are 
discussed in section 5.1 of this chapter. 
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an issue more fully addressed in section 5.3 in this chapter).
5
 Other parameters that 
narrowed the list of available cases were: 1) case status (I chose only completed 
cases), 2) the variety of available witness testimonies (I attempted to choose cases 
in which larger groups of victims testified, rather than one or two individuals, as 
there would be a larger sample of varied text in these cases. For chapter 7 in 
particular, I needed a list of cases that included testimony of the accused on his or 
her behalf, and compiled a list of both high and low ranking individuals to choose 
from according to the definitions of rank that I set out in chapter 7.  
The questions I brought to the data were the broad research questions articulated in 
the introductory chapter of this thesis, namely – what do applications of cognitive 
linguistic methods reveal about testimonies at the ICTY? The findings from the test 
case are discussed in chapter 3, but relevant to describing the data is the fact that the 
my reading these testimonies began to reveal a set of patterns that focused future 
analysis. Through Kvočka, the four main chapters of this thesis arose (on the 
subjects of memory and emotional expressions of victims, and power relationships 
as apparent in accused testimony), narrowing the approach and allowing the project 
to take on a more reasonable format. The resulting chapters all expand upon a 
different idea and its related patterns, but are all still part of the same story, and thus 
inter-relate.  
It is important to make clear that not all transcripts from selected cases were 
examined. Some, like status conferences and procedural hearings, were left out due 
to the lack of information relating to the crimes themselves. There would be little to 
no sociological or linguistic information gleaned from hearings consisting entirely 
                                                          
5
 Examined at this stage were the testimonies of one victim, one individual also working at the camp 
where the accused worked, the testimony of the wife of the accused Miroslav Kvočka, and the 
testimony of Kvočka himself.   
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of legal discussions on issues such as hearing dates or procedural arrangements. For 
example, the case of Duško Tadić (analysed in chapters 4 and 7), was the first case 
brought before the ICTY and dealt at length with several questions relating to the 
jurisdiction of the court itself (and ultimately whether or not the court had the right 
to make decisions determining its own jurisdiction) (Kerr 2004). While this has 
important implications for the future of international law, a large portion of the 
transcripts are dedicated to discussion of legal issues unrelated to the specific 
actions of Mr. Tadić, and as such, only those pertinent to this project were 
examined. For similar reasons, I have also decided not to look at cases relating to 
Srebrenica for this project.  
It will be necessary to explain for the reader the incidences relating to the cases 
studied. Each case involves the actions of an individual (or multiple individuals, 
tried together) that are rooted in time and place, and the situations surrounding 
these actions are always relevant. They are also, however, very specific, and best 
described within the chapters on the cases to which they relate. The best way to 
truly understand the patterns in the transcripts is to compare transcripts from 
communities where there are obvious differences in circumstances and 
relationships, and the choice of cases was broadly guided with this intention. The 
overview of cases examined, the type of testimonies analysed, and the region(s) the 
cases related to can be seen in the table below. 
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Table 1 – Case overview 
Chapter Case Type of testimony Region concerned 
3 Kvočka et al Victim and prosecution 
witnesses 
Prijedor (Omarska camp) 
4 Kvočka et al Victim  Prijedor (Omarska camp) 
4 Tadić Victim  Prijedor 
4 Kunarac et al Victim Foča 
5 Kvočka et al Victim Prijedor (Omarska camp) 
5 Stakić Victim Prijedor 
5 Krajišnik Victim Bosnia and Herzegovina 
6 Milošević Accused Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Croatia 
6 Šešelj Accused Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Vojvodina 
7 Kvočka et al Accused Prijedor (Omarska camp) 
7 Tadić Accused Prijedor 
7 Landžo Accused Konjić (Čelebići camp) 
7 Blaškić Accused Lašva Valley 
7 Krajišnik Accused Bosnia and Herzegovina 
7 Krnojelac Accused Foča 
 
4 Examining court discourse 
It is impossible to examine this set of data and ignore the fact that the ways in 
which it was created were constantly changing, difficult, and unique. Certain cases 
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were heavily political (like the Milosevic trial), some were momentous in terms of 
establishing precedent in the field of international law and the authority of the court 
itself (like the Tadić case), and much of the courtroom discussions reflect these 
elements. The ICTY itself has evolved over time, and much of what was acceptable 
in court at its inception is no longer tolerated, and the seriousness and attention paid 
to the overall workings of the court on a day to day basis has been refined 
(Akhavan 1998; Bass 2000; Hagan 2003; Hirsh 2003; Kerr 2004; O'Connell 1999). 
In addition, as part of these processes, the words being spoken and recorded in the 
courtroom reflected additional relationships that shaped (and can continue to shape) 
the ways in which information is recounted and explained, and knowledge created. 
 4.1 The court as a speech community 
Examining ICTY data linguistically is in many ways accepting that the court itself 
is essentially a speech community. As a speech community, the existence of the 
court is evaluative in nature, and there are therefore certain overt linguistic 
uniformities that are built-in (such as certain common uses of legal jargon, and 
methods of explanation that are fashioned through an atmosphere heavy with legal 
process). According to sociolinguist William Labov, ‘members [of a speech 
community] share social evaluation by ranking performances relative to each other’ 
(Labov 1972). This allows for an atmosphere that produces performances 
(discussed in greater detail in chapter 6), as well as hierarchies.  
The speech acts of those on the stand therefore do not exist independently, but as 
part of this larger evaluative structure. There is evidence that courtroom speech is 
commonly co-constructed – that is, although there is the feeling that individuals on 
the stand are giving an unbroken account of events, these events are in fact created 
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not only by the witness or accused, but through the interjections of the judges and 
lawyers as well, however routine these interjections may seem (Woodbury 1984). 
Looking at the court as a speech community has interesting implications on the 
study of legal transcripts, most notably because of what this implies about power 
relationships within the court. There are several studies on how power relationships 
play out between legal professionals and those on trial or present as witnesses 
(Barry 1991; Bennett 1981; Galatolo 2006; Walker 1987; Wodak 1981), which is 
all the more relevant when looking at the challenges witnesses who have been 
through trauma face when taking the stand (Ehrlich 2001). Critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) is often used to describe the process through which the court 
constructs and/or defines facts and events (Atkinson 1979; Bennett 1981), and 
although CDA is not at the forefront of methods used for this project, it is important 
to keep it in mind as an alternative similar way of attempting to contextualise the 
recurring evidence of power struggles in court.  
4.2 Turn-by-turn interactions and question types 
Inherent in court processes is a phenomenon that Atkinson and Drew refer to as 
‘turn-type pre-allocation’, which means that because the freedom to speak is 
controlled by pre-existing roles, the potential for what can be said by each 
individual is constrained (Atkinson 1979). It is not uncommon for elements of 
event construction to be included in the questions asked (Gibbons 2003), and while 
measures are taken by the court to curtail this type of practice, it is by no means 
universally controlled (objections to ‘leading’ questions control some pre-
construction of events, but only where it is legally significant. There are linguistic 
elements in some questions that are contributing to the construction of an event that 
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are not relevant to legal process and therefore left to contribute to court discourse). 
This is not to say that the answers to these questions do not have any ability to 
inform court narrative. Indeed, it is frequently the case that answers given can in 
fact ‘re-calibrate’ the question (Matoesian 2005).  
Also relevant to this discussion are studies of how court strategies influence 
individual responses. Oxburgh et al refer to this as ‘the question of question types’, 
and this can play a role in the way responses are constructed (Gnisci 2004; Oxburgh 
2010). There is extensive literature examining how power relationships are 
expressed within the courtroom through questioning tactics, and there is evidence 
that questioning tactics can influence witness responses (Bülow-møller 1991; 
Ehrlich 2001; Erikson 1978; Loftus 1981; Matoesian 1993; O'Barr 2001; Penman 
1987; Svongoro 2012; Woodbury 1984). The important issue here is that not only 
can questions influence the answers given (even when not considered ‘leading’ by 
the judge), but there are additional implications on narrative. Most pertinent to this 
research is the idea that the interrogator can, through questioning and various other 
verbal forms of courtroom control (such as a judge’s limitations on the length and 
subject of testimony, and legal decisions on what can and cannot be included), be a 
strong contributor to narrative, or even the primary author of an event (Conley 
1990; Ewick 1995; Philips 1998). This is not, however, something that makes the 
data for this project suspect, but is an additional aspect of its creation that needs to 
be kept in mind. The discursive ramifications of these issues are discussed in 
greater detail in the chapters in which evidence of these practices arise. However, it 
can be stated at this point that the choice of the methods used – DST analysis 
alongside theories of social psychology and discourse analysis – enables these 
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issues to be seen and understood in ways that give greater insight into how the 
linguistic relationships between witness and interrogator function. 
4.3 Using legal data for non-legal research 
The symbolic purposes behind the gathering of the ICTY data cannot be ignored, 
especially as evidence was heard against accused that were yet to be apprehended. 
These were not trials in absentia, but were forums conducted to allow available 
information to be added to official records and give a platform for witnesses to tell 
their stories (Kerr 2004). This is apparent at the outset, and the legal records 
existing for wider purposes is spoken to in the opening statement by Justice 
Goldstone, who states that that they exist as, 
(…) permanent judicial record ... of the horrendous crimes that have been 
committed in the former Yugoslavia ... attributing guilt to individuals [and] 
avoiding the attribution of collective guilt to any nation or ethnic group 
(Opening Statement by Justice Goldstone, Prosecutor v. Nikolić , IT-94-2, 9 
October 1995) (Kerr 2004: 101). 
 
Because of this, the legal edge to the directions of questioning is not always a 
dominating presence, which may prove to be both positive and negative when 
analysing the transcripts to locate patterns not being directly sought out. The 
important thing to note, however, is that the legal drive behind questioning in the 
courtroom does not mean that responses are necessarily coloured by law. The way 
an individual interprets a question and chooses to respond is often significant in 
itself. As will be explained and demonstrated in chapter 4, the reaction an 
individual has to a line of questioning, however unexpected, can be a statement 
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about the individual’s experience and opinion of the legal process they are a part of 
(or feel marginalised by). For the sake of this research, the motivations and legal 
agendas present in what is essentially being treated as a sociological data set are an 
integral part in a well-rounded analysis of it.  
That being said, what are the implications of using legal data for non-legal 
research? There are serious gaps in the literature here, as most scholars have 
addressed either technical questions of sociolinguistics and applied them to legal 
data (Gumperz 1982) without addressing the issue of legal agendas behind the 
existence of the data, or they have addressed the legal agendas with aims for 
political interpretation, but have gone no further (Danet 1980; Hirsh 2003; Kerr 
2004; O'Connell 1999). Although there are certainly symbolic and political 
purposes behind the creation of the ICTY, there is also a functioning legal system at 
the heart of this data.  
The reason I highlight this issue is that there are factors at work here that might be 
seen to impact conclusions, but are in fact ever-present elements of exchanges in 
language. Gumperz’s work cited above touches on the issue of instantaneous 
interpretations in courtroom settings, but it is Trinch (2010) whose comments on 
interpretive ideologies shed light on the issue of how court dialogue can change 
based on what people think they are saying, and what those questioning them 
understand their motives to be. She deals with the idea that the listener hears things 
from the narrative that relate to cultural context. She refers to this gap in the 
literature, and explains, 
 
Norms of interpretation are the criteria that are intimately and 
incriminatingly connected to beliefs people have about power. However, 
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much of the sociolinguistic analysis of narrative has focused on the 
narrator’s purpose for telling and has largely ignored what listeners perceive 
as the narrator’s purpose (Trinch 2010: 183).  
 
‘What listeners perceive as the narrator’s purpose’ is likely, in the case of the 
ICTY, what is helping the legal teams form their questions when interrogating 
witnesses and experts. This in turn impacts the information shared. Since I am 
placing importance on communicative processes in this research (which is taken as 
a given when using linguistic methods), it would be a failing to ignore the fact that 
communicative processes were functioning within the courtroom, impacting the 
way information was presented, what was shared, and what was not. It would be 
overly ambitious to assert that my methodological design could decode all 
intentions in the courtroom, but this is not the purpose or focus of my research. 
However, as this has been expressed by sociolinguists as a factor impacting 
information, I highlight it here as something of which I have aimed to be aware.  
 
As such, the more in-depth interpretation is that this relates to linguistic ‘semiotic 
chains’, which are chains of communication that focus on cultural perspectives and 
symbols (Agha 2007). Agha states that, ‘semiotic regularities that appear as 
Durkheimean social facts in one locale have a sociohistorical existence mediated by 
patterns of communicative behaviour that connect many locales to each other (Agha 
2007: 205).’ This is essentially a description of elements in metalinguistics, ‘the 
study of the relationship between languages and the other cultural systems they 
refer to (Agha 2007: 205)’. This technical side is important because it draws upon a 
more collective idea of communication, namely that culture has a function in 
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linguistic expression. This idea has been applied to the former Yugoslavia more 
broadly by scholars looking to explain shifts in narrative (Guzina 2003; Ingrao 
2009). In the context of my research, this means that it is possible for individuals, 
when describing actions, to be referring back to these types of patterns without 
being aware.  
An important distinction should be made here, to avoid connection with certain 
perspectives of study. When talking about ethnic conflict in a broader sense, there 
are common theories that are widely discussed that this research, while 
acknowledging a contribution, will not rely upon for a variety of reasons. Because 
my research accepts the notion that behaviours are complex and changing, the 
primordialist angle suggested by Kaplan is rejected (Kaplan 1993), as it assumes 
that cultural identities are static and ignores the impact of perception on shifting 
norms. Instrumentalist viewpoints are also not to be leant upon heavily, due to the 
fact that they assume individuals will have a clear-cut idea of their own ethnic 
loyalties (Oberschall 2000). To state that my research accepts a connection between 
culture and language does not assert that these connections are fixed, 
predetermined, or unchanging.  
Anthony Oberschall paints in interesting picture of the interaction between fear and 
what he calls crisis discourse (Oberschall 2000). He cites interesting examples of 
communication theory to draw attention to the way the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia was escalated among people who often had no previous grievances. In 
particular, he describes how the two-step flow of communication (Wright 1959) 
breaks down in situations of increased fear. Under normal circumstances, people 
subject media reports to their own forms of verification, because they have access 
to a variety of forms of information. Linguists refer to this as a ‘chain of 
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authentication’ (Agha 2007), and Oberschall describes its breakdown in the 
Yugoslav context through his discussions with several people involved. He states, 
According to several informants, when politics became contentious, it 
strained friendships across nationality. Either one avoided discussing 
politics and public affairs with a friend in order to remain friends, or one 
stopped being friends, and turned for discussion of such matters to a fellow 
ethnic, with whom agreement was likely. In either case, exchange of 
political views across ethnic boundaries is impoverished. Each group 
becomes encapsulated; dialogue and understanding cease (Oberschall 2000: 
993).  
I draw attention to this work here because the ICTY is in many ways attempting to 
re-establish these chains of authentication, and attach culpability to those who acted 
violently as a result of previous ‘encapsulation’. This becomes very relevant when 
looking at the testimonies and statements of high profile individuals like Slobodan 
Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj. Those who were instrumental in solidifying ethnic 
boundaries are often prone to use ‘us/them’ delineations in court, demonstrating not 
only their entrenchment in ethnic divides, but also ardent attempts to redefine terms 
like ‘victim’.  
This, however, is not the only aspect of power in the courtroom that is worthy of 
study, and the ICTY transcripts demonstrate other important issues of power within 
the courtroom on which discussions are far less frequent. Notably, the power the 
court environment exerts in its physical sense, and the impact this could be having 
on language is something touched on briefly but is rarely a focal point. It seems to 
be something of an immeasurable set of details to scholars, and comes up primarily 
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in conjunction with discussions of audience, and the experiences of victims (White 
2008), and as such details of this idea tend to be found more frequently in the more 
anecdotal works of noted novelists, such as Slavenka Drakulić (They Would Never 
Hurt a Fly) and Antjie Krog (Country of my Skull) (Drakulić 2004; Krog 1998). 
This issue is something that does come up in the language studied for this project, 
and examples are given in chapter 5, on emotion and the victim-witness. 
Additionally, there are examples of types of power that judges impress upon the 
courtroom and the witness, and the way this is evident in language is discussed in 
chapters 4 and 5, building on work about the victim-witness done by Dembour and 
Haslam (Dembour 2004).  
4.4 The psychological impact of legal testimony  
How does the psychological impact of testifying about traumatic events influence 
the reliability of the data? There is a lot of interesting work on this subject from 
psychologists, but little of this has to do with international criminal tribunals (most 
work on this has been done in cases of domestic violence, and on the testimony of 
children in the courtroom). One exception is Antjie Krog, who deals with the 
subject in her book on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa 
(Krog 1998). On the subject of memory, she quotes psychologist Ria Kotze, who 
was treating famed torturer Jeffrey Benzien. Krog recalls several issues with 
Benzien’s testimony, primarily relating to his inability to recall the specifics of 
certain events. While the question remains open regarding whether this inability is 
just simple denial, Kotze brings up the issue of memory when testifying. There is 
memory loss due to one’s own will to forget, involuntary memory loss due to 
trauma, and memory loss that is specific to the courtroom. Krog states, 
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But there is also a third kind of memory loss and that occurs when you 
testify in public. Kotze says Benzien’s stress levels were so compounded by 
having to testify and his anxiety about how this might affect the last bits of 
life he has with his wife and children that it is quite possible he remembered 
even less than usual. (Krog 1998: 99).  
How will these types of revelations impact research here? As stated earlier, it is not 
the goal of my research to verify evidence discussed in the court, but to look at the 
significance of how things are discussed. Though the court has in effect already 
done all it can to verify information, there is the added complication that lawyers 
involved are strategic and selective about what information is presented. But 
ultimately, the court space still plays a role of authentication not through truth-
finding, but through the building of institutionally situated social memory. As 
David Hirsh states with regard to the cosmopolitan nature of these trials,  
Courts receive particular and contradictory testimony; they act upon this 
according to their own rules, and produce a single narrative. Cosmopolitan 
courts receive nationally particularistic narratives as testimony that they 
transform into an authoritative cosmopolitan social memory. (Hirsh 2003: 
142). 
The reason the psychological impacts of testifying described by Krog are relevant 
to my research is that they are in fact a contributor to this single narrative of which 
Hirsh speaks. With particular reference to the mechanics of my research, this can 
impact how sociolinguistic methods play out. It is important to remember that the 
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single narrative produced is not instantaneous, nor is it internally consistent.
6
 The 
examination of evidence, testimony, cross-examination, and questioning are 
processes of verification that do not reveal themselves clearly or quickly. To 
effectively comment on linguistic patterns drawn from expressions of those 
speaking to the ICTY, these memory gaps may initially block sociolinguistic 
indicators of patterns in certain places, only to be more effectively revealed later 
(either through corrections, other testimony, or the presentation of physical 
evidence etc.). This is one reason that I have decided against using software to 
examine transcripts, as it is likely impossible to instruct technology to look for 
things when it is unknown exactly how they will be expressed until they are 
encountered.  
5 Translation  
To state that translation played an essential role in the construction of these 
transcripts may seem an overly basic way of referring to a process that allowed 
proceedings to take place at all, but there is a balance between appreciating the 
importance this process had to the data itself while avoiding an overstatement of its 
place within this research. There are two significant questions to ask regarding 
translation that are important here. First, how might translation impact findings? 
And second, how might processes of simultaneous translation in the courtroom lead 
to knowledge creation? 
Transcripts are available in English, French and B/C/S (Bosnian, Croatian, 
Serbian), with a growing number also bring translated into Albanian. The court, 
however, was conducted in English, with participants wearing headphones through 
                                                          
6
 This research takes the viewpoint that court narrative of this kind is rarely internally consistent, as 
contradictory verdicts and reversals through appeal can and do occur. 
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which translations were provided. While many of the linguistic indicators I sought 
out were simple words that are difficult to mistranslate (we, them, could, etc.), 
context and accuracy are still important. To test whether or not translation was an 
issue for my study, I compared sections of transcripts in both languages to 
determine if the patterns found do in fact transcend language barriers. This was, 
unfortunately, only possible for the excerpts used from Krajišnik. The results of this 
comparison can be found in Appendix 1, which demonstrated that while 
discrepancies do occur, these do not change the findings of this project. Transcript 
translation at the ICTY is an ongoing project, and the ICTY faces a large issue with 
this data. Transcripts were created in English, recording the translations made 
within the courtroom rather than the first responses made in B/C/S or Albanian. 
Therefore, the B/C/S versions available through the ICTY were created much later, 
many as part of a translation project undertaken by the court in 2011-12. That being 
said, the majority of transcripts still exist only in English.  
A thorough linguistic investigation was done by Mišković-Luković and Dedaić 
(Mišković-Luković 2012) into the uses of odnosno during ICTY testimonies, and 
the problems that arose in its translation. This work looks at issues of the choices 
translators at the ICTY have in the meanings they ascribe to words, and their 
findings point to purposeful neutrality used in translation that denotes measurable 
attempts away from direct translation. Not only are there issues of discrepancies 
that arise during the process of translation at the ICTY, there are marked choices in 
which translations can be used when multiples may be available. This is not, 
however, a major setback to this research. Indeed, the transcripts remain as the 
primary record of processes going on in the court, as the simultaneous translations 
informed court discourse due to their immediacy – that is, a B/C/S response was 
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translated to English, which then often informed the interrogator’s construction of 
his or her next response. This was done repeatedly and constantly. The courtroom 
environment, therefore, was informed through translation over and over again, and 
the perspective of this project is that the simultaneous translations found therein 
were not impediments to creating transcripts, simply an additional part of them. 
Section 5.2 below will examine this idea further, in light of ideas initiated by the 
work of Foucault on translation and the materiality of discourse.  
On the subject of translation, there are a few more points to be made. First, it is 
important to note that simultaneous translation taking place in the courtroom can at 
certain times signal patterns where there are none, due to dialogue surrounding 
technical issues with misunderstandings. This is one reason that I have chosen to 
analyse these transcripts without using software. Words expressing confusion may 
be highlighted by software, and rather than point to past thought processes among 
individuals describing events, they may refer only to gaps in in-court 
communications (for example, when looking for expressions of fear, and searching 
for uses of ‘afraid’, the most common usages are in sentences like, ‘I’m afraid your 
microphone isn’t working.’). This is one area where the technology cannot be 
refined to avoid such occurrences.  
To make sure that the decision to exclude the use of linguistic analysis software 
was the right one for this study, I tested the use of one type of software, WMatrix 
(developed for use at Lancaster Universty), on transcripts chosen for my test case, 
Kvocka et al. I discovered that while the software is effective at highlighting 
repeated word usages in most circumstances, what this tends to do in witness 
transcripts is simply give line by line highlights in what is essentially consecutive 
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lines of text, as seen below when searching for uses of knew as an indicator for the 
role of information in decision-making processes:  
Figure 1: WMatrix software sample text 
 
While this brings together uses of the word in a comparative setting, it fragments 
the narratives at work within the testimony itself, as well as makes the tracking of 
statements made by witness and interrogator harder to do. In addition, this research 
project leans heavily on the idea that there are important elements within 
testimonies that are currently unknown and in need of discovery, and therefore 
attempting to tell the software to seek out certain things that are better found 
through general reading would fall to close to guesswork and potentially harm 
findings.  
A positive note on the subject of translations is that there is evidence in linguistic 
research that patterns transcend language barriers. George Lakoff states in reference 
to effects shown among categorizations of types of causation, ‘these effects are 
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relatively uniform across languages.’ (Lakoff 1987: 54). This statement relates 
Eleanor Rosch’s work on clustering and causation (Rosch 1973, 1975), a type of 
linguistic study that looks to identify levels of causation through language, but is 
applicable to this research as well.  
 5.1 Translation and the materialities of discourse 
The complicated relationship between the individuals speaking in court and the 
nature of translation at the ICTY creates an interesting discussion on how this might 
shape the materiality of this discourse. The term ‘materiality’ as discussed by 
Foucault (Foucault 1972), refers to the myriad conditions which make the existence 
of discourse possible. This is to ask, what had to occur in order for a statement to be 
heard, read, recorded or repeated? Behind this question lie several large discussions 
which Foucault vigorously undertakes in much of his work, but it is his dealing 
with it in The Archaeology of Knowledge that is of particular importance here. This 
is primarily because Foucault deals with the subject of simultaneous translation 
directly in his chapter entitled, ‘The Enunciative Function’, and the conclusions 
drawn there are embraced by this thesis.  
First, there is importance in discussing the philosophical underpinnings of the 
materialities of ICTY transcripts as a data set because of the unique properties 
involved in their creation discussed above. Foucault takes up these issues, stating: 
Yet the materiality plays a much more important role in the statement: it is 
not simply a principle of variation, a modification of the criteria of 
recognition, or a determination of linguistic sub-groups. It is constitutive of 
the statement itself: a statement must have a substance, a support, a place, 
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and a date. And when these requisites change, it too changes identity 
(Foucault 1972: 101).  
From a Foucauldian perspective, the relevant question to ask here is, how does the 
act of translation in this particular courtroom leave the identity of the transcripts 
open to modification? Essentially, what changes are being made in the act of 
creating these records that might make the data itself something different? And if 
translation is in fact doing this, what merit would there be in studying the responses 
made in court as responses, rather than as translations?  
Foucault argues that the question of original statements and their simultaneous 
translations can be taken as a single statement if there is agreement between the 
content of the information and the uses it is put to. Again, Foucault explains this 
best, 
The rule of materiality that statements necessarily obey is therefore of the 
order of the institution rather than of the spatio-temporal localisation; it 
defines possibilities of reinscription and transcription (but also thresholds 
and limits), rather than limited perishable individualities (Foucault 1972: 
103).  
The translation employed within the courtroom, while it may be contested or 
highlighted by those taking part in proceedings, is ultimately consistent with the 
institution’s uses of it, particularly because in this case it makes the institution in 
question (the ICTY) possible.  
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5.2 Meta-data  
The role of meta-data is also worth mentioning here, especially as this has been 
looked at in terms of its role in determining the truth in witness accounts of 
genocide. Lee Ann Fujii states, 
Meta-data are informants’ spoken and unspoken thoughts and feelings 
which they do not always articulate in their stories or interview responses, 
but which emerge in other ways (Fujii 2010: 231). 
These ‘meta-data’ can emerge in a variety of ways, ranging from facial expressions 
and gestures, to inflections and other elements of spoken language not recorded in 
transcripts (such as intakes of breath, nervous clicking of the tongue, etc.) Fujii 
speaks to the role of meta-data in witness accounts of atrocities in Rwanda, and 
gives examples where things outside the text like evasions and silences can help the 
interviewer determine the validity of statements. In terms of my research, these 
meta-data exist outside of transcripts, and therefore potentially outside of my 
notice. This, however, is not a major issue for this project, merely something to pay 
close attention to as meta-data may influence some of the questions or responses in 
the transcripts.  
This is another benefit of using ICTY data: questioning and cross-examining of 
witnesses and the additional questioning of witnesses by judges allows for several 
individuals in the courtroom to bear witness to responses that exist outside 
language. Statements submitted to the court are validated by multiple signed and 
witnessed affidavits. Also, prosecution, defence and judges pay close attention to a 
variety of types of responses, and will at times adjust their questioning when they 
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sense evasive responses through gesture and facial expression, or see indicators of 
psychological trauma. This does place quite a lot of faith in the court, but it is also 
important to state that for the purposes of my research the focus is placed on data 
that is measurable. To linger too long over silences and evasions would distract 
from the primary type of evidence begging examination.  
5.3 Practical issues 
One practical issue that bears discussion is the fact that many transcripts oscillate 
between being closed and open, making events rather difficult to follow. Some 
witness statements give patches of information in between redactions, while other 
witness statements are complete. For example, in the test case explored in chapter 
3, the witness statements of Mrs Kvočka are complete while statements from 
protected witnesses are predominantly closed. The potential issue is, when 
comparing linguistic patterns across transcripts, how accurate can comparisons be 
between full records and partial ones? In the case of the two contrasting witness 
statements in the Kvočka case, preliminary readings of the transcripts have shown 
that although Mrs Kvočka’s statements are complete and Witness DC4’s (to give 
one example) are not, the information remaining is of the same type. That is, the 
information deemed acceptable for open court is a standard held across all sessions, 
and therefore what remains in the open transcripts is subject to the same patterns, 
whether complete or not. The cognitive linguistic approach reveals underlying 
indicators of categorisations where they are not expressly being sought out, and as 
such, if these types of indicators do in fact exist, in theory they should be visible in 
responses made to all types of questions.  
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6 Conclusion 
This chapter has undertaken the task of describing the ICTY transcripts as a dataset. 
In doing so, understandings of what the transcripts are and what they are not were 
put forward, focusing how the transcripts were approached for the purposes of this 
research. Focus was paid to how cases were selected, how the courtroom is 
perceived (the nature of it as a speech community, and how the court space can 
impact the creation of the transcripts), and what implications might be present when 
using legal data for non-legal research. Important issues such as the materiality of 
the transcripts, their translation, and how additional factors that lie outside the 
realm of the transcripts (such as metadata like facial expressions and inflections) 
were also discussed in terms of how they will impact this project.  
It is difficult to discuss the data while leaving the methods of its analysis wholly out 
of the picture, especially because the nature of this project leans heavily on the 
ability of the linguistic methods to find significant patterns. The following chapter 
will delve more deeply into the mechanics of locating patterns, but that discussion 
would not be as successful if the foundations of what the data consists of were not 
established first. The purpose of this project is to explore the question, ‘What 
sociological patterns exist within the ICTY transcripts, and what do these patterns 
mean?’ The following section will not only demonstrate the methods of finding 
these patterns, but also how they are explained. The examination of in-court speech 
in the arena of war crimes tribunals will hopefully bring several unstudied elements 
of these trials to light, giving a clearer picture of an environment that is all too often 
only examined for its legal contributions.  
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Chapter Three - Methods 
1 Introduction 
This section will explain the methods of my research in detail, and demonstrate 
their applicability. There are potential challenges to keep in mind, and I will use 
this section to discuss what issues are present that may impact my research, and 
explain why other potential problems may not be relevant. To fully illustrate how 
methods function for this project, the test case Kvočka et al will be examined at this 
stage. Results from this test case indicate that there is a strong tendency for 
witnesses to express their perceptions of ethnic boundaries in significant ways, 
which will be demonstrated below. As mentioned earlier, this case was chosen at 
random from the list of cases involving the Prijedor region, and the Omarska camps 
in particular.  
First, the platform of current studies involving legal transcripts will be discussed 
briefly, alongside how developments from it have impacted this project. The merits 
of cognitive linguistic applications will then be discussed, with emphasis placed on 
understanding mental spaces, the benefits of cognitive models, and the use of 
Discourse Space Theory (DST) (Chilton 2005), which is a recent linguistic framing 
technique that draws from conceptual metaphor theory and mental space theory 
(Fauconnier 1994; Lakoff 1987, 1989). The technical nature of the methods I 
employ will be fully explained in this section, which puts the interdisciplinary 
elements of this research into action. The benefits of using a variety of methods, 
rather than simply one or the other, will also be discussed. The relevant ideas from 
social psychology and theories of discourse analysis (including the defining of 
terms important to this research) will be discussed, and how these theories help 
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situate DST results from this project will be made clear. Finally, results from the 
test case Kvočka et al will be discussed in detail, demonstrating how these methods 
come together and function well.  
2 Current studies: Language, legal transcripts and transitional justice 
There are many studies looking at communications in court that intend to expand 
transcript analysis beyond the normal legal applications. These studies tend to fall 
within the disciplines of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and linguistics, but 
this leaves gaps in transcript research (and transcript analysis of international 
criminal tribunals specifically) when it comes to applying linguistics as a method of 
seeking out social patterns. The existing literature, however, provides a platform for 
new methods, and demonstrates the direction that linguistic studies of international 
criminal tribunal proceedings have evolved.  
 2.1 The beginnings of interdisciplinary transcript analysis: 
Sociolinguistics and forensic linguistics 
The methods employed by this project take linguistics as their starting point, and 
consider the further intersections linguistics has had with additional disciplines. A 
helpful beginning is therefore to determine which definition of linguistics is both 
broad enough to incorporate the extended discussions warranted by this research, 
and refined enough to set a clear path for the undertaking of a well-directed 
analysis. Charles Fillmore’s definition provides both of these things: 
The science of linguistics concerns itself with discovering, describing, and 
(where relevant) explaining (1) the units of linguistic form or content, (2) 
the structures or patterns in which these units are defined and situated, (3) 
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the roles or functions that these units serve in these structures, and (4) the 
dependencies or interpretive links that obtain between different units in the 
same text (Fillmore 1985: 10).  
This definition effectively describes what this project is seeking to uncover from 
within ICTY transcripts, and is compatible with the specific approaches of 
cognitive linguistics described in the next section, as well as the second layer of 
analyses employed by this thesis using social psychology and discourse analysis.  
The early eighties to mid-nineties saw the emergence of scholarly attention to the 
linking of studies of language with studies of the legal process (Bülow-møller 1991; 
Conley 1990; Danet 1980; Gumperz 1982). The disciplines of sociolinguistics and 
forensic linguistics began to gain traction in interdisciplinary circles, and many 
different works are cited as having broken ground for this, from Atkinson and 
Drew’s work on the importance of understanding language construction within 
court spaces (Atkinson 1979), to Matoesian’s studies of how power can be enacted 
through legal language and the phenomenon of re-victimisation through questioning 
(Matoesian 1993). The concept of power as it relates to language and the legal 
environment has been elaborated upon in productive ways that have opened up 
fruitful debates into how sociology and anthropology can best conceptualise this 
idea, alongside other emerging questions (Byrne 2013; Ehrlich 2001; Galatolo 
2006; Gibbons 2003; Mertz 1994; Philips 1998; Trinch 2010; Walker 1987). The 
intricacies of this body of work will be discussed later in this chapter and in the 
subsequent chapters, but it is helpful to mention at the outset that this is the 
platform of research that this project engages with in the first instance. 
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3 Methods: The benefits of cognitive linguistics 
When looking at this particular corpus of texts, linguistic methods allow them to be 
at their most revealing, because significant social patterns embedded within 
transcripts become easier to identify with slightly more technical methods than 
traditional critical discourse analysis methodologies. Additionally, applications of 
political psychology and legal analysis alone would not show the underlying 
patterns in the speech processes of individuals on the stand. One reason for 
employing cognitive linguistic methods is that these methods are an effective tool 
in revealing decision making patterns within individual expression. This is because 
certain types of cognitive linguistics (such as conceptual metaphor theory) provide 
evidence to the terms in which people understand ideas (Lakoff 1989). For this 
research, this can mean that it is possible to look at decision making patterns 
functioning within the individualised mental space, which is constructed with 
language. This can then be projected onto larger social psychological patterns, to 
analyse shifts.  
Another benefit in the application of cognitive models is that there is a particular 
focus on modelling links between perception and categorisation. It is in the 
exploration of categorisation that we find specific linguistic indicators of identity. 
This will be explained in greater depth when demonstrating how this is put into 
practice with the data analysis, but it is important to note at this point that within 
cognitive linguistics, models for previously identified social psychological patterns 
already exist. This is especially evident when noting that cognitive linguistics 
accepts that all elements of conceptual structure can be construed, which impacts 
the way experience can be communicated (Croft 2004). 
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3.1 Cognitive linguistic applications 
It is important to state here that this research is seeking to apply linguistic tools to 
reveal larger social patterns. One of the major benefits of using a model like the 
discourse space theory model is that the complex linguistic building blocks making 
up the model have already been in existence and functioning well elsewhere, such 
as within conceptual metaphor theory and mental space theory (Fauconnier 1994, 
1997; Lakoff 1989). The application of these methods to legal transcripts, however, 
has not previously been attempted. That being said, this research is not an attempt 
to contribute new ideas on how linguistic tools should function, but an attempt to 
contribute a new set of applications of these existing tools.  
As was stated above, cognitive linguistics (CL) can be a very useful tool in 
illuminating the ways in which individuals understand their own actions, which is 
one key concept that this project highlights. Cognitive linguistics functions on the 
same principle of subjective reality that this research assumes, and findings for this 
project align naturally to this platform for measuring human understanding. 
Meaning is thus determined through individual perceptions (also referred to as 
cognitive frames, or mental spaces). The layout of ideas in this manner has much in 
common with work done on causality in sociology and linguistics. Max Weber and 
his focus on the interpretation of social action through causal explanation (Ringer 
1997) coincides with the cognitive linguistic explanations of the constructs of the 
mental space.  
The findings from the test case explained below reveal linguistic emphasis on 
categorisation and group identification. Philosophies of judgement are linked to 
cognitive comparisons, deriving from several conclusions in the western 
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philosophical tradition (most notably thinkers like Kant and Husserl) (Croft 2004; 
Kant 1787). The bridge between judgement and linguistic categorisation is 
therefore a strong one, making the goals of this research consistent with the 
philosophies underlying the constructs of the tools being used. Taking this a step 
further, there are benefits of applying these methods not only to court data, but to 
genocide in particular. Group theory and the study of genocide highlights the 
importance of the individual assessment of threat perception and categorisation 
(Baum 2008; Chirot 2006; Staub 1985; Staub 1989, 2000; Valentino 2004). As 
Croft and Cruise have stated, 
Categorisation involves schematisation as well as judgement: in comparing 
the new experience to prior ones and categorising it in one way over 
another, we attend to some characteristics and ignore others (Croft 2004).  
This statement gains even more significance when held up against other similar 
ideas about the way the mind deals with information. Some elements of linguistic 
philosophy highlight the idea that understanding is an achievement - it requires 
effort on the part of the individual and is not something that simply happens 
(Coulter 1979). This allows the interpretation of information to be given a cultural 
or social edge by the individual processing it, and the schematisation that Croft and 
Cruise speak of above comes about with these elements embedded in it.  
Similarly, the recounting of memory is relevant in light of these ideas. One question 
that this research needs to keep to the forefront when examining the data is, how 
does the retrieval of memory shift when the atmosphere for judgements changes? 
The court is, after all, a very specific type of environment. As Kvale states,  
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How an event is remembered depends upon the context in which it is 
perceived, retained, and retrieved. (Kvale 1974).  
I draw the reader again back to the previous chapter, to the section on the 
psychological impact of giving legal testimony, and related issues involving 
memory. Some of the basic issues linguistic theory deals with involving speech 
events are the issues of motivation and intended interpretation (Gumperz 1982; 
Trinch 2010). How someone explains or recounts something is always influenced in 
part by how they intend to come across to the listener. The way someone 
communicates is therefore influenced by how they perceive their situation and their 
audience. As Jenny Edkins has stated, ‘the production of memory is a performative 
practice, and inevitably social’. (Edkins 2003: 54).  
This is not a hindrance to the research, but a way in which to learn even more about 
the relationship between information, communication, and the court.7 It is here that 
the benefits of using cognitive linguistic methods are apparent. CL theory, 
especially DST (explained in greater detail below), has a strong focus on what is 
called the deictic centre, and is set up to examine speech events with specific 
attention paid to what has been termed ‘situatedness’ (also explained in the next 
section). DST uses the speech of the individual to effectively map their mental 
space. This is especially useful because it allows analysis to extend beyond initial 
readings of texts to examine why an individual is recounting an event in a particular 
way. Therefore, in using this technique, we can examine the information recounted 
but also draw out individual motivations in recounting information in the way they 
present it.  
                                                          
7
 Other avenues of inquiry can also be opened up through this exercise that could be reserved for 
future research.  For example, the way in which events are communicated and treated by the court 
could be examined in terms of symbolic or verbal violence.   
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For example, common phrases used by those on the stand at the ICTY relate to a 
specific need to attach difficulty to time. The social psychological interpretation of 
this effort points to a need for individuals to communicate perceptions of past 
threats. Taking this analysis further, the cognitive linguistic interpretation reveals 
an attempt to separate that time from this time. One witness in the Kvočka et al. 
trial stated,  
I didn’t have anything to do with that. And the times were very difficult, and 
only later on when certain units were established and where people went to 
war did the situation change, but those times were very difficult and a word 
could cost you your life. (p 7339, 5 February, 2001, Prosecutor v Miroslav 
Kvočka et al, IT-98-30-I).  
In this statement Pero Rendić, a cook in the quartermaster’s detachment near 
Omarska, is describing his assessment of threats made on the accused, Miroslav 
Kvočka, during Kvočka’s employment as a guard at the Omarska camp. His choice 
to convey his memory of the facts in this way, adding this statement at the end, is 
evidence that he sees his own memory in the context of time and situation. It is also 
worth noting that his effort to separate these concepts indicates that the way a 
memory is recounted can change in the time between initial perception and final 
retrieval, when cognitive (as well as social, cultural, and factual) circumstances 
surrounding the retention of the memory change.  
This analysis of the recounting of this memory is an example of how potent 
communication can be in those circumstances. With Rendić, we see not only the 
underlying linguistic and social psychological indicators of his assessment of a 
threatening situation, but a direct expression of his opinion on individual 
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communications. The implication is that he felt that communication could change 
how intense threat was. Specifically, ‘a word could cost you your life.’  
3.2 Mental spaces 
Space is an essential concept in cognitive linguistics, and is the starting point for 
many of the models that analyse categorisation (Zlatev 2007). Space as linked to 
meaning and perception comes from Kant (Kant 1787) and has been elaborated 
upon in several ways that are significant to this research. Spatial semantics is a 
technical way of breaking down expressions of space and the role it plays in 
communication (prepositions like ‘over’ and ‘above’ can take physical properties 
and attach values to them, which can indicate attitudes and categories. A phrase 
like, ‘He is over his break-up’ invokes ideas of recovery, but in spatial terms could 
also imply positive and negative sides to a situation) (Lakoff 1989; Zlatev 2007). 
These linguistic elements of how space is communicated are the ingredients in 
larger theories. Mental space theory is a way of understanding how a variety of 
elements come into play during speech events. As Gilles Fauconnier explains,  
Mental spaces are very partial assemblies constructed as we think and talk 
for purposes of local understanding and action. (Fauconnier 1994: 351). 
Mental spaces can be shifted to examine fact and counterfact, existing within 
working memory but also making use of long-term memory. According to 
Fauconnier, ‘Frames are entrenched mental spaces that we can activate all at once.’ 
(Fauconnier 1994: 352). This is useful in understanding the ICTY data because it 
opens up an approach to understanding not only memory and speech, but also 
thought processes, both past and present. Because those on the stand are providing 
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their record of events, the researcher is in a unique position to examine the meaning 
of these events as deconstructed from the speaker’s choice of expression.  
Attempting to reconstruct the mental space using language may in some ways seem 
like an attempt at taking apart ideas and finding within them opinions to assign to 
the speaker. Indeed the initial criticism of these approaches in the 1970s was aimed 
at the abstract foundations of the approach, and the academic community had 
interesting arguments on the applications of something that had little to say in the 
way of physical evidence (Agha 2007; Fauconnier 1994, 1997). In the decades 
since, a solid platform of cognitive linguistics has been developed and these 
foundations have become central to understanding the nature of the links between 
though and expression. The added benefit of using these approaches in tandem with 
discourse analysis approaches is that patterns found and mapped using cognitive 
linguistic tools can be verified by separate insights in group theory.  
Mental space theory also introduces what Chilton has termed the ‘possibility 
space’, where words like ‘maybe’ set up spaces relative to the discourse that allow 
for the inclusion of other meanings or facts (Chilton 2004; Fauconnier 1994). The 
possibility space is one section of the DST model that is especially fascinating 
when looking at ICTY data. Expressions of the conditional, such as ‘could have’ or 
‘would’ highlight ways in which an individual sees his or her choices (or past 
possible decisions, depending on the tense). For example, if a prosecutor asks a 
witness, ‘why did you run?’ and a witness answers with something like, ‘If I stayed 
I could have been caught,’ or ‘Because I thought I might be caught’, these are 
indicators of elements of the decision making patterns the individual undertook 
when making the decision to run. Sentences using ‘if’ are also indicators that the 
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individual was operating within a mental space that included other specific 
scenarios.  
Another reason the possible space is an important element in understanding 
violence is that this type of expression also highlights threat assessments. Because 
the assessment of threat has been identified as an important precursor to many 
violent situations in ethnic conflict (Chirot 2006; Staub 1989), the identifying of 
individual expressions of how these threats were internalised and understood is key 
to examining behaviours during ethnic conflict. It is not just the initial assessment 
of threat, but also the communication of threat that is important to this research. 
The mapping of these relative to other important elements in the mental space 
according to discourse space theory will be explained more fully with diagrams in 
section 3.4. 
One element of cognitive linguistics that this research will focus on heavily is the 
notion of situatedness. Situatedness relates to the expression of the speaker’s 
projected self and the speaker’s understanding of his or her own place in the world 
(Croft 2004). Closely linked to this is the concept of deixis, which is the way the 
speaker’s situatedness defines the scene. Chilton’s model places this at the centre of 
the cognitive space, allowing this space to be constructed in a way that best 
illuminates construal (Chilton 2011) (see Figure 1). It is these expressions of 
situatedness that often reveal internal categorisations. For this research, it is person 
deixis that helps reveal where groupings are being expressed. Expressions of person 
deixis are pronouns like we, us, them, it – elements of speech that hold meaning 
relative to who is speaking (Evans 2006). Chilton’s model also allows for 
expressions of projected selves, most notably what he calls the political ‘we’ 
(Chilton 2011). When looking to understand groupings as embedded in discourse, it 
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is essential that perspectives are mapped in a way that places emphasis on how the 
speaker refers to him or herself, and which categories are related as ‘other’.  
3.3 Cognitive models and the geometric space 
Discourse Space Theory is a cognitive linguistic approach developed by Paul 
Chilton that adds to previous theoretical approaches, such as conceptual metaphor 
theory and discourse representation theory (Chilton 2005). It allows for a more 
integrated look at how certain linguistic indicators are functioning simultaneously 
by projecting them onto an abstract three-dimensional geometric space. One benefit 
of using DST for this research is that this method of analysis allows for an 
integration of several linguistic elements in such a way as to examine them relative 
to one another. This allows the tracking of shifts, which is important to this set of 
data in particular for the examination of situatedness alongside the modality of the 
speaker (Chilton 2011).  
The projecting of linguistic theories onto linear algorithms and other mathematical 
models is not new, and there are specific benefits to using three dimensional 
geometric space. First, this layout provides a way of explaining information that is 
congruent to working theories on how the mental space is constructed more 
generally. Cognitive science has used this format to explain the workings of the 
mind, and these linguistic applications are simply taking things a step further 
(Chilton 2005; Gardenfors 2000). Second, many of the older criticisms of other, 
more basic models of linguistics stem from a failure to add anything new to the way 
information is perceived. Many scholars have referred to these models as merely 
‘item collections’, while others fall into the trap of glorified list-making (Stoddard 
1991; Yabuuchi 2004). The three-dimensional geometric model allows for not only 
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a variety of speech elements to be placed together in a way that mirrors the mind, 
but also allows for shifts and internal ‘worlds’ to be plotted within the space as 
well.  
3.4 The DST Model  
For the purposes of this research, a simplified version of the DST model will be 
used. The aim here is to provide new understandings of expressions that point to 
larger socio-political patterns -  because of this there are highly specialised 
linguistic elements of the diagram that, while important, will not be focused on. The 
appeal of this approach for my research is that it provides a way to highlight 
elements of the text and explain their significance visually, while drawing upon 
previous theories that can explain the patterns that are revealed. As such, I will 
initially be focusing on the four main axes in the model, and the ways that 
separating elements of the text onto these axes have shown patterns that are well 
worth examining.  
The interdisciplinary approach of this project has allowed for the application of the 
DST model to a lesser level of detail than the more intricate uses demonstrated by 
Chilton’s research in his book Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice 
(Chilton 2004). There are several reasons for not employing a purely DST analysis, 
the foremost being that this project places importance on social relationships and 
the functions of power in the courtroom, and discourse theories are best suited for 
more specific understandings of these relationships as a way of situating DST 
findings. This is not to say, however, that this research applies different methods on 
an as-and-when basis. The cognitive linguistic theoretical understandings and DST 
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analysis underpin the transcript analysis, functioning as the tools through which 
patterns in the text are located.  
It is the broader explaining of these patterns for which I have chosen to use 
discourse insights. This has been done for two reasons – one, because these ideas fit 
will with the DST analyses due to the fact that the foundations of linguistic studies 
and discourse analysis are often interrelated, and two, the findings of the project are 
enhanced and better explained with this added element of understanding. As 
mentioned before, many of the gaps in the literature exist because of a focus inward 
– the aim here is to bring in additional insights that might bridge these gaps, but 
with careful focus to maintain a balanced approach that does not attempt to bring in 
too many ideas for one study. Therefore, DST graphs will only be shown when the 
complexities of the patterns found are best demonstrated visually. There are equally 
times when the text is best explained more basically, and the added graph would be 
redundant.  
Though briefly explained earlier, the intricacies of the DST model are best 
expressed visually, and with examples from the text. In figure 1, we see the basic 
DST diagram as set out by Chilton.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Chilton’s basic DST model (Chilton 2011) 
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There are four primary axes, at the centre of which is the deictic centre, or self. At 
the top of this axis are discourse referents (d), and the distance between these and 
the deictic centre (s) represents the degree of estrangement, visually expressing 
concepts of ‘other’ in relation to the speaker. The t axis is the deictic chronology, 
which allows for framing in the context of time. The m axis represents modality, 
including expressions of the possible, and the speaker’s degree of commitment. 
Within this space are possible counter-realities, which can be expressed by re-
creating a smaller version of the entire diagram along the m axis, using words 
expressed in the conditional, or the speaker’s expression of what ‘might’ have 
happened.  
The first step in applying DST to my data was to pull from the text expressions of 
self/other. This helped illuminate the speaker’s perceptions of his or her group, and 
opinions of those determined to be outside. This was applied to excerpts on a 
speaker-by-speaker basis, because it was not productive to map all transcripts 
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relating to one case, as speaker responses were from a variety of perspectives. Each 
witness transcript was therefore done individually, so that the proper context could 
then be provided.  
For example, with the Pero Rendić witness statements, Rendić uses ‘we’ and ‘us’ to 
frequently refer to the group he identifies with relative to the memory he is 
expressing. Since he is being asked about his time at Omarska, his ‘we’ refers to the 
kitchen staff in the quartermasters detachment. His expressions of ‘other’ include 
camp guards as well as prisoners, which is not altogether unexpected given the fact 
that he is being questioned in a court on war crimes. His need to express 
detachment from the whole situation (using phrases like ‘I don’t know anything 
about that’ and ‘I didn’t have anything to do with that’) are common phrases in the 
court. As a witness, Rendić wants to give what information he has, but is also 
acutely aware of the seriousness of being incorporated into the events about which 
he is being questioned. Therefore, he defines ‘other’ as any person connected to the 
crimes (whether as perpetrator or as victim) the court is in session for.  
The analysis of self/other can be an indicator of ethnic identity or group 
identification, and the way things are phrased and the additional words used 
expressing these ideas can reveal negative or positive opinions attached to these 
groupings. An individual who uses ‘we’ in the place of ‘I’ shows a strong 
attachment to this group perspective. The evidence of this attachment becomes even 
stronger in cases where the question being asked did not originally refer to any 
collective.  
The next step in the DST analysis is to look at expressions of the possible space, 
and map them in the diagram alongside the other information uncovered. 
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Expressions of time can also be pulled from the text and inserted at this point, as 
this helps provide a larger picture for how the individual sees his or her 
environment. This gives a space for marking the frequency of these time-specific 
phrases like the ones above (attaching difficulty to time, or more importantly, 
attaching ‘otherness’ to time, as in ‘that was a different time’ – also a potential 
indicator of perception of threat or distancing), which can be interpreted as 
expressions of cognitive dissonance as well as a need to express a separate frame in 
which these choices took place.  
Another potential concept to pull from the text, though not part of the DST 
diagram, is the expression of what information was or was not available to 
individuals. Expressions like ‘know’ or expressions of confusion are interesting 
markers in terms of how information was passing from person to person. The use of 
phrases like, ‘we knew that…’ followed by details of fact helps fill out the 
cognitive frame of the speaker. Places where these phrases are attached to 
expressions of decision (for example, ‘we knew X, so we did Y’ or ‘we thought X, 
and because of X we did Y’), are markers of how elements of information impact 
choices.  
 
4 Situating DST results within additional theories 
The linguistic analysis is only part of the picture for this project. Using social 
psychology and discourse theory in my methods has added an additional layer to 
the linguistic analyses, and most importantly gives weight to findings by providing 
analysis that expands on ideas already highlighted. As was mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, there are very specific reasons for choosing to use these two 
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disciplines in tandem with DST applications, and careful consideration was made 
for the necessity of using additional methodological insights in the first place. The 
two-fold analysis this research project takes does not assume that the DST falls 
short in the scope of its analysis. Quite the opposite, it is the strength of the theory 
as an analytical tool that was a strong indicator that its use on a project such as this 
one would be both innovative and productive.  
The courtroom atmosphere, however, is particular in its complexities and while it 
would have been both possible and beneficial to use DST alone to analyse the 
language contained within, the aim of this project is to incorporate findings within 
the larger sphere of transitional justice studies. This goal is necessary in order to 
demonstrate that findings using linguistics can provide insights productive to wider 
audiences. Essentially, this project took the first step in answering the question 
(what might a cognitive linguistic analysis of ICTY transcripts reveal about social 
processes occurring within the courtroom?) by applying DST to transcripts, and 
then took a further step of placing the findings within related disciplines to 
determine what those disciplines might say for the meaning of the findings.  
The reason for using insights from both social psychology and discourse analysis 
for this was again related to the data itself. Early in the process of analysing 
testimonies it became clear that whether the individual giving testimony was a 
victim or an accused changed the nature of it significantly. More specifically, the 
testimonies of victims dealt more frequently with events, subjects and issues that 
social psychology could more easily make sense of. This also proved to be the case 
for the speech of several low ranking accused analysed in chapter 7. Certain 
accused, however, spoke to larger and more abstract ideas that resonated differently 
within the courtroom, and their approach to the ICTY itself was of a unique, more 
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political nature. Both of these reasons meant that speech of accused was understood 
more clearly through examining the DST results as discourse. Essentially, the 
amount of power an individual held - both during the conflict and in court - 
changed the nature of testimony and therefore invited two approaches of second-
level analysis. Both approaches required a strong basis for how their insights related 
to the data itself, and therefore literature was examined and relevant terms defined 
according to the assumptions of the project.  
5 Social psychological insights 
Social psychology’s relationship to studies of the ICTY begins first with the subject 
the tribunal is tackling, which in this instance is ethnic conflict. Although it is not 
the aim of this project to take on how and why violence occurred within the former 
Yugoslavia at the time that it did, those who have examined these reasons have 
developed theoretical underpinnings that can make greater sense of the language 
used by those who were involved in or victims of this violence.  
5.1 Social psychology and the study of ethnic conflict 
The study of ethnic conflict is interdisciplinary, benefitting from methods brought 
to it from international relations, law, sociology, anthropology and social 
psychology, among others. While each discipline brings to the inquiry something 
significant, the insights in much of the literature resonate particularly well with 
social psychology. There is an ambitious predictive aim in research on ethnic 
conflict that often drives this literature. In seeking to understand genocide and 
ethnic violence, it is hoped that societies at high risk for such violence can be more 
easily identified (Chirot 2006; Mann 2005; Stanton 1996; Staub 1989). Within 
these efforts to understand and explain are elements of study most directly related 
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to social psychology: individuals acting violently against others, and the groups 
with which they interact and identify (Tajfel 1982; Taylor 1994). In examining the 
phases present in what he refers to as the “steps along a continuum of destruction”, 
Ervin Staub uses psychological tools to illuminate mechanisms behind violent 
behaviours (Staub 1989). He stresses the importance of these applications by 
placing emphasis on processes, and this emphasis is in line with the early claims 
made by this thesis about legal transcripts – that once completed, they remain 
dynamic: 
(…) In both individuals and groups the organization of characteristics and 
psychological processes is not static but dynamic (…) Influences acting on 
persons and groups can change their thoughts, feelings, motivations and 
actions (Staub 1989: 28). 
Examined in this light, the exclusion of social psychological applications would 
produce a failure to highlight these influences in ways that reveal their changing 
functions. As such, the aims behind the study of ethnic conflict, with their 
ambitious predictive intentions, would lack several important indicators that have 
arisen from social psychological input.  
The details of the transformation of ordinary people to agents of mass murder is 
something that most major works on ethnic conflict grapple with, and is an angle 
that is an important bridge between the political and the psychological (Browning 
1992; Chirot 2006; Valentino 2004; Waller 2002). Examining this process is 
effectively looking for the ways in which previously non-violent individuals change 
their perception of a political situation, with violent results. Though this may seem 
to be an oversimplification, it serves to underline the larger need for an application 
85 
 
of social psychology to political violence. Additionally, while these theories are 
insightful and do examine different sets of historical data to support them 
(particularly the work done by Browning), keeping them in mind when looking at 
the descriptions of violent conflict within the courtroom allows an even wider reach 
for these ideas.  
There are certainly critics of these applications, though they tend to criticise 
psychological methods that are clinical rather than social and will not be used in 
this research (such as research relating to psychoanalysis). The use of social 
psychological methods does not lend credence to any legal arguments seeking to 
link sanity with culpability, nor do they look at the issue of sanity as a whole. As 
this research highlights social processes, the access to logic is implied. The social 
psychological angle does not remove the individual from his or her choices in 
favour of the group, but examines a shift in perspective. Again, this highlights the 
relevance of the dynamic nature of processes as explained above by Staub, and the 
potential for social psychological methods to most effectively reveal them.  
 
5.2 Identity, communication, and categorisation 
Identity is often treated as the lifeblood of intergroup relations (Taylor 1994) and a 
wide array of theories reflect this (Hogg 2006; Howard 2000; Monroe 2009; 
Pynchon 1999; Reicher 2004; Sherif 1961; Sidanius 2004). Social identity theory 
has been given a lot of attention, and the early 1990s found Tajfel’s work from the 
late 1970s elaborated upon significantly (Tajfel 1978, 1981; Tajfel 1982; Taylor 
1994). Early definitions of the theory speak to the desire to join groups with strong 
identities, and lean heavily on the in-group/out-group bias established by Sumner 
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and further articulated by Levine and Campbell (Levine 1972; Sumner 1906). 
Research in this direction is significant to this thesis because it has taken the 
tendency to categorise others (and examines how the self is perceived relative to 
this) as its starting point and from there established several significant conclusions. 
This is not to say it will be relied upon heavily (nor is it without its critics) but its 
contributions cannot be ignored.  
Turner et al (Turner 1987) place emphasis on the relationship between self-
perception and action. This touches on questions of accountability that are 
discussed in chapter 7, as it assumes a disconnection with the internal workings of 
the self in favour of group narratives. This is not unlike work done on genocide 
theory examining the role of bureaucracies in creating distance between action and 
direct responsibility (Arendt 1994; Bauman 1993; Hirsh 2003), but the important 
distinction to maintain here is that I am seeking to understand the way courtroom 
communications reflect social process, and to examine the bureaucratic element in 
this process with exclusivity would lean too far away from my primary unit if 
analysis (the speech of the individual).  
Extensive research has been conducted in an attempt to understand how individuals 
undertake processes of categorisation (Pettigrew 1958; Sherif 1966; Tajfel 1963), 
and it is this process which can shed light on some of the phenomena found within 
testimonies at the ICTY. The early research and experiments into categorisation 
established several basic principles. The most notable of these are: that people tend 
toward categorisation as a way to make sense of their environment, that their 
categorisation choices are influenced by the norms with which they have been in 
contact, and finally, that identification with a group is then followed by a tendency 
to want to distinguish the group that one is a part of (Taylor 1994).  
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What are the driving forces behind categorisation? At the centre of this project are 
questions of ethnicity, and therefore several things must be understood about 
differences in groupings, and how this might impact court speech. There is most 
certainly a difference between the tendency to identify with groups, and the 
tendency to separate into groups. The former implies a type of categorisation that is 
not necessarily exclusive or detrimental, as people can (and do) identify with 
multiple groups. The latter, however, implies a social push toward exclusivity, 
which brings about the in-group/out-group bias that blocks free-flowing 
communication (Levine 1972). It may be that identification begets separation, but 
that separation only happens when certain issues are present. With ethnic violence, 
the common factor cited to solidify ethnic groups is the perception of threat (Chirot 
2006; Staub 1989). Though there is a significant amount of research examining the 
tendency for group distinction through violence (Crosby 1979; Gurney 1982; 
Stouffer 1949), there is a failure to address the influence of communication, and a 
failure to address the influence of communication on categorisation choices, 
especially with specific emphasis on the role of communication in shifting basic 
identification to efforts for distinction through violence. Looking at how this might 
be occurring within the court setting offers valuable explanation for related 
phenomena found within speech.  
 
 
5.3 Social interchange analysis, appraisal theory and universal moral 
grammar 
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Understanding the social psychological perception of communication in general is 
central to applying social psychology to patterns found within courtroom speech. 
There is extensive literature in the social psychological and linguistic spheres on 
communication theory, much of which relates to understandings of violence and 
genocide. As this study highlights communication patterns, it is essential to have a 
clearly articulated understanding of what has been called ‘social interchange 
analysis’ (Cairns 1994). Social interchange analysis describes how individuals 
interacting will tailor their actions to ‘fit into the organised stream of the other’, 
which functions as a way of providing constraints. This often produces a 
phenomenon of ‘serving two masters simultaneously’, one being one’s own internal 
understandings and the other being the constraints coming from those with whom 
one interacts (Cairns 1994). This gives pivotal insight into understanding the role 
the court might be playing in its influence on the way testimonies are carried out.  
Additionally, this can be applied when questions arise regarding why individuals 
make choices that go against previously developed internal moral codes. The role of 
this process is interesting when explained in conjunction with work on cognitive 
dissonance theory, an element of communication theory that seeks to explain 
situations where there is a gap between behaviour and belief (Festinger 1957). It 
seeks to explain the tendency for individuals to examine actions, and when finding 
these actions incongruous to previously held beliefs, to shift beliefs to match more 
closely with the original actions as a method of justification (Stone 2001). Again, 
this is something that relates to the court environment quite well, and has come in 
use in chapter 7, when looking at the speech of several accused of lower rank.  
One benefit of using social interchange analysis and cognitive dissonance theory to 
understand explanations of violence is that it illuminates the possibility for subtle 
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communication to shift beliefs in a way that changes individual perspectives 
enough to bring about the first instances of violent behaviours in situations where 
they were previously seen as illogical or immoral. The dissonance then created will 
push for a solidification of belief structures through post-action justification. 
Violence is therefore never outside the realm of possibility when communications 
can have such a dynamic function in shifting views. The usefulness of cognitive 
dissonance theory in understanding ethnic violence has been repeatedly highlighted 
by genocide scholars, because it can be an effective tool in figuring out how and 
why people act as they do, but it can be taken further – it can give us greater insight 
into how people explain actions, and how thought patterns highlighted by DST 
might be a precursor to things like cognitive dissonance. 
When looking at how subtle communication can shift beliefs, it is helpful to 
examine appraisal theory and recent linguistic insights into the concept of universal 
moral grammar (DuPoux 2007; Mikhail 2007; Monroe 2009). These theories 
attempt to illuminate connections between emotion, language, and decision making 
patterns. Monroe argues that the field of moral psychology is shifting away from 
paradigms of reason and toward this more physical idea of emotive influence on 
asserting moralities already mapped in the human brain. Appraisal theory attempts 
to connect emotion and decision making in a way that explains decisions that seem 
instantaneous but may in fact be a result of internal appraisal mechanisms that 
happen very quickly (Monroe 2009). Monroe’s research reinforces ideas previously 
stated about categorisation, and the malleability of perspectives in terms of how 
violence is viewed. She states that, ‘it is the cognitive process of categorising others 
- friends or foe, innocent or guilty - that creates (or fails to create) a feeling that 
another’s suffering is relevant for the observer (Monroe 2009: 431).’ One benefit of 
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my research is a greater understanding of which conditions increase moral salience, 
pointing to the importance in understanding such theories on decision making. Just 
as access to logic is implied in this study, it is also implied that to fully understand 
the functions of logic within one’s own interpretations of action, it must be assumed 
that the mechanics of decisions are potentially extremely subtle. This again speaks 
to the strength in pairing DST analysis with social psychology, as DST can help 
illuminate this process.  
5.4 Cross-cutting ties and fraternal interest group theory  
Another perspective that is important to this project is work done on the theory of 
cross-cutting ties. This theory maintains that the greater the flow of information 
(creating ties between a variety of groups within a society), the less likely it is for 
violence to occur (Hibbs 1973; Levine 1972; Ross 1986). Multiple ties decrease 
suspicion, and promote dispute settlements. Placing this in context is important, to 
avoid contradiction. As was stated earlier, detrimental cohesion exists when there 
are multiple insular cohesive groups forced to coexist closely within a single 
environment. When the flow of information between these groups is minimal, 
violence becomes more likely. Ties between groups can manage levels of cohesion 
so that extreme insularity is less likely. One of the reasons for choosing Bosnia as a 
focus is because in this case there were environments where group ties were varied 
and often shifted under strain. Section 6 of this chapter, the analysis of data from 
the test case Kvočka et al, will demonstrate how DST analysis held up against this 
theory indicates the fluidity of boundaries in some scenarios.  
Authors like Ross (Ross 1986) discuss this theory from a more 
anthropological/ethnographical perspective, citing things like movements of people 
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and marriages in the data sets as evidence. Ross also refers to fraternal interest 
group theory, which proposes that the presence of cohesive fraternal groups in a 
society aligned under specific interests/aims will raise the potential for violence and 
that this allows for “rapid mobilization into fighting groups”, which has been 
mentioned in ethnic conflict literature by other scholars, most notably Mueller 
(Mueller 2000). It is important to note that it seems that these theories are 
commonly applied to ethnographic data with the intent of predicting violence 
within societies and relate to the run-up to violent outbreaks, which places its use 
more firmly among scholars seeking to contribute research within the predictive 
aims of other studies of ethnic conflict.  
Also relevant to this discussion is the principle of ‘group polarization.’ This idea is 
firmly established in social psychological viewpoints on group analysis and seeks 
to explain the shifting of opinions along steps that become gradually more extreme 
due to circumstances hinging on two mechanisms: exposure to opinions not heard 
before, and comparison/competition among individual members that leads people to 
take opinions aligning with the norm to new extremes in order to set themselves 
apart (Pynchon 1999). Though this is commonly applied to violent scenarios 
directly, it can be extended to examine such functions within the courtroom as a 
speech community.  
 
6 Discourse analysis insights 
Some of the discourse insights as they apply to this project have already been 
discussed in chapter 2, most notably in section 4 on examining the data as 
discourse, and section 5 on translation and its role in knowledge creation. This 
section will therefore be a brief extension of important ideas not covered there, 
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most notably the way terms commonly discussed by discourse theorists are defined 
for this project, the way Foucault in particular interacted with ideas concerning the 
law, and how issues of intertextuality relate to this project.  
 6.1 Defining terms 
This project takes its definition of discourse from Conley and O’Barr (Conley 
2005), who accept that two definitions of discourse are common, with both being 
important for different (but connected) reasons. The first type of discourse they 
identify is linguistic. They define this simply as, ‘connected segments of speech or 
writing, in fact any chunk of speech or writing larger than a single utterance 
(Conley 2005: 6).’ This linguistic definition of discourse therefore allows that its 
analysis should be on how such speech or writing is used in communication, as well 
as on more detailed interpretations of its structure. They use this definition as the 
one forming terms like ‘courtroom discourse’, versus a reference to ‘the discourse 
of human rights’, which belongs in their second category of discourse. This second 
category is discourse in the more Foucauldian, social sense. They define this second 
category (in line with Foucault) as ‘the broad range of discussion that takes place 
within a society about an issue or a set of issues (Conley 2005: 7).’ This emphasises 
the oft-discussed relationship of discourse to power, and it is worth noting here that 
this research takes Foucault’s emphasis on the complexities of this relationship as 
central to categorising the findings made by this thesis (Foucault 1972, 1977). 
It is well known that Foucault did not engage directly with the wider discipline of 
legal studies, but much of his work deals with concepts that interconnect with it, 
and thus there are a few things to say on his relationship with the subject, primarily 
in terms of how power is conceived in terms of the court space (Conley 2005; Hunt 
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1994). Power itself will not be defined for the purposes of this research, merely the 
relevant discussions surrounding it elucidated for reasons of clearer understanding 
in terms of its functions and impact. For this, I turn to discussions of links between 
law and discourse. Within the legal space, there are several types of power that are 
identifiably at work, the most prominent being the power of the State, or in the case 
of the ICTY, the power of the UN Security Council specifically, and the 
international community more generally. Conley and O’Barr argue that also present 
are issues of dispersed power - that is, power exercised in places and ways that are 
more removed from political hubs (Conley 2005). While these are both types of 
power to consider when discussing power as it is visible within the ICTY 
courtroom, it is what power does to discourse that is most important to keep in 
mind for the purposes of this thesis. Again, taking Foucault’s understanding of the 
relationship between discourse and power, it ‘produces domains of objects and 
rituals of truth (Foucault 1977: 194).’ In this way, power has, as its core function, 
the ability to create reality. This is not to say that all relationships studied within 
this thesis will revolve back to the same discussions of power, but that there will be 
a focus on how relationships in court are functioning as a result of it.  
Several terms are used frequently in this thesis that can be defined in a variety of 
ways, specifically the terms ‘narrative’ and ‘frame’. Narrative analysis has a long 
and complex tradition, with the most notable contributions to it being from scholars 
such as Paul Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1984, 1985, 1988) and Hayden White (White 1987). 
While a well-organised description of the various contributions to it over the years 
has been done by Gülich and Quasthoff (Gülich 1985), this project looks to Ewick 
and Silbey’s more streamlined approach, which examines the concept of narrative 
within sociology primarily, making a claim for its use in sociolegal studies (Ewick 
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1995). They maintain that for something to qualify as narrative, it must have three 
things: past events and characters selectively brought together for its purpose, its 
events must be temporally ordered (that is, taking a form that most commonly has a 
beginning, middle, and end), and the events and characters must be connected to 
each other within some kind of unifying structure (Ewick 1995: 200). Incorporating 
Ricoeur’s assertion that narrative statements are connected through an ordering that 
is both temporal and moral, they explain:  
[Narrative is] language organized temporally to report a moral reflects and 
sustains institutional and cultural arrangements at the same time as it 
accomplishes social action. In other words, stories people tell about 
themselves and their lives both constitute and interpret those lives; the 
stories describe the world as it is lived and understood by the storyteller 
(Ewick 1995: 198).  
This has important bearing on testimonies at the ICTY, and all of the testimonies 
analysed for this project have been determined, according to these guidelines, to be 
narrative, regardless of (and at times, incorporating) interruptions by the court.  
Another benefit of using discourse methods when examining these transcripts is 
that there are many instances where the narrative is layered (through the 
interconnectedness of multiple narratives playing out in the same space), and it is 
easy to forget that the individual speaking is giving an account of events situated in 
his or her own cognitive space. The events recounted in court feed into a larger set 
of events, and are evaluated alongside other narratives that are not always directly 
visible to the researcher when conducting the micro-level analysis inherent in the 
application of cognitive linguistics. Essentially, employing discourse analysis 
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techniques from time to time can help where the linguistic methods are too focused 
on the cognitive space, and draw attention to the larger picture created by the 
struggle for narrative dominance in the courtroom. In the case of the accused, for 
example, the concern of this research is not whether or not the individual is giving a 
true account of events, but of the reasons for which he gives the account the way he 
does.  
Finally, the term ‘frame’ is used quite often in this thesis, and this is partially due to 
the role frames have in cognitive linguistic analysis, and also due to the wider 
acceptance of frames as valuable ways of conceptualising how people make sense 
of the myriad factors involved in social life. A simple definition can be taken from 
Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis. He states that frames are, ‘the principles of 
organisation which govern social events and the actor’s subjective involvement in 
them (Goffman 1974: 10).’ Chilton describes frames in a manner more specific to 
cognitive linguistic analysis, which sees frames as ‘theoretical constructs, having 
some cognitive, ultimately, neural reality.’ Additionally, he states that, ‘In terms of 
their content, frames can be thought of as structures related to the conceptualisation 
of situation types and their expression in language (Chilton 2004: 51).’ Both 
definitions are compatible, and both additionally stress that properties of frames 
also incorporate relationships - both between people, as well as between people and 
concepts invoked through utterance.  
 
 
6.2 Questions of intertextuality 
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Because this project analyses multiple texts that are particular to a single 
environment, it follows that this research could be categorised as ‘intertextual’, in 
the sense that these texts do have the propensity to be interconnected. 
Intertextuality, a term developed by Julia Kristeva (see the essay, ‘Word, Dialogue 
and Novel’, 1966 (Kristeva 1986)), which can be seen as a continuation of 
discussion on literary dialogue from Bakhtin (Alfaro 1996). Kristeva argues that 
intertextuality occurs when texts intersect in ways that create a dialogue, and do not 
lean on any ‘point’, or fixed meaning. It can be argued that transcripts from the 
ICTY do not exist as what might be termed a ‘self-sufficient whole’ (or a system of 
texts that is self-contained), however while texts at the ICTY relate to one another, 
intertextuality is not the central research focus of this project, and as such will not 
be discussed at length  
7 Sample case: Applying DST methods to Kvočka et al 
The statement below is an example of how complex the categories and boundaries 
are in ICTY testimonies. In the statement, the witness is speaking of his brother’s 
time as a detainee at the Omarska camp. Witness DC4 had been in contact with the 
accused, Mlađo Radić, and had asked him to deliver a package to his brother while 
he was detained: 
 
 
Example 1: Witness DC4
8
 
                                                          
8
 Accents on names and places tend not to be present in ICTY transcripts, and therefore this 
example, and all examples hereafter, are included verbatim. 
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1 Judge Riad: I hope you can help me understand a few things to the best of your  2 
knowledge. You said that your brother was not involved in politics, was not a   3 
member of SDA. To your knowledge, why were people like him arrested? 
4 A. Because they were Muslims. 
5 Judge Riad: Only men or women too? 
6 A. Women, too. 
7 Judge Riad: Women too. And then concerning your intervention to send him food 
8 and the medicine, you think Mr. -- was it thanks to an acquaintance between you 
9 and Mrs Radić or was it because your brother knew Mr. Radić? Because he can't 
10 do it for everyone.  
11 A. Of course he couldn't, of the other Serbs, no. He did this because we knew 12 
each other from the 1970s. We were acquaintances and he said that he would 13 
do as much as he could, to the best of his ability, but of course he was afraid of 
his other people. 
14 Judge Riad: Whether you say ‘we,’ it means you or your brother? Who was a  15 
friend of Radić? Were you a friend of the family or that you -- 
16 A. Me. I was friendly with their family, with them. - Kvočka et al Trial 
Transcript (Testimony of Witness DC4) 8 March 2001: 8867. Emphasis added. 
This statement has interesting implications when compared to excerpts from 
statements made by the wife of one of the accused, Miroslav Kvočka. On the 
relationship between the camp and the surrounding village, Mrs Kvočka states: 
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Example 2: Mrs Jasminka Kvočka  
1 Q. Do you know whether or not your husband received any religious            
2 memorabilia, books, from anyone in Omarska camp? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. What was that, if you know, if you remember? 
5 A. It was a Koran, but it's not the only one my husband brought. I have 50 or 70 6 
Korans in my parents' house. It's a holy book. You can't throw it away, you can't 7 
burn it, so they gave it to me to look after the book, holy book, for them. 
8 Q. Who's ‘they’? Who gave it? 
9 A. These people, my neighbours who didn't dare keep the book at home. 
10 Q. Were they in the camp or were these neighbours that stayed in Prijedor or   
11 neighbours who left Prijedor? Who were these people? 
12 A. A man gave a copy to my husband in the camp, whereas at home, in my case, 
13 my neighbours would come to my house and give it to me because as they were 
14 leaving Prijedor, they were afraid to carry it with them. 
15 Q. Did your husband tell you of any request by the donor, by the person who  16 
gave that Koran to him, about what to do with it? 
17 A. When he brought it, he said, ‘A man gave this to me to give to you to look 18 
after it for him because he feared to have it on him up there.’ 
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19 Q. Up there in Omarska camp; is that right? 
20 A. Yes. Yes. - Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Jasminka Kvočka) 12 
February 2001: 7969-7970. Emphasis added. 
These two excerpts, one from Witness DC4 and one from Jasminka Kvočka, 
demonstrate the different ways in which people were communicating, and how ties 
between the community and the camp impacted groups. With the first statement, we 
see the witness explaining his assessment of Radić’s motives for taking his package 
to an inmate. The witness speaks of his past acquaintance with Radić, but also 
recalls Radić’s reply to him, a linguistically significant expression of Radić’s 
‘possible space’ (‘he would do as much as he could’).  
Radić’s violent behaviour in the camp was severe, he was sentenced to 20 years 
imprisonment for a variety of crimes that included personal involvement in rape, 
murder and torture. It was noted by the court that Radić used his authority to 
prevent some crimes selectively, and ignore others. This witness statement is one 
indicator that according to DC4, Radić’s mental space could have been constructed 
around boundaries that included Muslim detainees he had known in the past, and 
those he did not. The use of the word ‘afraid’ is used by the witness to state that he 
understood that Radić would deliver the package if he could, but one thing that 
might stop him was fear of ‘his other people’.  
This is an interesting distinction. The witness is admitting that there were issues of 
fear that could prevent Radić from having this type of contact with a detainee, while 
at the same time highlighting the fact that asking Radić to do this type of favour 
was bringing him away from his group, from ‘his other people.’ The fact that the 
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witness makes this statement in this way indicates that he sees Radić as not only 
tied to a group, but that this tie makes his actions contingent on the others in that 
group. While Radić’s willingness to try to deliver the package might come across as 
indicating that cohesive forces in his case might be lower, the fact that his actions 
are contingent on ‘his other people’ indicates that the forces binding him to this 
group are in fact quite strong.  
With the second statement, we see evidence of the opposite. Mrs Kvočka describes 
expressions of fear that are coming from the detainee, spoken to the accused, 
Miroslav Kvočka (lines 12-14). From this perspective, motives of the accused seem 
to be in reaction to the fears of the detainee, not in reaction to fears of his own 
ethnic group. The detainee was afraid to have the Koran in the camp, and Kvočka’s 
willingness to take it to his wife for safekeeping shows Kvočka’s connection to the 
detainee as (in that example) overriding his connection to his ethnic group. This is 
in no way an indication of non-violent behaviour, however there are differences in 
Kvočka’s behaviour and role in the camp and Radić’s. Kvočka was sentenced to 
seven years imprisonment for failure to use his influence to stop acts of violence 
within the camp, and for his aiding, abetting and acquiescence of the treatment of 
prisoners.  
Preliminary results from a selection of transcripts in the test case reveal some 
interesting challenges applying the DST model for this type of analysis. These 
challenges, when addressed, do not derail its usefulness but are important to bring 
up to demonstrate the depth of the analysis. The first issue that needs addressing is 
that while the model easily highlights speech indicating various levels of cohesion 
(distance from the deictic centre along the central line where expressions of ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ can be plotted) and clearly constructs degrees of commitment to 
101 
 
counter-realities (revealing decision making patterns as the individual understands 
them), interpreting these phrases within the diagram needs careful consideration as 
it can appear that there are multiple ways of doing this. 
For consistency, I have mapped the same excerpt from the testimony of witness 
DC4 using DST theory below to demonstrate. 
Figure 3: DST Model for Witness DC4 
 
On the left, under number 1, we see DC4’s explanation of his relationship with 
Radić, and way that the effect of questioning reframes the degree of social distance 
(as the arrow travels upward from ‘I was friendly with’ to ‘knew each other’). The 
analysis is helped in looking at the progression of the words under each number – 
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these (1: their relationship, 2: his (Radić’s) fear, and 3: how he (Radić) hedges his 
future act) are tied together through implication.  
We can see DC4’s understanding of Radić’s degree of commitment to the prospect 
of helping the Omarska inmate, DC4’s brother (‘he would do as much as he could’) 
illustrated in the diagram alongside DC4’s understanding of why Radić had this 
connection (‘we were acquaintances’, ‘I was friendly with them’). DC4’s initial 
expression of cohesion is strong - he says of Radić and himself, ‘we knew each 
other from the 1970s’. The expression only grows more distant with the 
interference of Judge Riad, who is looking for clarification of who is included in 
‘we’. At this point, DC4 splits ‘we’ into ‘I’ plus ‘them’. This is something to be 
aware of, as interjections that change the way things are expressed are common in 
court transcripts. The significant indicator in this exchange however, is DC4’s 
initial impulse to use ‘we’, and the fact that he does so twice before Judge Riad 
interjects. Therefore, from the diagram we can see that in the construction of DC4’s 
cognitive space he places himself and Radić in a relatively cohesive space. The fact 
that he expresses Radić’s choices within the ‘possible space’ (using ‘would’ and 
‘could’) rather than focusing on counter-realities (for example, things Radić should 
or could have done but didn’t) as well as his initial impulse to use ‘we’ allows the 
frame to be constructed proximal to the deictic centre, or self.  
Radić’s relationship with DC4 shows us something unique: it demonstrates that the 
theory of cross-cutting ties (Ross 1986; Sidanius 2004) does not decrease violent 
behaviours toward a group in general, it merely shows a tendency for violence to be 
avoided in certain cases where familiarity exists, and refocused in others where 
there is greater estrangement. The fact remains that DC4 and his brother are 
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members of the same ethnic group as the countless others Radić subjected to 
unspeakable humiliation and violence.  
The phrase ‘he was afraid of his other people’ analysed alongside his statements 
regarding his relationship in the 1970s with Radić (and their families) demonstrates 
how his statements on the witness stand are tied together through implication. As 
we see from figure 2, ultimately he defines his future action through assessment of 
two things: relationships (Radić’s to his family, and Radić’s to his ‘other people’, 
and fear. DC4’s explanation that ‘he would do as much as he could’ indicates that 
DC4 attached Radić’s fear to his expression of what it was possible for him to do.  
These results also reinforce the need for a two-fold analysis of transcripts. The up-
close analysis that the DST theory provides has given significant results in showing 
clear indicators of cohesion. This, when taken into the context of the larger 
comparison across transcripts, shows the full complexity of how these behaviours 
are functioning within certain cohesive circumstances. Also noteworthy is the fact 
that there are elements in this exchange that are only revealed through the manual 
reading of the larger excerpt. This reinforces the issue that linguistic software limits 
the scope of understanding, and though it may be useful elsewhere, demonstrates 
why it can’t be relied on for this particular type of research. For example, 
expressions of ‘them’ or ‘they’ in this transcript, the statement made by DC4 
‘because they were Muslims’ comes up in a software frequency search. This would 
initially indicate that DC4 is expressing distance between himself and Muslims, 
which would move the construction of his reality further out on the DST diagram, 
indicating that he is fairly cohesive with Radić, but less cohesive with Muslims. 
This is not the case with DC4, who (it is explained in the transcripts) has asked for 
anonymity as a witness to protect himself, his brother, and his family, who are 
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Muslims. Here, again, the language DC4 uses in Example 3 is due to the phrasing 
of Judge Riad: 
Example 3: Witness DC4 and Judge Riad 
1 Judge Riad: (...) why were people like him arrested?  
2 Witness DC4: Because they were Muslims. - Kvočka et al Trial Transcript 
(Testimony of Witness DC4) 8 March 2001: 8867. Emphasis added. 
The phrasing Judge Riad uses here (‘people like him’) makes it nearly impossible 
for DC4 to answer the question without using ‘they’. Software cannot be 
programmed to account for these types of situations, it is only through the 
applications of DST that the leading phrasing of questions can be identified. The 
best way forward is through manual reading, so that it is possible to identify where 
this is occurring and separate it from the more original phrasing (as was done 
above) with explanations of how these outliers occurred embedded in the model 
where necessary.  
Also important is clarification of what is being measured. The strength of DST lies 
in the fact that the mental space is something that underlies all expression. The 
example above demonstrates that although expressions can be influenced by 
interjections or the way questions are phrased, the underlying patterns remain 
constant. Methods based on cognitive linguistic framing and mapping techniques 
have come about as a response to the discovery that language is evidence of larger 
mental patterns. The example has revealed patterns relating specifically to 
categorisation, and although at times the chosen expressions of categorisation can 
be marginally influenced, the categories themselves remain solid. With the right 
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linguistic and social psychological tools, it is possible to see where the true 
boundaries lie.  
7.1 Other Patterns Found in Kvočka et al 
The example from the test case has shown that group boundaries can be effectively 
revealed through cognitive linguistic means, and that doing so has given us insight 
into the behaviours of individuals and their respective groups. Expressions of self 
vs. other reveal some beliefs by making boundaries more visible, while expressions 
of fear show how threat is treated differently depending on where these boundaries 
lie. Assessments of environment, however, can be seen in a variety of ways. Most 
prominently, this becomes more visible through the highlighting of expressions of 
what is known, believed, or understood. Expressions like ‘knew/know’ or 
‘think/thought’ can show what information individuals were coming into contact 
with, and more importantly how this helped form their opinions.  
The frequency of these expressions is not to be taken as a point in itself, because 
some of the occurrences are results of the way in which the court goes about 
establishing facts and chains of events. However, this does not mean that these 
expressions are insignificant - it relates directly to the idea that perception impacts 
action. As was stated previously, this link is at the heart of understanding large-
scale ethnic violence, as it has been commonly stated that decisions to act violently 
are determinant of how environments are assessed. The natural question is then, 
‘perception of what?’ In the case of ethnic conflict, it is often claimed that the 
primary drive toward violence lies in the perception of threat (Chirot 2006; Staub 
1989; Valentino 2004). Though Christopher Browning’s work on Police Battalion 
101 (Browning 1992) may seem like a counterargument to the role threat plays in 
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ethnic violence (Browning found several instances where threat was not a major 
factor in the violent behaviours of the battalion), this can be looked at as an 
example of the idea of ‘threat’ needing further explanation and definition. 
Browning found that a variety of factors influenced the decisions of the men 
involved, but none so much as the desire to maintain group loyalties (Browning 
1992). It can be understood, then, that in cases such as this one the willingness to 
act violently could be related to threats to the group that are internal, such as the 
threat of group fragmentation resulting from what Browning referred to as ‘refusing 
one’s share of an unpleasant collective obligation’ (Browning 1992). Taking this 
into account, threat can function in ways that are indirect or more subtle. Threats 
can be perceived as coming from outward actors, and can also be felt by individuals 
in terms of roles within the community or group.  
For this logic to function, the link between perception and action must be a valid 
one. For this validity, we need only look back to the literature on group theory. 
Theories on decision making, from appraisal theory to theories linking 
impressionability to information access, all accept the link between perception and 
action to be central to understanding behaviours (Converse 1962; Orbell 1970; 
Newcomb 1952). These theories would not have come about if the two ideas were 
unrelated, or only connected in an arbitrary or minor way. Authors committed to the 
merit of principles behind the theory of cross-cutting ties (Hibbs 1973; Levine 
1972; Ross 1986), or others following the constructivist viewpoint that a shared 
liberal identity decreases the perception of threat in terms of larger global actors 
(Rousseau 2005; Wendt 1999) are also forming their arguments on the basis that 
perception and action are inextricably linked. Even in instances where decisions are 
determined to be made primarily on an emotional basis, perception and action are 
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still the two most prominent variables in the equation, and the causal relationship 
between them is often so ingrained that it is taken as given (Monroe 2009).  
8 Conclusion 
This section has introduced the methods with which this data set is to be explored, 
and has explained the reasons and merits of the choice of these methods. The 
interdisciplinary approach joining methodologies from cognitive linguistics and 
discourse theories will allow for the data to be examined from a broader 
perspective, while also contributing analysis that will give specific insights and 
highlight the implications of discoveries made. The use of the innovative DST 
model provides a productive way to separate out linguistic indicators into the 
categories underlying them, a method which has philosophical underpinnings with 
discourse approaches that highlight the more subtle aspects of relationships enacted 
through speech.  
Initial readings of the data from the test case have shown that legal transcripts do in 
fact reveal quite a lot about communities, and examinations of the excerpts above 
from Kvočka provide a small example of how analysis of this data will work. 
Preliminary findings show that significant patterns have been revealed, with the 
specific examples given here highlighting group identification in the speech of 
witnesses. The DST analysis has shown that it maps perspectives well, but is also 
capable of highlighting unexpected results in the response patterns. These findings 
were placed within the larger literature on ethnic conflict and group violence, and 
the insights found concerning threat assessment also reinforce the findings on 
expressions of fear demonstrated in the examples, and the DST findings effectively 
support these theories.  
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These preliminary findings will bear further significance when held up against 
analysis of the rest of the chosen transcripts. Further patterns found and discussed at 
length in this thesis in the subsequent chapters (chapters on in-court instructions on 
memory, the uses of in-court expressions of emotion, comparing the speech of 
Slobodan Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj, and differences in high and low rank 
expressions of the accused) are testament to the fact that linguistics paired with 
social psychology and discourse analysis can provide an innovative look at war 
crimes tribunal transcripts, and can make a contribution to the wider understanding 
of ethnic violence.  
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Chapter Four - In-Court References to Memory: What to Remember and 
What to Forget 
 ‘Thank you very much, madam. I have no further questions. I would like you to 
forget this as soon as possible and that we can all go back to normal. Thank you.’ 
(K. Simić speaking to Witness B, Kvočka et al T-98-30-I, pg 2407/8 (eng), 
23/08/11).  
1 Introduction 
This chapter compares transcripts from individuals referred to as victim-witnesses 
in an effort to differentiate them from other types of witnesses used during 
tribunals. Looking at testimony from Kvočka et al (IT-98-30/1), Tadić (IT-94-1-T) 
and Kunarac et al (IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1), analysis has revealed that 
discussions surrounding remembering and forgetting are very frequently found 
alongside in-court struggles between the witness and agents of the court for power 
over narrative. This demonstrates that whether or not it is intended, the court 
impresses a concept of memory upon the victim-witness that is at odds with their 
personal understandings, which then has implications on victim expectations of the 
transitional justice process and broader understandings of its role in victim-witness 
interactions, potentially putting strain on the relationship between victims and the 
tribunal.  
2 Memory and transitional justice: Current studies  
Though the subject of memory has been thoroughly explored within literature on 
war crimes tribunals, there has been little work done regarding the significance of 
in-court statements surrounding the retrieval of these memories. The extensive and 
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important work done on collective memory (Beim 2007; Brants 2013; Halbwachs 
1992; Osiel 1997; Savelsberg 2007) examines key concepts, many of which are 
elaborations of the establishment of Durkheimian social facts, demonstrating for the 
scholar the importance of the links between legal power, social and historical 
constructions, and community identity post-trauma. Additional related avenues of 
research that are commonly explored under this umbrella are the concept of legacy 
in relation to the ICTY (Barasin 2011; Campbell 2008; Gow 2014; Ramet 2012), 
trauma and memory (Caruth 1995; Edkins 2003; Douglass 2003; Maček 2014; 
Zehfuss 2006), and issues of remembering and forgetting in post-conflict settings 
(Buckley-Zistel 2006; Christianson 1996; Krondorfer 2008). Attempting to add to 
the discussion on memory within the transitional justice sphere implies a tackling of 
these issues, and while this chapter will deal with some of the specifics they have 
contributed, it will do so with a more narrow focus than is commonly applied. 
Specifically, I would like to deal with in-court utterances as discourse, looking at 
direct statements of remembering and forgetting. I ask, in essence, how instructions 
on what to remember and what to forget impact power relationships in court, and 
how they might influence the ways victims experience narrative control.  
The act of remembering is inherent in court processes, so much so that the words 
used to encourage witnesses to recount events often treat memories as part of the 
legal process rather than something connected with specific individuals. 
Instructions on what to remember are therefore repetitive and automatic, and 
witnesses are often treated according to how the court views their function, even 
when there is a clear effort toward sensitivity on the part of the court. We are then 
left with several questions: Are the ways in which memories are treated in court an 
unavoidable aspect of court process, and if so, how might these treatments impact 
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perceptions of justice? To what extent do requests on what to remember and what 
to forget change from procedural requests to symbolic requests, and what does this 
say about the court’s power over memories after tribunals have finished? The 
questions posited in this chapter thus far hold within them concepts that can be 
examined alongside the literature for a more helpful understanding of the issues at 
stake. Briefly, these are: memory in the legal setting, trauma and memory, the 
specifics of remembering and forgetting, the court’s relationship with collective 
memory, and the concept of narrative control. 
 2.1 Beyond legal memory  
Memory is conceptualised within the field of transitional justice in a variety of 
ways. Pivotal to the discipline is the understanding of the making of legal memory 
– that is, the acceptance or rejection of events that comes from legal decisions 
functioning to set both legal precedent and to put the authority of the international 
community behind this version of events, whether intentional or not. This is 
primarily seen on the macro level, for example through struggles over court 
authority or issues relating to the accepting and rejection of the categorisation of 
Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) as a vehicle for expanding the concept of 
culpability (Danner 2005; Gibson 2008; Kerr 2004). While one might argue that 
these issues do not relate directly to legal memory (more to legal precedent), I 
would contend that these concepts are related under the heading of the 
establishment of authority on the part of the ICTY. The ways in which international 
criminal law prioritises events and creates an archival record of its own dealings 
forms particular conflict histories that fit with the international legal narrative. The 
importance of this when looking at memory on the individual level is that the 
wielding of authority on the part of the ICTY as manifest in landmark decisions is 
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the crux of the power that in turn finds its way into the memory discourse I am 
dealing with.  
Work done by Baharona de Brito (Barahona de Brito 2010) takes a broadly 
theoretical approach that has benefited the discussion by bringing it beyond the 
basic issues of how voicing memory impacts the healing process. She calls for 
interdisciplinary approaches to the study of memory and transitional justice, and 
approaches memory within transitional justice along a similar line of enquiry as the 
one I am suggesting here, albeit along a more philosophical avenue rather than the 
more empirical approach that I offer. Her work focuses on the pairing of memory 
studies with transitional justice studies, but she applies Wilber’s (Wilber 2001) 
‘domains of knowledge’ to the field and categorises disciplinary approaches in a 
way that engages more actively with debates on human rights theory 
(universalist/rationalist traditions) and neither employs suggested methods 
practically nor suggests direct ways in which analysis might be undertaken. This 
research, however, is encouraging and speaks to the potential for a new and 
innovative approach to databases left by war crimes tribunals that many may 
erroneously view as being behind us.  
 2.2 Memory, trauma, and the concept of the unspeakable 
The link between memory and trauma is well-researched, and the concept is 
frequently dealt with in terms of its role in post-conflict reconstruction as well as 
the role it has in constructing historical discourse. Tribunals certainly come into 
this, however they do so primarily as vehicles of (or impediments to) the voicing of 
memory as part of the healing process. Adding critical depth to the discussion is 
Jenny Edkins’ excellent book Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Edkins 2003), 
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which has become a platform upon which many important studies have built, 
linking memory and trauma with key elements in international relations such as 
security and foreign policymaking within the critical discourse setting (Bell 2006; 
Maček 2014; Resende 2014). In this work, Edkins tackles the difficult concept of 
how trauma becomes separated from language. Going beyond the issue of the 
victim’s ‘voice’ being appropriated and used by others as a part of court process, 
she brings the Lacanian perspective to what is happening in court. On the 
experience of speaking about trauma, she writes, 
There the traumatic experience is seen as something that takes place outside 
language. In that sense it is not experience at all, in that it cannot be made 
sense of or recounted in language. In Lacanian terms, it is an encounter with 
the real. The Lacanian real is that which is outside the linguistic realm, 
outside the symbolic or social order. (Edkins 2003: 213).  
She adds to this the interpretation of Giorgio Agamben (from Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life), and his analysis that speaking about trauma is an 
attempt to bring this pure reality back into pre-existing linguistic barriers which in 
essence functions to destroy its truth (Edkins 2003).  
Why then analyse court statements with such emphasis on linguistic 
categorisations? This chapter makes the important distinction of not analysing court 
statements as artefacts of experience, but as evidence of social process. While this 
doesn’t expressly reject the Lacanian understanding of the memory of trauma - 
whether it exists in truth outside language or within language outside truth, it is still 
possible and indeed necessary to then extend our understandings of how these 
linguistic barriers function and to what extent the court setting changes them. These 
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ideas will be expanded upon in a moment, but first it is helpful to turn to another 
perspective in the discussion.  
There are arguments within critical theory on the ‘unspeakable’ and the role of this 
concept within the act of recounting traumatic memory that bear discussing at this 
point. Thomas Trezise (Trezise 2001) gives a thorough exploration of the uses, 
meanings, limitations (and through limitations, functions) of that which is 
‘unspeakable’, using the Holocaust as the domain for discussion. He is 
comprehensive in how the word is conceived, giving three possible meanings for 
‘unspeakable.’ The first is that something is, in actuality, ‘verbally 
unrepresentable’. The second use for ‘unspeakable’ is to convey that something is 
‘indescribably bad,’ and the third use encompasses the idea that something may not 
or cannot be spoken of, because of the social implications resulting from its 
utterance. These three categories are not entirely disconnected, and on the first 
category he states that to claim the Holocaust is unspeakable: 
(…) is also to recognize that the Holocaust does not lie entirely “outside” or 
“inside” of language, since, on the one hand, to ascribe to it an ineffable 
exteriority is already to represent it, to interpret what supposedly surpasses 
interpretation, while on the other, to contend that it is now strictly a matter 
of representation and interpretation is to ignore or deny the extent to which 
their linguistic medium has been disrupted and altered by the Holocaust as 
event. The Holocaust only “exceeds” speech because its effects are internal 
to speech itself (Trezise 2001: 41). 
 
It may seem that we are presented with contradicting viewpoints of the same act – 
the act of speaking about trauma. On the one hand, we have Edkins’ Lacanian view 
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that traumatic experience occurs outside language, and therefore the act of speaking 
about it in a court setting is to pull it into a realm that will in effect, strip an 
essential essence (truth) from it. On the other, we have Trezise claiming that 
trauma, as connected to event, is something that cannot be claimed to be either 
inside or outside language, as there are two things happening simultaneously that 
can point to it being both. In short, it being ‘unspeakable’ is a representation, but 
more than simply assigning representation through the inability to represent, we 
have its disruption of the linguistic medium. These two views, however they may 
seem to contradict each other, are actually speaking about two different aspects of 
the same thing, and when made to interact within the same discussion can add depth 
to how we perceive the act of speaking about trauma.  
 
Edkins’ emphasis is on the attempt to speak about something that is ‘outside’ 
language, and the way that these attempts can change the nature of the traumatic 
memory. This chapter seeks to understand the way that the power of the court 
influences memory, and while ‘truth’ in a traditional sense is not something sought 
by this research, it cannot be discounted that the experience of trying to bring what 
may be a ‘pure reality’ back into parameters of language may create within the 
witness an additional sense of loss.  
 
Trezise’s discussion gives a more practical approach to how the idea of the 
‘unspeakable’ is understood in that he looks at how it might be impacting the ideas 
with which it is interacting (or with which it is failing to interact). Most notably, the 
implied moral points of reference within the second understanding of ‘unspeakable’ 
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(something is unspeakable because its negative aspects cannot be described), and 
the fact that the normative frameworks which situate it are limited:  
 
It is to acknowledge as well that this inadequacy does not characterize the 
framework in relation to an object lying completely “outside” of it, but 
instead reflects the internal disruption of the framework by a “fact” that 
exceeds its limits. Indeed, one could even say that this excess is precisely 
what imparts to the judgment itself its peculiar force (…) (Trezise 2001: 
42).  
 
Therefore, not only is rendering something ‘unspeakable’ to assign to the event the 
power to disrupt the common standards of evaluation in place within normal 
language, but this may be the reason the term carries with it additional emotional 
sensations implied through its inability to be bound. This is important, as the 
attempt to speak about trauma and the frustrations that accompany these attempts 
(as demonstrated in greater detail in chapter 5 on emotional expression within 
witness testimony) can be located within testimonies and deconstructed, and these 
understandings of what can and cannot be spoken of must be considered. Hence 
Edkins’ understanding of the complexities involved in the explanation of a 
traumatic memory is important to considering the fraught linguistic relationship 
between the victim-witness and interrogator, because there may be things occurring 
under the surface of the words spoken that make evident the process of making 
something conform to a format it inherently rejects. The ‘force’ that Trezise 
ascribes to the use of ‘unspeakable’ may be a reclaiming of the power behind the 
true understanding of the traumatic memory on the part of the witness, and the use 
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of a term that breaks the limits of linguistic frameworks is the means through which 
this can be done.  
2.3 Remembering and forgetting within personal narrative 
While this chapter deals directly with utterances of remembering and forgetting, 
these concepts resonate in a variety of disciplines under larger, more theoretical 
headings. The anthropological, historical and philosophical literature on the 
concepts of remembering and forgetting is extensive to the point that some have 
deemed the subject exhausted (Berliner 2005), while others have broadened it to 
include elements relevant to post-conflict reconstruction such as wilful forgetting as 
a (potentially dangerous) tool of reconciliation (Buckley-Zistel 2006; Krondorfer 
2008) or as a natural process of nation construction (Anderson 1983; Misztal 2003; 
Renan (1882) 1990). While literature on the philosophy of remembering and 
forgetting (often cycling back to Nietzsche’s argument on forgetting as a necessary 
way to avoid being ruled by the past) paints an important picture of the traps 
societies might fall into when navigating their own understandings of histories, the 
arguments for remembering and forgetting often reduce down to questions of 
morality. As Maja Zehfuss explains, 
…the supposed ‘knowledge’ about the past is presented as an ethico-
political question about the present: we know what is right because we 
remember (Zehfuss 2006), p 228. 
How then, do we properly conceptualise these types of efforts in the court setting? 
Adding the dimension of testimony to the conversation on remembering and 
forgetting brings with it the implication of the court’s moral decisiveness as a final 
statement on how conflict memories should be treated. This makes the occurrence 
of in-court discussions on forgetting all the more worthy of study, especially as this 
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topic is not without controversy (Brants 2013). For the ICTY in particular, there is a 
tension between the need to encourage victim testimony and the problems of fact 
and verification that are inherent in the processes of transitional justice (Dembour 
2004). As we see in the testimonies included here, a clear dichotomy emerges along 
emotional lines: remembering is categorised alongside justice, while forgetting 
appears in the context of apology and remorse, at times functioning as a tool for 
questioning credibility.  
2.4 Symbolic and collective memory and the ICTY archive 
In order to properly discuss memory at the ICTY, the concept of collective memory 
needs to be touched upon briefly, as this is a subject that has previously been a 
central focus of scholars when talking about memory and international criminal 
tribunals (Brants 2013; Crane 1997; Denich 1994; Osiel 1997; Savelsberg 2007). 
While there is extensive research on collective memory, I will highlight some of the 
important claims from this literature in the context of the ICTY archive in 
particular, in an effort to examine past studies in a manner that better suits the aims 
of this study. Collective memory is relevant to ICTY archival analysis in terms of 
the broader community function (and indeed, international functions) of the court. 
As Kirsten Campbell states,  
…this archive does not passively record memories, but instead actively 
constructs memory as an object in the present through its juridical, 
international, and transitional structure (Campbell 2012). 
 
Understanding the archive as an element of memory construction in itself places it 
in an interesting position when defining collective memory with ICTY 
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characteristics. This implies that the oft-discussed concepts of collective memory 
introduced by Halbwachs (Halbwachs (1950) 1997) and elaborated upon by so 
many others (Beim 2007; Crane 1997; Gedi 1996; Misztal 2003; Osiel 1997; 
Ricoeur 2004) are only part of the ICTY archive’s memory dimensions. The dual 
cognitive linguistic and discourse analysis of the transcripts makes it clear that there 
are layers of memory functioning in this atmosphere. This is not an entirely new 
idea – indeed much of the literature on transitional justice and memory makes 
separate space for understanding legal memory, collective memory, and individual 
victim memories (Minow 1998; Osiel 1997), but understanding what memory truly 
means in the ICTY context requires more than the categorisation of types of 
memory. The archive’s construction of ‘memory as an object in the present’ speaks 
to an active connection between these types of memory, leading the scholar to 
question what the relationships between them might mean. Essentially, memory 
construction in the court setting is not a singular, containable process but something 
that occurs as a result of the intersection of several different structures, each with 
potentially different aims. Because of this, the ways memories are expressed, 
referred to, questioned, and understood can change in accordance to the way they 
each shape the discourse. For example, the way a memory is expressed impacts 
how it is referred to later in proceedings, but the way the court deal with these 
references (whether they are questioned, validated, etc.) can change the defining of 
the memory itself and how it is understood.  
Abstract as this may sound, it is precisely what the results of this study have 
highlighted. Focusing specifically on in-court utterances surrounding remembering 
and forgetting, we can pinpoint the interactions between legal memory, as it was 
loosely defined in section 2.1, and individual memory. The archive’s preservation 
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of these interactions brings the tensions discovered into the present, and this fragile 
relationship between the individual and the court becomes an object of the 
discourse itself, which will be demonstrated through the analyses of testimonies 
below. 
2.5 The concept of narrative control and the victim as witness 
The idea of individual responses in court being influenced by perception (both 
through situation and audience) and intention was spoken about in chapter 3, but is 
beneficial to discuss further under the heading of the victim-witness specifically. 
The philosophical discussions surrounding the discourse of the witness give a 
multi-layered analysis of this practice, ultimately placing the witness and his or her 
testimony head-to-head with the search for truth (Douglass 2003; Misztal 2003). 
Indeed, much of the literature on the philosophy of memory and witnessing 
concerns itself with the experiences of the witness within the envelope of truth and 
its location in discourse, and while this is certainly a noble enterprise, this study 
will set aside the navigation of truth in witness discourse in favour of broader 
understandings of what courtroom interactions can reveal to the social scientist.  
However, there are elements of this body of research that can give interesting 
perspective on the little-researched concept of narrative control. The notion that one 
has control over one’s own statements is a tenuous one in the ICTY, an issue that 
very likely stems from the nature of the regulatory and hierarchical format of court 
proceedings in general. This has been highlighted by scholars both in terms of the 
victims as well as perpetrators (Ivković 2006; Pena 2013; Schomburg 2011). 
Questions then arise regarding whether or not testimony is proprietary and, if so, 
how this ‘ownership’ of accounts influences interactions in court. Karyn Ball’s 
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exploration of the denial of gas chambers (claims made by Robert Faurisson in 
Mémoire en défense: contre ceux qui m’accusent de falsifier l’histoire, 1980) 
demonstrates the ways in which the philosophy of Jean-François Lyotard 
categorises what she deems ‘the rhetorical parameters of knowledge production’. 
This gives rise to the notion that the ‘property’ of truth cannot be shifted (even in 
the event of linguistic resituating) as it ‘belongs to’ the object of discourse  rather 
than to any transferrable meaning (Ball 2003: 255). This understanding is important 
to note because the results of this chapter indicate that the perceptions of the 
speakers function on the notion that the ‘property’ of truth can in fact be shifted. 
Placing this within the courtroom, we can see that it underlies tensions that arise 
between witness and interrogator, and in the context of one specific phenomenon 
discussed later in this chapter – namely, the direct suggestion by the interrogator 
that the witness forget an experience after it has been recounted – the proprietary 
aspect of an account is then in effect being taken away from the individual by an 
institution (by way of a representative of the court).  
The concept of the victim-witness is referred to frequently enough in academic 
literature that it has become commonplace, and invokes larger concepts. 
Discussions of storytelling as a tool for personal healing, the construction of 
collective memory, and critiques of the effectiveness of ‘justice’ for the victims 
abound, and have all contributed to the weight that now sits behind the term (Brants 
2013; Haslam 2004; Horn 2009; Mendeloff 2009; Minow 1998; Osiel 1997; Pena 
2013). While it initially seems the prudent term to use in order to distinguish 
between the other types of witnesses who give testimony before international 
criminal tribunals, the pairing of ‘victim’ with ‘witness’ adds a categorical 
reference that automatically implies a difficult personal history, and then sets this 
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implication alongside the individual’s function in the court. While this is not 
uncommon (expert witnesses being another example), the uniqueness of this 
position lies in the bridge between personal experience of trauma and function for 
the victim-witness.  
The problems that arise from this category go beyond the commonly addressed 
‘needs of the witness vs needs of the court’ to include attitudes so entrenched in the 
institution of the ICTY that they are frequently unnoticed. This is addressed by 
Dembour and Haslam, who give one of the few analyses of in-court responses to 
witnesses, examining transcripts from Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic (Dembour 
2004). They bring up crucial questions about the relationship between the witness 
and the court in the context of the ICTY’s adversarial and inquisitorial models, and 
give direct examples of court responses to witnesses that are similar to those 
analysed in this chapter. However, while Dembour and Haslam have noticed similar 
patterns in the dialogue between court agent and witness, I maintain that these need 
to be not simply acknowledged, but deconstructed. Therefore, building on this 
small pocket of transcript research, cognitive linguistics offers an avenue for deeper 
inquiry.  
3 Examples 
The witness statements analysed in this section are from three cases all relating to 
offences within Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Prosecutor vs Kvočka et al (Case 
Number IT-98-30/1), Prosecutor vs Kunarac et al (IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1) and 
Prosecutor vs Duško Tadić (Case Number IT-94-1-T). The case concerning 
Miroslav Kvočka et al deals with lower ranking individuals at the Omarška 
internment camp in the Prijedor region - Miroslav Kvočka, Dragoljub Prcać, 
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Milojica Kos, Mlađo Radić and Zoran Žigić. Kvočka, Prcać, and Radić were 
professional police officers before the conflict who took on a variety of roles in the 
camp, with Radić the most senior of the group (Radić was a shift leader). Kos was a 
guard, while Žigić was a civilian taxi driver-turned-guard who acted as a reserve 
policeman. Victims of this camp testified to the harsh conditions, physical and 
psychological violence and torture carried out by guards in the camp, as well as 
instances where murder was witnessed or known individuals disappeared never to 
be seen again. Kunarac et al addresses crimes in Foča committed by Dragoljub 
Kunarac, Radomir Kovač, and Zoran Vuković, who were members of varying 
status in the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) sentenced for egregious acts of rape, 
torture, enslavement and outrages upon personal dignity against Bosnian Muslim 
women and girls as young as fifteen.  
The Tadić case was a landmark case in several respects, however this is not the 
reason I have chosen to look at selected transcripts. Again dealing with violence in 
the Prijedor region, this case specifically relates to the actions of Duško Tadić, who 
was the president of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) in Kozarac. The Tadić case 
tested the limits of the ICTY’s jurisdiction and powers at the very beginning of its 
working life (Kerr 2004). Tadić was guilty of personally killing and abusing 
Muslims during the attack on Konarac, and aiding in the detainment and forcible 
transfer of civilians. As Tadić was one of the first to be tried before the ICTY, 
witness transcripts from this case give an interesting look at what types of 
exchanges were happening in court between victim-witnesses and court 
representatives, while Kvočka et al reveals what behaviours continued and 
solidified, and in certain cases became even more exaggerated.  
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3.1 Forgetting as a symbolic request: Witness B and Emir Beganović  
The quote used at the start of this article is from the end of a lengthy testimony 
given by a protected witness (known as Witness B) in the case known as Kvočka et 
al. For clarity of analysis, I include the quote again, as Example 1. 
Example 4: Witness B 
1 ‘Thank you very much, madam. I have no further questions. I would like you to   
2 forget this as soon as possible and that we can all go back to normal. Thank you.’ 
- K. Simić speaking to Witness B, Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of 
Witness B) 19 May 2000: 2407-2408.  
While the direct request to forget is very significant (as is the way in which 
identities arise embedded in the language used – ‘I would like you to forget this 
(…) and that we can all go back to normal’), which will be discussed in a moment, 
this comes after definitions of Witness B’s role is defined to her by defence 
counsel. K. Simić states:  
 
 
 
 
 
Example 5: Witness B 
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1 Q. Yes, the arrivals. You explained that. You said where you were standing, what 
2 that looked like, so let's not return to that. But were you ever present, as a witness 
3 -- don't be so surprised. You're a witness, so I have to ask you whether you  4 
saw. Witnesses see, if you see what I mean. - K. Simić speaking to Witness B, 
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness B) 19 May 2000: 2403. 
Emphasis added.  
Defining the witness by her role places her among the court processes as a piece of 
the larger legal environment, giving the clear message that the individual is seen by 
the court as synonymous with her function. Even though the act of being a witness 
at a tribunal implies this, the instruction given here by the defence not only defines 
for her what it is to be a witness, but what the act of witnessing is. The comment is 
evidence to her presence as a witness being defined not as she sees herself, but 
through how she is seen by the court. For the witness, these are issues of seeing and 
being seen, but the defence attorney’s role is more about hearing and being heard. 
The witness is an essential element in his point being heard, rather than the witness 
being heard directly.  
Regarding the embedding of identities within the statement referred to earlier - ‘I 
would like you to forget this (…) and that we can all go back to normal’, there are 
several things at stake here. First, there is the power of the interrogator to direct the 
witness on how he would like her to treat her memories. This is significant whether 
or not he is referring to her memories of testifying, or the memories of her 
experience during the conflict that she was recounting to the court. The second part 
of the statement, referring to ‘us all’ implies that he might mean the latter, which 
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does bear strong implications on how this interrogator sees his own power to speak 
for a group that depends on her ability to forget.  
The issue of normalcy is also of great significance. The idea of ‘normal’, and the 
witness’ memories as a barrier holding back the group from reaching some 
previously occurring state of ‘normal’ implies that her memories are not only a 
barrier to some form of reconciliation, but also that the interrogator (and through 
him, an element of the court) are the authorities of what this previous state of 
normal was and should be, and how ‘we all’ might best get back there. The 
intention of this statement was very likely not to demonstrate this, and may very 
well have arisen out of an attempt at a polite closing on the part of the defence. 
Regardless, the social-psychological interpretations of the impact this type of 
statement can have on the wider court environment indicate that these ideas – 
creating barriers between victims and a ‘reconciled’ or ‘normal’ group or groups 
(barriers formed of the victim’s own memories) - may underlie not only court 
discourse, but social and community discourse as well.  
These parting sentiments are not uncommon at the ICTY, and while they may seem 
benign, the idea of forgetting is often invoked. Attempting to address someone who 
has just spent hours testifying to terrible abuses must be understandably difficult, 
and the issues that must be navigated by the interrogator or judges involved when 
trying to properly thank someone for spending time in such an emotionally 
exhaustive state must not be discounted by the scholar. However, this does not 
mean that linguistic trends present among these statements should be ignored, 
particularly when they so often reinforce the strata of power relationships inherent 
in court hierarchies.  
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At the end of testimony from witness Emir Beganović (a Bosnian Muslim detained 
at the Omarška internment camp) during the Tadić case, Judge Rodrigues states:  
Example 6: Emir Beganović 
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Witness, thank you very much for coming here. We wish 
2 you to be able to resume the friendships that you had, to be able to forget       
3 hatred, and to be a good witness of peace and good relations with other people, 
4 those who have other political options, other religious, even, beliefs and ethnic   
5 beliefs. So thank you very much. You may go now. - Tadić Trial Transcript 
(Testimony of Emir Beganović) 19 July 1996: 1562. Emphasis added.  
 
The text in bold highlights the section of Judge Rodrigues’ statement that is similar 
to the earlier example from K. Simić. Though the concept of normalcy is not 
touched upon, similarities are found in the expression of a collective (‘we’) 
directing the individual (‘you’) toward the act of forgetting. The next phrase is 
interesting as well, as it invokes the role of the witness directly, but in an open and 
symbolic way. The literal court witness is transformed into a ‘witness of peace’, 
contrasting with the previous concept of hatred mentioned. The addition of a value 
judgement (‘good’) further adds to the weight of the witness’ responsibility in the 
wider symbolic sense, with implications of future community interactions 
underlying the statement.  
A closer breakdown of the statement demonstrates the way in which the court 
instructs the witness in dealings with the wider community:  
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We (wish)     You (to be a good witness to)   Those 
(other) 
 
Continuing with the testimony of Emir Beganović from the Tadić case (he also 
testified later during Kvočka et al), there is an interesting treatment of memory by 
the witness at an earlier point in his testimony, when he is asked about what he 
noticed during an incident at Omarška: 
Example 7: Emir Beganović 
1 Q. Did any of the others have a similar colour belt? 
2 A. I cannot remember at this time, nor did I try very hard to observe that. I was 
3 -- I did not believe that I would come out of the camp and especially that a day   
4 would come that I could testify to being there. If I had been aware of that, I     
5 would have remembered and observed more. 
6 Q. I understand that, and do not take any of these questions as being a criticism of 
7 you. I am asking them as part of my job, you understand? – Tadić Trial Transcript 
(Testimony of Emir Beganović) 19 July 1996: 3814-3815. Emphasis added. 
Here there is an interesting effort on the part of the witness to move the memory 
through the entire cognitive space, as show below: 
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Figure 4: DST model for Emir Beganović 
 
This bears significance in terms of individual perceptions of the responsibility to 
remember, linked closely with survivor’s guilt (Minow 1998). Seeing evidence of 
this in memory retrieval is interesting not only because it demonstrates the witness’ 
own understanding of his responsibility and (perceived) failure to remember, but 
the reaction of the interrogator in reinforcing his role in this responsibility. The 
response in italics above (lines 4-5), while part of an attempt by the interrogator to 
make the witness feel less of a burden regarding his own forgetting, then includes 
the express explanation of the interrogator’s job in order to depersonalise his role in 
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this exchange. This depersonalisation denotes a desire on the part of the speaker to 
use his role (or ‘part of my job’ as he states) as the true generator of the 
unpleasantness of the exchange, shifting responsibility to a more powerful platform 
(from himself as an individual to himself as a lawyer).  
This is an interesting divergence from the more common phrases used to make 
witnesses feel that there is some sympathy in the room, which usually begin with 
apology (very common in ICTY transcripts is the prefacing of questions - 
especially concerning rape and sexual violence – with, ‘I’m sorry to have to ask 
this, but…’).9 The witness expression of his perceived failure to remember followed 
immediately by the interrogator’s shifting responsibility toward professional role is 
subtle but significant evidence to the ways in which court professionals further 
embed existing hierarchies upon memory retrieval itself.  
3.2 Control over memories: The examples of Edin Mrkalj and Witness 
87 
A different example of the role of memory during ICTY witness testimony can be 
found in the testimony of Edin Mrkalj, who testified in Kvočka et al and also 
detailed his time interned at Omarška. During his testimony, conflicts between his 
answers and the intentions of the defence lead to emotional exhaustion on the part 
of the witness, as he struggles with expressing his experience on the court’s terms. 
This leads him to abandon control over his own narrative, saying things throughout 
his testimony such as ‘What do you want me to answer now?’ (Case No IT-98-30/1 
                                                          
9
 For example, during the testimony of Witness 87, a rape victim from Foča – ‘Q: I'm sorry to have 
to ask you this again, but could you tell the Court specifically what he did?’ - Kunarac et al Trial 
Transcript (Testimony of Witness 87) 4 April 2000: 1683.   
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Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvočka et al, 23 August 2011, English transcript pg 2914) 
and ‘This is a catastrophe.’ (Case No IT-98-30/1 Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvočka et 
al, 23 August 2011, English transcript pg 2913).  
During this time, there is a struggle between the witness and the interrogator, and 
then the interrogator and the judge. This leads the judge to instruct the witness 
directly on the role of forgetting in court:  
Example 8: Edin Mrkalj 
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Witness, you have to answer questions   2 
put to you. If you can remember, you say so. You tell us what you remember. If  3 
you can't remember, you simply say, "I can't remember." That is an answer to the 4 
question. - Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Edin Mrkalj) 23 August 
2011: 2933. 
This instruction leads the witness to more obviously abandon control over his own 
narrative, using the act of forgetting as a way out of his struggle with the court. He 
replies:  
Example 9: Edin Mrkalj 
1 A. I can't remember. You're quite right. To avoid this further torture, I can't      
2 remember those things, and I don't want to go into them. It was the worst situation 
3 for me. - Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Edin Mrkalj) 23 August 
2011: 2933. 
This instruction is an interesting contrast with the previous example, although it is 
again referring to forgetting, this time it is not a soft request (as we see with the 
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other example), but a reminder to him that forgetting is an option. Interestingly, in 
all the instructions to remember, the witness is then treated as if he is unaware that 
forgetting is a valid option. 
Interestingly, his frustration seems to stem from the fact that he can remember, but 
being compelled to recount these experiences is outside the way he sees his role as 
a witness, especially given his previous descriptions of the same experiences to the 
court. He takes the option of forgetting as a reaction to the court – ‘To avoid this 
further torture’. The fact that he also includes the phrase ‘you’re quite right’ is an 
interesting indicator as to his views on the judge’s statement. Here, we see him 
accept not only that forgetting is an option, as the judge is reminding him, but that 
forgetting is a tool that he can use in the face of his ordeal in court.  
Edin Mrkalj’s struggle with his narrative indicates that his memories could stand 
symbolically as properties of the court – something once given, one should not have 
to give again as the court is already in possession. Earlier he states: 
Example 10: Edin Mrkalj 
1 A. It's rather hard for me to go back to those events, because for years I have been 
2 trying to forget them and to simply wipe them away from my memory. And I     
3 have answered these same questions so many times. I see no need for me to make 
4 the effort to look back. - Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Edin 
Mrkalj) 23 August 2011: 2932. 
As with Witness B, there remains this issue of the witness as a mouthpiece for the 
lawyer’s point to be heard, which brings us back to the question posed at the 
beginning – Is this type of treatment of memories a necessary part of court 
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processes, and if so, how does this impact perceptions of justice, and in turn, 
reconciliation? The desire to remember or forget is something unique to 
individuals, and cannot be seen as something that is fixed once decided upon. 
Though both witnesses in these examples are standing before the court in a 
voluntary capacity, the pressure of legal process taking precedence over the 
witness’ own personal narrative power can produce additional pressure to forget, as 
we see with Edin Mrkalj. Conflictingly, in instances where forgetting has not been 
an issue, as with the Witness B example, forgetting is still brought up as a 
suggestion to the witness, implying that once the act of bearing witness has taken 
place, forgetting is something that should take place.  
The impact this has on perceptions of justice and reconciliation is difficult to 
discern, but can be seen in terms of the messages these exchanges could be sending 
– messages that form court environments, and messages that are reflections of or 
instructions on community behaviours. This research, as research into these 
messages, also exists as only one line of enquiry in a field previously dominated by 
emphasis on legal successes and failures.  
Below, Witness 87, a rape victim from Foča testifying in Kunarac et al (IT-96-23-T 
and IT-96-23/1), is asked during cross-examination about why there are differences 
in her responses to the same questions when comparing her testimony to past 
interviews. The example demonstrates an interesting depersonalisation that occurs 
when discussing the difference between ‘no’ and ‘I don’t remember’.  
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Example 11: Witness 87 
1 A. I can't really say. Perhaps at that time it slipped my memory. Perhaps simply it 
2 just came. I don't know. 
3 Q. Today when the Prosecutor asked you about Kovac's mother, you said that she 
4 never came nor did she ever bring food. Is that correct? 
5 A. It is, yes. 
6 Q. Also on the 5th of April this year, in the cross-examination on page 1805,     
7 when I asked you, "Did Kovac's mother ever come and bring food to you?" your 8 
answer was that you could not remember. 
9 A. Yes. Yes. I don't remember his mother -- I don't remember Klanfa's [sic]     
10 mother ever coming to us. 
11 Q. So what is correct, what you're telling me or what you told the Prosecutor, "I 
12 don't remember," or, "She did not come"? Which is correct? 
13 A. She did not come. 
14 Q. Then on the 5th of April, why did you tell me that you did not remember if 
15 she came? 
16 A. Well, perhaps it was my fault, perhaps the way I pronounced those words, but 
17 both times it meant that that woman really did not -- I mean, Klanfa's [sic]     
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18 mother did not come to the flat. 
19 Q. Let me refresh your memory. It was not your fault. During the cross-    
20 examination with me on the 5th of April, you answered, "I don't remember," 49 
21 times to my questions, and today you answered all those questions specifically. 
22 You did give answers to all those questions. So -- 
23 A. And what do you mean by that? 
24 Q. I'm merely telling you how you're answering the questions, and what I 
25 think about that I shall say in my closing argument. It has nothing do with 
26 you. 
27 A. If I say, "I don't remember," it means I do not remember. And if I say    
28 "No," then that means no. 
29 Q. Yes, but on the 5th of April, you told me, "I don't remember," and to the    
30 Prosecutor today, you answered, "No." 
31 A. Quite. 
32 Q. So will you please explain why? Why did you say, "I don't remember," then 
33 and now you said "No"? 
34 A. This difference -- I don't know. I don't really know what to say. - Kunarac 
etal Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness 87) 23 October, 2000: 6120-6123. 
Emphasis added. 
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Though seemingly benign, the phrase ‘Let me refresh your memory’ is used by the 
interrogator as a precursor to restating the witness’ past responses. While this is a 
colloquial and common turn of phrase in several languages, its use in the court 
setting does have significance on the memories in question. First, it implies that 
testimony (and in effect, memories), once given, becomes the property of the court 
as the witness’ own knowledge of it can be declared suspect. This echoes the issues 
discussed earlier surrounding narrative control, and the example above gives clear 
evidence to this shift in ownership by immediately following this exchange with 
linguistic separations – ‘it was not your fault’ and ‘it has nothing to do with you’ 
alongside the reference to the interrogator’s personal use of the witness’ answers 
(‘what I think about that I shall say in my closing argument’). All the witness is left 
to do is define her answers through repetition (‘if I say no, then that means no’) and 
articulate her confusion (‘I don’t know what to say’).  
Strategically, the interrogator appears to be questioning the credibility of the 
witness through the demonstration of the unreliability of her own memories. This is 
not uncommon in cross-examination tactics, but deeper analysis of it can give us 
insight as to why the interrogator might push for the depersonalisation discussed 
above. As Paul Ricoeur states, 
The specificity of testimony consists in the fact that the assertion of reality 
is inseparable from its being paired with the self-designation of the 
testifying subject. The typical formulation of testimony proceeds from this 
pairing: I was there (Ricoeur 2004: 163). 
For Ricoeur, the witness label begins with this admission (I was there), and is only 
a label one can attach to oneself. If the ‘assertion of reality’ is tied to this concept, 
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then the reality of the witness is also self-designated. The personal power over 
one’s own testimony, narrative and memories stems from this ownership of the 
witness designation. The shift to the court’s designation and use of the witness and 
her testimony, the statements that it is being used ‘for’ something (closing 
argument) that belongs in the realm of the court only (‘it has nothing to do with 
you’) demonstrates that this exchange contains more than strategic attempts to 
discredit memories. Clear lines emerge where the court’s functions do not simply 
outweigh witness testimonies, but simultaneously claim to be the true originators of 
the witness role and the vehicle through which this role is ignored.  
4 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that references to remembering and forgetting during 
witness testimonies are significant utterances that can change the nature of several 
important elements of the court environment. Testimony analysis has shown that 
expressions of forgetting made by the interrogator can introduce the idea of 
forgetting as a symbolic request. This places a priority on forgetting as a tool for 
reconciliation (implying that the witness’ memories are the barrier for the collective 
return to ‘normalcy’, as was shown with Witness B) but also introduces a power 
relationship where the interrogator has the final say in how a witness should treat 
her memories. Additionally, there are issues of control over memories that arise 
between witness and interrogator, with forgetting used as a tool for avoiding 
traumatic testimony, but only after the option is given to him by the judge (as 
shown with the testimony of Edin Mrkalj). Testimony analysis here has also 
demonstrated that there is a struggle over the proprietary aspects of testimony, and 
the idea that once given, testimony is used for purposes within the courtroom that 
might be unrelated to the witness’ role (as shown with Witness 87).  
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Addressing the wide array of literature on memory and applying certain ideas found 
there to the cognitive linguistic analysis I have undertaken has demonstrated that 
this broad field, while spanning several disciplines, has unique ideas that add new 
angles to the way this type of discourse analysis is both undertaken and understood. 
Although the concepts of remembering and forgetting form popular discussions in 
academia, there are gaps that if left unaddressed, could have serious implications 
for the definitions of what it means to remember or forget on one’s own terms 
versus the terms of the court. While it may seem an oversimplification to claim that 
these issues come down to power in the court environment, it is plain that given the 
analyses here, there are blatant interactions where personal power over witness 
memories is undermined in favour of a variety of court powers.  
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Chapter Five - Expressions of Emotion in Witness Testimony: Power 
Relationships and Narrative Control 
 
1 Introduction 
Examining expressions of emotion as relayed on the stand by victims of ethnic 
violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina may at first seem like something of a 
redundant enterprise. Emotion is something easily linked with trauma, and it 
therefore might be expected that highlighting these expressions will simply give us 
a marker for a traumatic memory. While this may seem an obvious by-product of 
war crimes tribunals in general, these expressions are by no means insignificant.  
Through the application of cognitive linguistic and sociolinguistic methods, 
examining expressions of emotion alongside expressions of situatedness and deixis 
(the projection of one’s place in the world and expressions relating to self or 
identity, respectively) reveals several significant things. In the case of the accused, 
it demonstrates how realities were constructed, and how emotions informed choices 
that were made in times of perceived threat (this will be explored further in chapter 
7, comparing high ranking and low ranking accused). In the case of the victims, it 
demonstrates how the strength of these expressions in the courtroom solidifies the 
narrative of the victims, breaking with previously demonstrated patterns of power 
relationships commonly displayed in courtroom settings.  
This chapter is an examination of victim testimony, theorising that in-court 
expressions of emotion from victims are markers of struggles for power between 
the individual and the court, which ultimately make a statement about the 
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importance of emotion in the personalisation of recounted trauma. This then 
produces a paradox within the court – the symbolic power of the court allows for 
the seriousness of the crimes brought before it to resonate with the communities 
that have been affected, while its processes to reveal truths are often at odds with 
the ways in which individuals are able to express these memories. The most basic 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that in-court expressions of emotion are 
significant. They give a more complete picture of a previously under-analysed 
element of post-conflict transitional justice – the relationship between victim and 
tribunal as an autonomous process that constantly bridges past, present and future 
understandings of this conflict. 
 1.1 Cases  
To understand how these expressions come about and how their influence functions 
within the courtroom, three cases are compared from different regions of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. While a search across all cases before the ICTY might yield 
interesting results, an up-close examination of testimony from these three cases 
allows for several significant research strengths. First, in examining only these 
cases in-depth, it allows for a comparison of witnesses brought before the court by 
both the prosecution and the defence who are speaking to similar circumstances and 
recounting similar events, but from different perspectives. This allows for a more 
comparative study of expressions of emotion while in court, asking - are these 
expressions of emotion unique to victims who are testifying for the prosecution 
about personal traumas, and who struggle for power over their testimony when 
cross-examined by the defence? Or do they arise in a more uniform manner, 
whenever a witness feels his or her testimony is being marginalised by the court? 
Second, I have chosen to compare some cases in which the type of violence was 
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similar, and another in which it differed significantly. The cases chosen are the case 
of Momčilo Krajišnik (IT-00-39), Milomir Stakić (IT-97-24) and Miroslav Kvočka 
et al (IT-98-30/1). 
Momčilo Krajišnik was responsible for the forcible deportation of several 
thousands of Muslim and Croat civilians between April-December 1992, in various 
places in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His position was one of leadership, which took a 
variety of forms during the war – he was a prominent member of the SDS (Serbian 
Democratic Party in BiH) and was President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.  
Milomir Stakić held several positions of authority in the Prijedor region, and was 
the president of the Serbian Crisis Staff in this region in 1992 and the Head of the 
Prijedor Municipal Council for National Defence. He was instrumental in the 
establishment of the internment camps in this region (Omarska, Keraterm, and 
Trnopolje), and in the deportation of approximately 20,000 non-Serb residents of 
Prijedor. Additionally, he was responsible for several mass-executions of non-Serbs 
in 1992. 
The case concerning Miroslav Kvočka et al deals with lower ranking individuals at 
the Omarska internment camp - Miroslav Kvočka, Dragoljub Prcać, Milojica Kos, 
Mlađo Radić and Zoran Žigić. Kvočka, Prcać, and Radić were professional police 
officers before the conflict who took on a variety of roles in the camp, with Radić 
the most senior of the group (Radić was a shift leader). Kos was a guard, while 
Žigić was a civilian taxi driver-turned-guard who acted as a reserve policeman.  
While Kvočka et al and Stakić operated in the same region, these cases concern 
events in this region from different angles, with questions in the Kvočka case 
focusing on specific abuses of prisoners and overall conditions in the camp, and 
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questions in the Stakić case dealing primarily with the Crisis Staff and the overall 
atmosphere created in Prijedor as a result of their actions under Stakić. The 
Krajišnik case focuses heavily on the timelines, experiences and effects of those 
forcibly transferred, and the examples used here are from the Bijeljina region. 
These three cases give us a variety of data to examine – testimony relating to 
campaigns of fear and arrests (Crisis Staff, Stakić), testimony relating to abuse in 
camps (Omarska, Kvočka), and testimony relating to forcible transfer (Bijeljina, 
Krajišnik), which allows for more varied events to inform the study. This chapter 
will analyse expressions of emotion in ICTY transcripts categorically, first by 
identifying and explaining the two categories of expressions examined relevant to 
the type of discourse being studied, and then by tackling each category in turn, 
integrating examples from the transcripts.  
2 Explaining expressions of emotion 
Attempting to define expressions of emotion is a difficult undertaking. Linguistic 
markers for expressions of emotion are not defined in any solid way, and in looking 
to see what significant patterns exist surrounding something this difficult to define 
demands some creativity in approach. While other chapters in this thesis begin with 
searching for basic linguistic markers such as uses of us/them distinctions for the 
analysis of high and low rank accused (chapter 7), or references to the past in the 
comparison of testimonies of Milošević and Šešelj(chapter 6), an exchange between 
witness and interrogator in which emotion is expressed cannot be reduced to a 
standard set of words or phrases. This is where categorisation is important – 
determining different categories of emotion expressed has allowed for consistency 
of analysis as DST methods are utilised within these categories, rather than 
comparisons made from category to category, which would confuse the data.  
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Psychological studies on emotion are extensive but varied, with scholars breaking 
down elements of the cognitive process into both measurable and abstract 
components. Defining emotion has been something scholars have sought to do 
since 1884, when psychologist William James, together with Carl Lange, defined 
emotion as the interaction between the mind and body in the face of stimulus 
(James 1884). Although basic, this definition fuelled psychological debate on the 
subject over the following years, creating the platform for many new definitions 
(Averill 1980; Edwards 1999; Izard 1992; Russel 1991; Scherer 1982, 2005). These 
definitions range from regarding emotion as a process consisting of multiple 
components (Scherer 1982) to emotion being whatever individuals claim them to be 
(Averill 1980). With such divided psychological definitions of emotion, it is 
unrealistic to expect linguistic identifiers to be easy to explain, and unwavering in 
their functions. 
The main categorical distinctions I have defined are 1) emotions expressed relating 
to real-time in-court events (frustration and confusion with court processes and 
questioning, for example), and 2) emotions expressed with reference to a past event 
(such as an individual explaining his fears of what would happen if he refused to 
comply with orders). The latter includes emotions relating to the recounting of past 
events, such as reluctance to recount something, or insistence on the difficulties 
faced when recounting events. It is important to note that these types of expressions 
can frequently overlap, one giving rise to the other. This in itself is also significant, 
as expressions of frustration and confusion relating to how past fears are being dealt 
with in court demonstrate a strong link between the role of power over personal 
narrative regarding recounting past events and the control the court exercises over 
the context and interpretation of these events.  
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Within each of these categories of emotional expression, the DST analysis can tell a 
more specific and accurate story, and demonstrates the consistency of emotional 
expressions as linked to struggles for narrative power. It is also important to keep 
several questions in mind alongside the DST results. For example, who are these 
expressions referring to or directed at, and what might this mean? Essentially, this 
is to ask how categories are revealed within emotional expression.  
When looking at testimony of both victims and accused, it is important to 
remember that there are always inherent differences, as there are differences 
between the responses of witnesses from either standpoint when being questioned 
by different sides of the legal divide. This research has determined that there is a 
greater frequency of expressions of frustration, confusion and anger coming from 
prosecution witnesses being questioned by defence than when they are being 
questioned by prosecution, and tension levels in general appear to rise during cross-
examinations, regardless of who is doing this cross-examining.
10
 When the 
adversarial nature of cross-examination is considered alongside this frequency, the 
hypothesis that struggles for power over narrative are occurring as marked by 
expressions of emotion also appears to be confirmed. 
Also important is determining what is meant when referring to ‘the court’ or ‘the 
Tribunal’ when deconstructing roles and speech patterns. It is easy to personify and 
reduce ‘the court’ to one homogenous body with singular outcomes, and indeed 
phrases like ‘the Tribunal heard’ and ‘the Tribunal will decide’ are common in 
research, media, and general discussion. What is usually implied here are the 
                                                          
10
 There could be several factors involved in this, two of the main issues being the time it takes to 
get the witness to cross-examination, and the repetitive and often confusing nature of cross-
examination tactics.  The prepping of witnesses beforehand could also account for reduced tension 
levels due to their encounters with familiar questions, a topic discussed in chapter 7.  
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actions and decisions of judges after interaction with the various other components 
that make up the Tribunal. In an effort to steer away from this type of reduction, 
this chapter will focus on the particular element of the court impacting the 
testimonies being analysed, be this judge, prosecution or defence. However, these 
three may frequently fall under one heading, which I will refer to as ‘the 
interrogator’. This is primarily for ease of distinction between roles (the questioner 
and the one being questioned), and because interrogators often switch while the one 
being questioned does not.  
3 Current studies: Emotion in the courtroom, emotion in linguistics 
There are a wealth of studies on emotion in the courtroom, primarily tackling issues 
of truth and credibility. Ellen Wessel explains what is called the ‘emotional witness 
effect’, building on work done earlier by Kaufman et al and Myers et al on how 
emotions can influence judgements in jury trials (Dahl 2007; Kaufman 2003; Myers 
2002; Tsoudis 1998; Wessel 2012). Though conclusions in these studies (primarily 
that emotions expressed from victims increase a juror’s opinion of their credibility) 
seem unrelated to non-jury trials such as those held at the ICTY, the important point 
to take away from these conclusions is that emotion and credibility have been 
proven to be linked in the mind of the observer. Whether or not an awareness of this 
link is always present in the speaker is difficult to determine and for the purposes of 
this chapter will not be explored, as the patterns examined with DST do not rest on 
this issue.  
Studies on truth and credibility as connected to emotion may dominate the 
discipline of court psychology and linguistics due to the fact that truth is at the 
foundation of courts and their functions. Additional studies focusing on truth and 
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emotion in court, such as those done by Laney and Loftus (Laney 2008, 2010) and 
Lee Ann Fujii (Fujii 2010) also explore the opposite elements of this equation, 
namely that there is a place for false memories within emotional expression. 
Literature on expressions of fear more generally in interviews primarily focuses on 
police interviews, and seeks to explain situations in which individuals feel unsafe 
and develop anxieties regarding the likelihood that they will be victims of crime, or 
understandings of victimhood in general in the face of interrogation (Garafolo 
1979; Holmberg 2004; Skogan 1987).  
The work on truth, emotion and credibility is relevant to the first category of 
emotional expression I have outlined above, while this last body of work is relevant 
to the second category of emotional expression – emotion expressed within a past 
memory. These types of expressions, when examined alongside the interrogation 
literature, confirm what the DST theory also demonstrates: that expressions of 
emotions like fear relate directly to projected victimhood, whether this is forward 
projection (the expectation of victimhood) or backward projection (memory of 
victimhood). The gap in the literature that this chapter hopes to address is the 
relationship between emotional expression and power with control over narrative. 
As was mentioned above, analysis of patterns highlighted by DST demonstrate that 
emotional expressions can be markers of struggles of power between the individual 
and the court.  
This chapter aims to build upon the small amount of literature examining the uses 
of emotion in court, with a particular focus on emotional description and language, 
asking, ‘what is the relationship between memory, emotion, and victimhood in 
court?’ Not much work has been done with respect to emotional expression in 
court, and the majority of what exists does not address international criminal 
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tribunals (aside from work done by Sedgwick on military tribunals after the Second 
World War, and Elander on expressivism at the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
courts of Cambodia) (Elander 2013; Sedgwick 2011). The larger platform of 
literature this chapter draws upon is primarily work done examining the witness 
experience before international criminal tribunals, such as the study on the Krstić 
trial done by Dembour and Haslam on the tension created between the aims of the 
tribunal and the needs of the witness (Dembour 2004), as well as several studies on 
the overall victim-witness experience (Brants 2013; Horn 2009; Moffett 2012), 
most notably Eric Stover’s book, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of 
Justice in the Hague (Stover 2005).  
The trauma of testifying is something that should not be discounted as an initiator 
of emotional expression, and could be seen as the more basic explanation for its 
prevalence in the transcripts studied in this chapter. However, linguistic analysis 
has demonstrated that these expressions, while they exist within a scenario that may 
be difficult and even traumatic for the victim/witness, are more than simply a 
reaction to a difficult situation. If we take James’ original definition of emotion as 
the paired mental and physical response to stimuli, we have to accept the role of 
stimuli as being both external and internal. Although James meant this to mean that 
emotions like fear can arise from assessment of things like physical peril, we can 
extend this to include external linguistic prompts that trigger internal cognitive 
(leading to linguistic) processes.  
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4 Emotions relating to in-court events: The tribunal’s role and expressions of 
frustration and confusion 
The most obvious examples of emotional expressions as markers of power struggles 
are found when looking at expressions of frustration and confusion in response to 
happenings in court. In the testimony of prosecution witness Edin Mrkalj, a witness 
in Kvočka et al, there are several exchanges demonstrating this that benefit from 
further analysis. Edin Mrkalj was a Muslim from the village of Biscani, near the 
town of Prijedor, where he worked as a policeman. At the end of April 1992, he 
was detained at Omarska after attending a meeting held by the Serbian Crisis Staff 
where he refused to sign a document declaring his loyalty to the Serb Republic 
(testimony on 7 June 2000, p 2801-2803). Mrkalj gives three distinct and important 
types of expressions: confusion leading to a relinquishing of control over his 
testimony, expression of difficulty leading to role reversal in an attempt to convey 
the extent of his trauma, and a lack of freedom in his testimony embedded within 
expressions of difficulty. 
4.1 Relinquishing control: Frustration  
The following examples demonstrate struggles for control over narrative on the part 
of Mrkalj, with Mrkalj relinquishing control over his own testimony:  
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Example 12: Edin Mrkalj 
1 Q. So after the 6th you are saying that buses with prisoners came to Omarska?2 
A. I didn't say buses. Could you please put your question in concrete terms? I    
3 don't know what you want me to say. 
 
4 Q. I want you to tell us the truth.5 A. I am telling the truth. - Kvočka et al Trial 
Transcript (Testimony of Edin Mrklaj) 9 June 2000: 2902. Emphasis added.  
And again : 
Example 13: Edin Mrkalj 
1 Q. Would you read sentence 1 of paragraph 7. Mr. Mrkalj, I see you've read it. 
 
2 A. Well, you see, I haven't read it. You can't see well. I see that you don't see  3 
very well because I haven't read it. The word "u koju" is written separately, two 4 
words. But, yes, I have completed reading now. 
 
5 Q. Is this an order to the mine's management of Ljubija to organise meals in      
6 conformity with the members of the military quartermaster service? 
 
7 A. That's only what it says on paper. 
 
8 Q. Please go on to read the second sentence of paragraph 7 so that we can wind  9 
this up. 
 
10 A. This is a catastrophe. 
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11 Q. I expect an answer, Witness, not a comment. Is it an order that the Mines' 
12 Management should organise a regular cleaning of the compound and everything 
13 else? 
 
14 A. Yes, that is what it states. 
 
15 Q. I should now like to ask you to read paragraph 11 on that same page. 
 
16 A. It says here –  
 
17 Q. Very well. You've read it, then. 
 
18 A. I haven't read it, because I can't see the number. I can't see what time it says. 
 
19 Q. It says 1200 hours. 
 
20 A. In my text it says "unit," and then there's nothing else, so I can't find my way. 
 
21 Q. Is this an order that the Security Services coordinators are duty-bound every 
22 day, at a particular hour, to send in a report to the chief of the Prijedor Public  23 
Security Station? 
 
24 A. That is what it says here. 
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25 Q. Who are the coordinators? And if you haven't remembered, we can go back 
26 to paragraph 3 on page 1 to remind you. 
 
27 A. What do you want me to answer now? - Kvočka et al Trial Transcript 
(Testimony of Edin Mrkalj) June 9 2000: 2912-1914. Emphasis added.  
 
His expression of frustration (shown in red) appears between two expressions 
indicating a relinquishing of control, namely, ‘I don’t know what you want me to 
say’ and ‘what do you want me to answer now?’ shown in blue. These expressions 
contain within them a concession in favour of the desires of the other, which in the 
case is the interrogator. The tension between the witness and interrogator is implied 
in the additional lines in the example, through contradiction and disagreement. 
Mrkalj’s struggle with the interrogator is akin to retaliation in this exchange, and in 
bold in Example 13 he makes an interesting criticism of the interrogator and his use 
of ‘I see you’ve read it [the document]’. Mrkalj responds with, ‘I see you don’t see 
very well,’ rejecting the interrogator’s ability to assess what he, the witness, knows. 
Mrkalj’s question, ‘what do you want me to answer now?’ could also be seen as a 
criticism of the interrogator, saying subtly that he is asking leading questions. 
This demonstrates not only that Mrkalj’s expressions of frustration mark power 
struggles, but that victim-witnesses can and do make commentary on the court’s 
processes during testimony. Until now, these have largely been passed over as 
extraneous responses, or ignored as the reactions of a difficult witness, but they 
bear importance as recorded and therefore lasting elements of the re-victimisation 
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of the victim-witness, this time placing the witness as a subject of marginalisation 
by agents of the court.  
4.2 Expression of difficulty and role reversal 
 
As was mentioned earlier, statements of difficulty occur frequently in victim 
testimony, often standing out as attempts to relate the present audience (the court) 
with past situations. Applying DST to the example below (in blue) we can clearly 
see this link between current mental state and past trauma – though we don’t need 
DST to reveal this, the witness expresses this plainly enough (‘It was brought on as 
a consequence of what happened…’). A struggle then ensues, with both witness and 
interrogator arguing over which end of their exchange has failed, question 
(interrogator) or answer (witness). Mrkalj responds to the interrogator, K. Simić, 
and the court by placing them firmly as witnesses to his own recurring trauma 
(shown in red/blue – ‘you witnessed’, ‘everybody was present’). Simić’s response 
treats this simply as courtroom data, as evidenced by his statement, ‘we already 
completed that question’ shown in bold.  
 
 
 
 
Example 14: Edin Mrkalj 
 
1 Q. Could you tell us what kind of -- what the manifestations of your illness or the 
2 consequences of what you have suffered are? 
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3 A. My psychological state is very difficult, and it was brought on as a           
4 consequence of what happened in the camp. 
 
5 Q. Yes, but could you tell us how this is manifested? Will you wait for me to     
6 finish? The Judges have been drawing my attention to ask concrete questions, so 
7 I'm asking you about the manifestations. 
 
8 A. Nobody has yet warned me. 
 
9 Q. Well, we were warned earlier on and you were asked to answer my questions. 
 
10 A. So you were cautioned, not me. 
 
11 Q. I think both of us were cautioned. 
 
12 A. Well, I have every respect for the work you do, and the consequences of the 
13 camp and what happened in the camp are as follows: The day before yesterday 
14 you witnessed a very -- quite an unusual event which took place here, and I see 
15 that everybody was present during the identification of accused, of a witness. 
16 When I turned around and had to point out the real name, I had a terrible scene 
17 conjured up in my mind, come to mind. 
 
18 Q. I'm not asking you that. We completed that question. I'm just asking you the 
19 manifestations of your health condition. - Kvočka et al Trial Transcript 
(Testimony of Edin Mrkalj) June 9 2000: 2918-2919. Emphasis added.  
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This struggle is interesting and unique: it demonstrates that the question of how the 
witness’ psychological trauma has manifested is expected to be answered in data 
(‘concrete’) terms according to the interrogator, but cannot be expressed this way 
by the witness. The preceding exchange over who is at fault for the lack of mutual 
understanding additionally undermines what the witness is trying to express, 
potentially giving room for him to answer in a way that more directly links the 
physical space of the court to his experiences (‘you saw what happened to me in 
court’). The response of the interrogator further reinforces a lack of connection 
between the witness and himself. It is these failed understandings/connections that 
could point to the origins of issues on how the effectiveness of the Tribunal is 
perceived from parties outside the court, which again links this research with other 
research such as Stover’s interviews with ICTY witnesses, and highlights a need for 
a continuation of studies on this subject (Hodžić 2010; Stover 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Discussions of ‘normalcy’ and the loss of narrative freedom 
 
The example below demonstrates the witness’ expression of how the court confined 
his testimony and his attempt to regain previously lost control over this testimony 
by expressing the seriousness of conditions in the camp:  
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Example 15: Edin Mrkalj 
 
1 Judge Rodriguez: You mentioned, and you used -- regarding a visit and        
2 improvements in the camp, you mentioned that that visit was masked. Could you 
3 explain what you meant by the word "masked"? What was masked in that visit? 
 
4 A. I can explain, yes. I can tell you what happened. That was the first time that I 
5 saw a quarter of a loaf of bread; that was the first time I got a full plate of food.  
6 You see, I was hungry. It was the first time that I saw something like that. This  7 
was done for somebody to see that things were fine for us. That was the cosmetic 8 
improvements that I was referring to. But that was not the real state of affairs   
9 that I have had to read out to you today, without having the ability to       
10 comment on what I read. I will tell you the truth. The paper that I read, the   
11 piece of paper, it is equal to pieces of paper from the Second World War that  12 
were written in camps such as Auschwitz. They can be compared to those. 
 
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Witness, has that paper got anything to 
14 do with the cosmetic improvements that I was asking you about? 
 
15 A. Yes. What I was reading today simply has nothing to do with reality, not a 
16 single paragraph; it is just dead letter on paper. And they are trying with these 
17 cosmetics to persuade this Court that we were fine, and we were not fine, ever. 
- Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Edin Mrkalj) June 9 2000: 2959-
2960. Emphasis added.  
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He does this by giving the contrasting views of normalcy demonstrated for the 
court. His repeated use of ‘first time’ (bold) demonstrates that the situation he 
describes is not normal, and his reference to his loss of narrative freedom (shown in 
red) leads him to draw comparison with past events proven to be traumatic 
(Auschwitz) in order to emphasize the seriousness of the situation he is describing. 
In blue are his expressions attempting to assert that his narrative is more powerful 
than the paper he read, as it is his narrative that is rooted in reality (blue: ‘just a 
dead letter on paper’) 11 and comes from human experience. Using this phrase to 
describe the paper he read shows his need to convince the court that there is an 
important difference between live, human testimony and that of a passive exhibit. 
This need is another indicator of feelings of marginalisation on the part of the 
witness. His struggle for power over his narrative continues (bold italics) as he tries 
to reiterate for the court that ‘fine’ was never a condition in the camp. 
 
 
 
5 Recounting past events: Reluctance, expressions of difficulty and expressions 
of fear 
Tension for an individual often increases as a result of recounting past fears, and is 
echoed in testimony. As such, it is important to look at expressions of fear on their 
own through the lens of DST – Are these expressions primarily collectivised or 
individualised? Do they explore alternate scenarios using conditional language? If 
so, how does the individual’s experience of fear impact the choices he or she felt 
were available (or not available, as the case may be)? These questions are posed 
                                                          
11
 The expression in B/C/S can translate as ‘mrtvo slovo na papiru’, and is a relatively common 
expression used to describe something written that has no power behind it, akin to ‘empty promises’ 
in English.   
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here because they break down more fully the situating of an expression of fear 
within a memory. Different answers to each would prioritise elements within the 
speech differently. For example, if expressions of fear more commonly referred to 
collectives, the indicator would be that the boundaries discussed were broader, 
demonstrating a higher tendency for expressions of fear to occur within statements 
concerning larger groups, such as ethnic groups or political parties. The goal of 
exploring these questions is to look at expressions of fear both individually and 
comparatively, to attempt to understand more fully what these expressions signify. 
In this excerpt from witness Amir Delić, a Muslim resident of Bosanki Novi who 
fled in 1992, we see an expression of fear as part of recounting a past memory 
leading to a power struggle between the witness and interrogator: 
 
 
 
 
Example 16: Amir Delić 
1 Q. You have described a number of people effectively agreeing to be incarcerated 
2 in the stadium because presumably they had no other option, or it was their best  3 
option. Did I understand your evidence correctly in that regard? 
4 A. (Delić) Look, people were afraid of staying in houses, I said that several   5 
times, because during the night, this infamous red van would pull up and a man  6 
who was in the house would be taken away. That was why we felt safer when we 7 
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were together with other people, and that's why I believed I was safer to be there 8 
with others rather than stay at home. At least this way there would be people who 9 
would know that I had been taken away. 
10 Q. Why, then, do you agree to be released? Did you have no option? Did you  11 
have to leave the stadium at the point of release? 
12 A. What else could I have done? 
13 Q. Well, what I'm trying to explore with you is this: Some people, some men, 14 
came to the stadium voluntarily and agreed to be locked up there because it was 15 
the worst -- I beg your pardon, it was the best of a number of bad options. 
16 A. Well, you see, if someone takes me to the stadium at gunpoint and then, 
17 after a while, tells me that I ought to go home, what am I to say to this     
18 person? No, I'm going to stay here? I don't know what you mean by that. - 
Krajišnik Trial Transcripts (Testimony of Amir Delić) 27 June 2006: 26397. 
Emphasis added. 
In bold is an expression of fear leading the witness to express frustration in the way 
this event is being co-constructed, while the red indicates evidence of pre-existing 
event construction from the interrogator. The blue shows an expression best 
explained through the use of the possible space – here conditional past is coupled 
with a projected scenario involving himself demonstrates the victim’s reality and 
his assessment of possible choices. There is then a struggle between the interrogator 
and the witness due to the interrogator’s assumption that feeling safer was 
synonymous to being safer in the eyes of the witness. The witness then uses the 
example of being brought at gunpoint to help explain to the interrogator the lack of 
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choice implied, a response that also indicates that there was an assumption from the 
interrogator that the witness had choices that he himself did not believe existed. 
5.1 Expressions of fear as solidifiers for us/them groupings 
The example below is from witness Sifeta Susić, who was an administrative worker 
at a police station in Prijedor before her detention at Omarska. Here, she describes 
her reaction to the mounting tensions in her office, and her eventual departure: 
Example 17: Sifeta Susić 
1 A. I followed my superior into the office. I put the mail on his table for him to    
2 sign; I waited. He was pale in the face and I was shaking. I was almost crying. 
 
3 Q. What, if anything, did you say to your boss, Ranko Mijic? 
 
4 A. I didn't say anything. 
 
5 Q. What, if anything, did you decide to do after that? 
 
6 A. That was close to the end of the working hours. I packed my table, cleared    
7 things away, and, like all the other employees, I went home. I couldn't sleep all   
8 night; I cried because this really did hurt me very deeply, because I finally      
9 realised that I was undesirable among this circle of people who were my    
10 friends and colleagues until the day – until yesterday. In the morning I took the 
11 keys, reported to my boss, left the keys on his table and said I was sick. I went to 
12 see a doctor and went on sick-leave, and I never again entered SUP, except on 
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13 the day when I was taken into custody. - Kvočka et al Trial Transcript 
(Testimony of Sifeta Susić) 9 June 2000: 2988-2989. Emphasis added. 
 
Here we see us/them distinctions form as she articulates how her ‘in-group’ shifts, 
but important in this is her reluctance, her hurt (bold), at no longer being a part of 
this group.  
Regarding her arrival at Omarska, she states: 
Example 18: Sifeta Susić 
1 Q. And what, if anything, did you notice about the condition of these persons? 
 
2 A. Those persons were standing there afraid and lost, just as I felt. My       
3 colleagues from work were passing by me, turning their head away from me,  4 
whereas I looked them all straight in the eye, because I had nothing to fear. But 5 
this was terribly painful, having been so close, such good friends with so many 6 
people for so many years and they refused to look at you. - Kvočka et al Trial 
Transcript (Testimony of Sifeta Susić) 9 June 2000: 2994. Emphasis added.  
 
 
 
Example 19: Sifeta Susić 
 
1 A. Yes. I remember Jadranka Cigelj, whom I knew personally, who approached  2 
me immediately because I was crying terribly. I was terrified. She consoled me. 3 
She whispered, "You'll manage. Look at the rest of us. We're still alive. So you 4 
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must bear out, as we have. You have to." Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony 
of Sifeta Susić) 9 June 2000: 3000. Emphasis added.  
 
In the above examples, the expressions of fear by the witness lead not to a struggle 
over narrative control, but to clearer us/them group distinctions. Interestingly, her 
expressions of fear in the first example serve to further unite her with the prisoners, 
and separate her from the staff. Her statement in blue in the first example identifies 
her with the group of prisoners through their mutual emotion, whereas in red she 
explains the opposing evasive behaviours of the staff. In bold, we see her rejection 
of fear in the face of the newly defined ‘other’.  
In the second example, the witness’ expression of fear stands again as a marker of 
group ties. In blue, she explains how she felt at the moment, and the response from 
the group is to unite her with their motivation to survive. These examples give us 
one answer to the question posed at the start of this chapter – how are categories 
revealed through emotional expression? Here, fear is equated with ‘us’, but also 
rejected in the face of ‘them’ (‘I looked them all straight in the eye, because I had 
nothing to fear’). In this way, it is a defining factor of the group, but also something 
to overcome.
12
 
With protected witnesses, it is important to this analysis to discern whether or not 
the witness is a victim, due to the fact that some of the protected witnesses are also 
accused in other cases and protected for reasons of safety as they testify against 
former colleagues or fellow soldiers. Others, like Witness D, are victims whose 
identities are protected to ensure their safety and the safety of their families, as 
                                                          
12
 For additional analysis of expressions of fear in the Kvočka case, I refer the reader back to the 
methodology chapter, to the comparative analysis of testimonies of Witness DC4 and Mrs Kvočka.   
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many still live in the communities about which they are speaking, among 
individuals who may disagree with their decisions to testify or their versions of 
events.  
While the details of the pre-conflict occupation and life of Witness D were 
discussed in closed session, it is clear to the court that he is male, of Bosnian 
Muslim ethnicity, and was a detainee at Omarška. He was a member of the SDA 
(Stranka Demokratske Akcije, or Party of Democratic Action), the Bosnian political 
party representing Bosnian and Slavic Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
states that this was a reason he was initially warned not to report for work one day 
at the end of April 1992 (2 May, 2002, 2479-2480). Witness D gives testimony 
describing his experience going into hiding in Prijedor, and gives his interpretations 
of the environment in which he found himself while trying to avoid being captured 
and detained.  
There are several interesting examples of emotion expressed within past memory by 
Witness D, and he also expresses fear within a past memory, but does so differently 
to Sukić and Delić. Several times he equates the Serbian Crisis Staff with fear:  
Example 20: Witness D 
1 Q. What did you learn about the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staff in Prijedor? 
 
2 A. What I was able to learn, or guess at, was based on my rare occasions when I 3 
listened to the radio, because I had to save on the batteries so as to be informed as 4 
to what was going on. For me, the Crisis Staff meant fear. I had the impression 5 
that everything that was being done in Prijedor, absolutely everything, that       
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6 behind it stood the Crisis Staff. - Stakić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of 
Witness D) 2 May 2002: 2486. Emphasis added. 
 
And again, 
Example 21: Witness D 
1 Q. Were there references to the Crisis Staff on the radio? 
2 A. Yes, very frequently. Whenever anything important for the town happened, no 
3 name was mentioned, but simply "the Crisis Staff." It was a "proclamation of the 
4 Crisis Staff." In my impression, it was the highest level body, but for me it      
5 simply meant fear. - Stakić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness D) 2 
May 2002: 2487. Emphasis added.  
In the first example, we see in red the expression of fear linked with a group (the 
Crisis Staff), but this is prefaced by a personalisation of this interpretation, with ‘for 
me’ shown in blue. In bold we see an expression of symbolic placement, with his 
use of the preposition ‘behind’ linked to the negative events Witness D has been 
describing in Prijedor.  
The personalisation expressed in blue delineates group boundaries, but in a more 
subtle way than in the previous testimonies analysed. The repeated use of ‘for me’ 
demonstrates that in the eyes of the witness there was a group or groups for whom 
the Crisis Staff did not equal fear. In this statement, the ‘other’ is therefore implied 
with the repeated personalisation of these feelings of fear. But what does this tell 
us, aside from something that already seems inherent, given Witness D’s history of 
suffering at the hands of this group? The fact that tensions were mounting between 
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Serbian groups and the Muslim citizens of Prijedor seems relatively clear at this 
point, so us/them distinctions should be natural in the descriptions of these events.  
But with Witness D gives more imformation – he continues on with descriptions of 
this fear, explaining where it comes from. The explanation he gives centres around 
the concept of uncertainty (marked in bold):  
Example 22: Witness D 
1 MR. BERGSMO: We go back to the document Minutes of the Meeting of the    
2 National Defence Council on the 5th of May 1992. If we can move to conclusion 
3 seven on page two, there is a reference at the end of that paragraph to "the most  4 
rigorous sanctions." In light of your professional and other experiences in       
5 Prijedor, how do you understand these words? 
 
6 A. For me, to say the least, this conclusion sounds threatening because the     
7 application of the most rigorous sanctions, one can only imagine what that can 
8 mean. To me, that is like a death threat or threaten -- threat of arrest. It is a      
9 threatening provision in any case and it is hard to imagine what lies behind  
10 the threat, exactly. - Stakić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness D) 2 
May 2002: 2529. Emphasis added.  
 
There are consistencies in this statement with his previous statements 
(personalisation in blue, prepositional in red), in addition to the explanations of 
threat and where the threat comes from (uncertainty), both marked in bold.  
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The significance of this is best seen through the social psychological lens, most 
notably through the uses of uncertainty as a catalyst of threat perception and/or as 
an intimidation tactic during conflict (Lake 1998; Oberschall 2000). What this 
example adds to these studies is its subsequent mark on memory. The presence of 
uncertainty as a facilitator of fear within court testimony confirms three things for 
the research: first, that expressions of fear are markers of solidifying ethnic 
boundaries, second, that uncertainty acts as a tactic to spread fear (both points well-
known in the study of ethnic conflict) and finally, that the linking of these concepts 
in post-conflict testimony by a victim stands as evidence of the effectiveness of 
these tactics. The personalisation of fear moves from expressed within a past 
memory, as in the earlier excerpt, to a present analysis, and finally into a more 
collectivised hypothetical (‘one can only imagine…’). The movement from 
memory to present is certainly partially linked to the way the questions were 
constructed for the witness, and indeed this is a common caveat to be aware of in 
this type of analysis – individuals almost always answer questions in a structure 
similar to the way these questions were posed. However, the personalisation 
contrasted by the move to a hypothetical collectivisation demonstrates a widening 
of the fear, and thus an effort to include others in the present situation (such as the 
court audience) in the imagining of these threats.  
 
6 Outliers: Implied emotion and expressions of guilt 
Being forced to harm fellow inmates was unfortunately common at Omarska, and 
during the conflict in general. The recounting of this understandably puts the 
witness in a difficult situation emotionally. Victims placed in this position are still 
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victims, but the court environment is one in which actions are analysed in binary 
terms (right/wrong, legal/illegal, innocent/guilty, victim/perpetrator). This seems to 
drive the witness towards expression commonly found in the speech of perpetrators, 
such as expressions of distancing and/or de-humanising, discussed in greater detail 
in chapter 7.  
 
Example 23: Edin Mrkalj 
 
1 Q. What happened after that? 
 
2 A. After that, when I fell down and when I regained consciousness, I was ordered 
3 -- he ordered me to hit the person lying down. When we came in, the person was 
4 already on the ground. I had no choice. 
 
5 Q. What was the condition of this person that you were forced to hit? 
 
6 A. He was in a catastrophic state. It's very difficult to explain. A dreadful state. 
 
7 Q. What part of his body did you hit him on? 
 
8 A. The head. 
 
9 Q. What was the condition of his head when you hit him? 
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10 A. I couldn't recognise him, whether it was a man or what it was. It was all  
11 smashed up. 
 
12 Q. When you hit him, what did it feel like? 
 
13 A. There was a groan, a cry. The man was still giving out signs of life. It is very 
14 difficult to describe the sounds that came from him, and the whole thing. But I 
15 had to do it. 
 
16 Q. What happened – 
 
17 A. I was forced to do it. - Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Edin 
Mrkalj) 7 June, 2000: 2825-2826. Emphasis added. 
The example above shows two types of expression on the part of the victim, it 
demonstrates a lack of choice as justification (blue) and distancing in the form of 
de-humanising (red), where the speaker changes from using ‘him’ to using ‘it’ to 
describe the individual he was forced to hit. This parallel between victim and 
perpetrator speech raises several important issues. First, it demonstrates that this 
type of speech, previously associated with perpetrators, is not unique to them. 
Second, given this fact, we need to question whether the victim is still feeling that 
the court perceives him as such. This refers not to a shift in the perception of the 
court, but the court’s role in shifting the victim’s self-perception. But is it the 
incident itself that can shift the victim’s own perceptions of his actions, or the 
court’s role in his recollection of it? The psychological literature would steer us 
toward concluding the former, as this type of torture is particular in its aims – by 
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making the victim commit an act of violence against another victim, a layer of 
cruelty is added in the form of both a strain on the morality of the victim forced to 
commit the act of violence, and a symbolic act against his or her own ethnic group.  
 
This is vaguely addressed in international law under the prohibition of various 
forms of torture (both physical and mental), but international law does not address 
the specific damages that this particular type of torture can produce, and how these 
damages are specific to ethnic conflict.
13
 The evidence brought out by this thesis 
highlights not only the specific and unique cruelties that this form of torture aims to 
bring about, but also the fact that, given the psycholinguistic evidence in the speech 
of the witness, the effects of this type of torture are specific and lingering. In light 
of this evidence, avenues of further research are highlighted, and more investigation 
into these tactics, their uses, and effects is needed, especially as this type of act is 
most commonly associated with ethnic conflict. 
 
The testimony of Witness P is an interesting example of testimony that is careful 
and controlled, with emotional expression implied by the events themselves rather 
than the witness’ own interpretation of them. Before the conflict, Witness P was a 
driver with his own company in the Prijedor municipality. During his testimony, he 
details how he and his wife and children were forced out of Kozarac and explains 
how he was told this was due to the area needing to be ‘cleansed’ (3330-3331, 22 
May, 2002, Prosecutor vs Milomir Stakić, IT-97-24). Witness P was detained first 
in the Trnopolje camp, and then at Omarska. 
                                                          
13
 See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 
UNTS 287. 
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Common among witnesses is event description that verges on tautological, giving 
the impression that the witnesses feel a need to repeat for the court that a horrible 
event was in fact horrible. This demonstrates that there may be a doubt in the mind 
of the speaker that his or her descriptions are truly being heard and interpreted 
correctly, regardless of the nature of the event being described. This can be 
interpreted as a failure of language to convey what the witness is hoping to get 
across, which is something of an impossible task – how to get a group of strangers 
to feel and truly understand things like this individual’s particular loss, horror, 
humiliation or fear.
14
 We see this especially with witnesses who have a difficult 
time on the stand (such as the earlier examples from the testimony of Edin Mrkalj) 
and this is not something that the DST theory picks up as significant, but a pattern 
recurring across multiple testimonies identified through general reading.  
Witness P not only refrains from this tendency, but at one point gives an implied 
explanation for his straightforward approach. He does this by outlining his view of 
the Tribunal’s interests, highlighting a difference between ‘speaking about’ and 
‘mentioning’. He states:  
Example 24: Witness P 
1 Witness P: As for the disappearance of people from the camp, let me put it that   
2 way, I do know about many such cases, although the Tribunal is not really     
3 very interested in me speaking about these incidents except to mention the   
4 names of the persons who were taken away from some rooms and never -- to  5 
the white house and never came back. And indeed, have never been seen since. 
 
                                                          
14
 This follows from the discussion in section 2.2 on the concept of the ‘unspeakable’. 
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6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May I briefly interrupt. Of course, this Tribunal is      
7 interested, and please feel free to say whatever you want also spontaneously. - 
Stakić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness P) 22 May 2002: 3363. 
Emphasis added. 
 
Judge Schomburg’s interjection to reassure Witness P that the Tribunal’s interests 
do in fact include whatever he would like to say do not convince him of his 
freedom to speak as he wishes. He uses this time to give the Tribunal what he feels 
matches its interests, and provides a list of those he knows were killed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 25 Witness P 
1 Witness P: (…) as for the other killings, I can mention the killing of Jasmin     
2 Hrnic, Eno Alic, and Emir Karabasic, who was also an active police officer from 
3 Kozarac. They were killed in front of our rooms in a large hall. All the rooms on 
4 the first floor could hear -- everybody in those rooms could hear these people     
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5 being tortured and the way that they were killed. And later on, they disappeared  6 
on that day from those rooms in the camp. That is as regards those three people.  7 
And I can also mention some other people who were also taken away in the     
8 same way and never came back. I don't know where they were taken to. - Stakić 
et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness P) 22 May 2002: 3363. Emphasis 
added.  
 
In this excerpt, it is the withholding of emotion that is interesting, and the fact that 
this distinct lack of emotion comes about after the witness specifically articulates 
his understanding of the Tribunal’s interests is no small coincidence. This 
demonstrates that the patterns found elsewhere can be present in reverse: where 
previously we’ve seen emotion give rise to power struggles, here we see the 
immediate assumption of the Tribunal’s power lead to explanations of horrific 
events without the emotional markers common to other testimonies. Even after the 
insistence of the Judge that the witness has complete freedom in his testimony, he 
continues on with no change, ‘mentioning’ rather than ‘speaking about’.  
 
But are there actual differences between these two ideas? One could certainly argue 
that differences between ‘mentioning’ and ‘speaking about’ could be interpretive 
only, and speculative at best. The important issue here is that there is a difference 
expressed from the perspective of the witness, and this difference is stated in terms 
of the witness’ acceptance of what the Tribunal wants. Additionally, the Judge 
declaring what the tribunal is interested in also demonstrates that ‘what the tribunal 
wants’ is not always clear (something that is also apparent on a larger, more 
political scale). Questions can be raised as to individual narrative preference – what 
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if this individual simply desires to relate these events while leaving out emotional 
expression? Is the link between ‘speaking about’ and emotional expression a jump? 
 
Here, we need to look further into the concept of implication. The difference the 
witness has presented implies there is a way of recounting these events that differs 
from what he is doing. But is this difference necessarily emotional expression? 
There is unfortunately no way that this can be proven, and to claim that the witness 
would have included expressions of emotion in ‘speaking about’ rather than 
‘mentioning’ would be presumptuous without the ability to ask the witness directly. 
That being said, it is enough in this instance that the statement of the Tribunal’s 
intentions by the witness (and through this, its perceived authority) is followed by 
testimony that stands apart from other, similar testimonies in that it lacks 
expressions consistent to those examples.  
 
There is an expression of emotion in Witness P’s testimony, but it is an outlier in 
comparison to other testimonies of this sort. Witness P gives a brief expression of 
guilt in the form of a need to apologise, and then proceeds to continue his 
mentioning of those he knew, their jobs, and what happened to them:  
 
Example 26: Witness P 
1 I would really like these people to be alive here, and it would be easier for me 
2 if I could say sorry. There was Vasif Kahrimanovic who had a sawmill, Enver  3 
Ekrem Melkic. I will mention some drivers such as Mehmed Hodzic, nicknamed 4 
Medo, a driver that worked in the mine -- Ljubija mine. Hare Dautovic, he used to 5 
be the manager's driver, chauffeur. Then a cafe owner, Sivac Sefik. He was     
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6 beaten up and killed. I saw his dead body lying next to a hedge near the red      
7 house. This is what I saw as we went -- or rather, ran to the kitchen where we had 
8 to line up. - Stakić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness P) 22 May 2002: 
3365. Emphasis added.  
 
The need for apology is interesting, and while it could be identified as ‘survivor’s 
guilt’, any claim on what this could represent would again be speculation, as it 
contains no clear indicators (neither prefacing the statement nor following it) as to 
why it came about, especially within such a purposeful list of names. The phrase 
needs to be noted, however, as the analysis of this excerpt would be misleading if 
the statement was simply ignored as unimportant. Whether guilt or loss, this 
statement is an expression of emotion, and is therefore important. This doesn’t 
change the above analysis of this testimony – this expression of emotion stands 
apart from other types expressed by other victims. It is neither fear, nor frustration 
or confusion, but a more reflective statement on the list of names the witness is 
remembering. As we can see from the rest of the excerpt, the witness continues his 
testimony in the same way, ‘mentioning’ additional people he has knowledge of.  
 
7 Conclusion 
The decision to analyse in-court expressions of emotion within ICTY transcripts 
arose from the general observation that these expressions are frequent in ICTY 
testimonies. The question that easily followed was, why? Although the obvious 
answer here would be that this is because testimonies in ICTY cases relate to 
difficult and traumatic events (and emotion must therefore be an obvious element in 
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the descriptions of events), the excerpts of the transcripts studied in this chapter 
have proven that expressions of emotion not only come from other issues, but tell 
us more than the fact that an event was difficult or traumatic. 
Expressions of frustration and confusion expressed in relation to in-court processes 
have demonstrated struggles of control over narrative, and importantly give us 
legitimate grounds for scrutiny of how these arise and are dealt with. This in turn 
allows a closer look at why the witness experience is important in these tribunals, 
demonstrating that it is possible to do more than simply make a witness 
comfortable and feel that they are protected – there are unanswered questions 
regarding how to treat narrative power in court.  
Expressions of fear often function as marking the shifting or solidifying of ethnic 
boundaries, and in analysing them in court transcripts we can look at the effects of 
these shifts, as seen with Sifeta Susić and Witness D, and what they might mean in 
terms of the lasting effects of fear. Expressions of difficulty and distancing have 
also demonstrated the lasting effects of events described, as the testimony of Edin 
Mrkalj demonstrates, and power struggles during this testimony show that issues of 
the depersonalisation of witnesses at the hands of the court are often present. We 
see issues with how events are being interpreted by the court with the testimony of 
Amir Delić, and the expression of fear there (and the subsequent struggle over 
narrative control) demonstrates that among witnesses there is not just an issue with 
being heard, but one of being understood. 
Analysing emotional expressions using cognitive linguistic methods, framed in 
social psychology allows for us to see how important emotion is, as emotional 
speech is speech based on the most human and instinctive sets of responses. Its uses 
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are therefore always significant, but this analysis adds to it a layer of importance, 
refusing to accept that emotional expression in court is simple and should be taken 
at face value. Through exploration of expressions such as the ones examined here, 
the analysis is of relationships as much as of speech itself. The relationship between 
the witness and the court is most notably a confusing and often fractured one, and 
through greater attention to it, we might be able to understand the beginnings of 
why this might be so. 
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Chapter Six - Slobodan Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj: Redefining Court 
Performance through Personal Power at the ICTY 
 
‘I'm not so sure, Mr. Antonetti, that you had already known all that I said so far. 
And as for the Prosecution, they are probably speechless by now, so they won't 
have rebuttal. What could they possibly rebut from all I said? Nothing.’ – Vojislav 
Šešelj to Judge Antonetti, Closing statement, p17466, 20 March 2012, Prosecutor v 
Vojislav Šešelj IT-03-67-T. 
 
1 Introduction 
In the process of examining transcripts of victim testimonies for this project, it has 
become clear that there are presences in the courtroom that can function without 
physicality. Milošević in particular often looms behind the statements of victims, 
expert witnesses, and even the words of judges and prosecution. Whether this 
happens symbolically or in actual reference, this can change the nature of how 
things are recounted. It then becomes important to look at the statements of 
Milošević in order to better understand his relationship with the ICTY, to determine 
how this relationship might be impacting narratives in court. Specifically, if his 
speech in court is conceived as political speech, then his power in court functions 
differently than other accused before the ICTY, with greater potential to inform the 
speech of others.  
If we are to properly examine how Milošević’s power in court has influenced the 
narrative of others, additional data is needed. The natural comparison is with the 
statements of former Serbian Radical Party president Vojislav Šešelj, who not only 
chose to represent himself (as Milošević did), but who had interactions with 
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Milošević in court when he was called as a defence witness during Milošević’s 
trial. Two primary questions then emerge. First, what might similarities in court 
performance tell us about the emerging norms of former political leaders testifying 
before the ICTY? Second, how does the relationship between power and narrative 
change when political leadership is at stake in court? 
By comparing the statements of Slobodan Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj, we can 
see that there were two main types of power at work during their court 
performances: power over historical narrative (the individual’s understanding of his 
own ability to inform or reveal dominant narratives), and power over process (the 
individual’s attempts to undermine structural aspects of the ICTY). Examination of 
transcripts has demonstrated that these two forms of power are linked in the minds 
of these individuals, and when the individual senses a struggle with his power over 
one element, he will attempt to exert power over the other. This analysis gives 
further insight into the actions of former political leaders on trial for various crimes 
before the ICTY, and helps us better understand why the relationship between the 
court and the high-profile defendant is such a notoriously complicated one. The 
application of some of the DST methods to what is essentially political speech, fits 
well with this data in particular, as Chilton’s models have been designed to analyse 
political speech in the first instance (Chilton 2004). Additional sections of 
testimony will be analysed with a combination of discourse and linguistic methods, 
in particular the conceptual metaphor theory of George Lakoff (Lakoff 1989), as 
well as perspectives from Norman Fairclough (Fairclough 1989, 2001) and Michel 
Foucault (Foucault 1977), to place these testimonies in the context of larger ICTY 
discourse as well as allow them to fit with the wider scope of this project.  
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Because there is a gap between these two trials of eight years, it is also possible to 
examine the evolution of the court in dealing with these particular behaviours. 
Linking the drive to self-represent with an individual’s perceptions of his own 
power in court (as linguistically revealed through his own speech patterns) can 
deepen our understandings of those tried before the international criminal courts, 
and the ways in which these courts address and respond to challenges. Section 2 
deals specifically with issues more closely related to the accused’s placement of 
‘self’, while section 3 examines the treatment of history more directly, as well as 
the linguistic placement of the ICTY’s authority within the speech of the accused, 
as well as the ways existing media frames impact the speech of the accused.  
One of the most important aspects of these findings is that they provide a new way 
of looking at something that has only been previously discussed in terms of its 
impact - both on the court and on regional and international politics - which is the 
political projects of the accused and their use of the court space as a platform. 
Impact is surely important, but this research has revealed that more questions need 
to be asked of this, such as how these projects are being conveyed in court, what the 
court’s response may be to them, and how this complicated relationship might 
shape court discourse. In this way, political projects of the accused cannot ever 
truly be treated as past, but must be conceived as ongoing, as they are part of what 
has shaped the ICTY environment and have the potential to inform the speech and 
behaviours of future accused.  
1.1 What makes court speech political? 
Without delving too deeply into discussions on what makes anything political (of 
which there are many, from Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics to Carl 
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Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political and on through the resulting discussions on 
what makes an action or speech political), the helpful starting point is with the 
relationship between politics and speech. Chilton deals with this early on in his 
book Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice, highlighting the 
Aristotelean view that,  
‘It is shared perceptions of values that defines political associations. And 
the human endowment for language has the function of ‘indicating’ – i.e. 
signifying, communicating – what is deemed, according to such shared 
perceptions, to be advantageous or not, by implication to the group, and 
what is deemed right and wrong within that group.’ (Chilton 2004: 5).  
The controversies generated by the speech of both Milošević and Šešelj have most 
frequently been written about in the context of what impact this speech has on the 
strength of the ICTY and the ICC as international bodies with the power to 
effectively try former leaders for war crimes (because if we cannot effectively do 
this, then the prospect for international criminal law as an active deterrent for things 
like war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity will be a slim one). The 
actions of Milošević and Šešelj in relation to the ICTY, beginning with the 
challenges and insistence that they represent themselves, attack the relationship the 
ICTY has with its own effectiveness by both intervening in its processes and 
allowing their behaviour to subsequently stand as an additional (and often 
overpowering) focus of attention in the wider media sense. This essentially makes a 
statement on what the international community can and cannot do regarding other 
people’s past conflicts. But the issue here goes beyond this – they both make 
statements on shared values (namely the international community’s perceptions of 
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justice) - but it is the understanding and application of these values (as action is 
both implied and important here) that Milošević and Šešelj have chosen to attack. 
It is not enough to say that because Milošević and Šešelj insisted on self-
representation, that all speech thereafter was automatically political in nature. The 
helpful way to conceptualise the political nature of speech at the ICTY is within the 
concepts of audience and referents. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, 
speech is political if 1) the intended audience of the speaker goes beyond the 
courtroom to include groups to be convinced or persuaded of new political 
associations and understandings of events, and 2) the referents of the speech are 
given new political contexts (events, concepts, and/or individuals situated within 
specifically constructed political frames). There are many questions that can arise 
from this, most notably, how can we know who the intended audience of the 
speaker is? This chapter will attempt to address this, as well as other significant 
questions, by examining the data itself in an effort to reveal new understandings of 
the speech of high-profile self-representers.  
2 Subjects of self: The discursive constructs of Milošević and Šešelj 
Taking as a starting point the decisions to represent oneself at the ICTY, the subject 
of ‘self’ is therefore an essential component to deconstruct. A large portion of the 
literature examining the court behaviour of Slobodan Milošević focuses on the 
challenge of self-representation before international criminal tribunals, seeing the 
precedent Milošević set as a significant challenge to the concept of fair proceedings 
before the international criminal courts (Anoya 2013; Boas 2007; Dickson 2006; 
Gow 2004; Jorgensen 2004; Scharf 2006). There are major difficulties in allowing 
for self-representation while avoiding the pitfalls of politically charged rhetoric 
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from individuals of dominant and calculating personalities. Once underway, the 
defence strategies of these individuals have a tendency to compromise the workings 
of the court, and thus the fairness of their own trials. The question is one of rights: 
the accused has both the right to self-represent, and the right to a fair trial. When 
one undermines the other, the result can have serious implications for the ability of 
the court, as well as wider perceptions of justice post-conflict.  
It is the strategic understandings of these perceptions within the minds of the 
individuals on trial that this chapter is concerned with. Behind the drive to self-
represent before an international criminal tribunal lie serious implications for 
power. While Milošević’s actions at the ICTY have faded in and out of scholarly 
interest, it is a mistake to assume that the subject of his behaviour at the ICTY has 
been exhausted. If we are to better understand the choices of the high-profile self-
representer, there is an abundance of unexplored data that can shed light on these 
behaviours. 
The existing literature on the personality and behaviour of Milošević in particular is 
expansive (Armatta 2010; Cohen 2002; Jakoljevic 2008; LeBor 2002; Post 2005; 
Ramet 2004; Sell 2002; Thomas 1999; Waters 2013) and sits alongside a growing 
number of works concerning Šešelj (Claverie 2009; Dojčinović 2014; Sluiter 2007; 
Zahar 2008).
15
 This chapter is not an attempt to add to the discussions surrounding 
the political decisions made by these men in the years leading up to detention and 
trial, nor will it be a deconstruction of the legal challenges they put forth to the 
ICTY and the controversies they have introduced that still resonate today, as these 
                                                          
15
 A small section of Predrag Dojčinović’s chapter ‘The Shifting of Grand Narratives in War Crimes 
Trials and International Law: History and Politics in the Courtroom’ features an emphasis on the 
words of Šešelj as speech acts which contain ‘mental fingerprints’.  He speaks to the cognitive 
fingerprinting of specific minds by Šešelj as a generator of words linked to larger concepts 
embedding themselves in discourse, but does not go further into how this process works, or what it 
entails. (Dojčinović 2014: 73). 
182 
 
topics are well-discussed in much of the literature on Milošević in particular, as 
well as on the ICTY more generally (Armatta 2013; De Graff 2006; Gow 2004; 
Laughland 2007; Rubin 2006; Scharf 2006). While these issues certainly add 
context to a deeper understanding of the world of Milošević and Šešelj, the focus 
here will remain on the analysis of court statements only, and their linguistic and 
discursive deconstructions.  
The differences in statements made by high ranking and low ranking accused are 
dealt with in greater detail in chapter 6, and the choice to exclude Milošević and 
Šešelj from that analysis was made for several reasons. First, there is the already 
mentioned issue of self-representation, a choice made by only a few individuals 
tried before the ICTY,
16
 which was not a common denominator among the higher 
ranking individuals compared in chapter 6. Second, there are stark differences from 
the beginning that set Milošević and Šešelj apart from their fellow accused, and it is 
these differences that have set out the organisation for this section.  
Data evidence of power over narrative and power over process will therefore be 
discussed under the following headings for section 2, specifically dealing with 
subjects more closely related to the ‘self’: the links between the ‘self’ and power 
over historical narrative; clear references within statements that define ‘audience’; 
deliberate attempts to foster an environment of mistrust in court; and indicators of 
the functions of self-perception for each individual. I will use data from the opening 
statement of Milošević and the closing statement of Šešelj, as well as a small 
sample of the exchanges the two men had while Šešelj testified as a witness for 
Milošević’s defence.  
                                                          
16
 Radovan Karadžić also chose to represent himself, but his defence took a more legal approach 
than Milošević’s or Šešelj’s.   
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 2.1 The self and power over narrative 
As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, the speech of defence and prosecution are 
commonly categorised as performative, and the term ‘court performance’ is not 
uncommon in discussions of the ICTY as well as courts in general (Byrne 2013; 
Mertz 1994; White 2008). Adding to this is the performative nature of political 
speech, especially the speech of those who have held or currently hold positions of 
power (Jakoljevic 2008). While it may seem like an easy observation, the aspects of 
performance undertaken by Milošević and Šešelj are important to understanding 
how they perceive themselves, their audience, and ultimately their own power in 
court. Mihela Mihai takes this one step further in her understandings of the ways in 
which democratic ideals can be socialised through language during international 
criminal tribunals (Mihai 2011). She uses Mark Osiel in particular to examine the 
nature of the courtroom as a ‘theatre of ideas’17,  
While the prosecution will choose the style of an accusatory moral drama 
and the defence that of a tragedy, he [Osiel] thinks judges should encourage 
the format of a theatre of ideas whereby alternative narratives compete to 
persuade the audience. It is his view that the superiority of the morality of 
equal respect will become apparent when contrasted with the alternatives. 
(Mihai 2011: 125). 
                                                          
17
 The courtroom as a ‘theatre of ideas’ does not originate with Mihai, but with Derrida, who 
proposes that the court is specifically a ‘theatre of forgiveness’ (Derrida 2004; Jakoljevic 2008).  
Derrida’s concern is with the odd nomenclature ‘crime against humanity’, and the position this puts 
humanity in, as it calls for the indictment of ‘itself as if it were another’ (Derrida 2004).  Derrida’s 
discussion of this occurs as attention to the ICTY and ICTR, alongside the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission for South Africa, were at the forefront of both academic and journalistic discussion.  
Forgiveness, however, is not a condition of transitional justice, but a social element of the process 
that remained uninvoked when both Milošević and Šešelj had the floor.   
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This has interesting implications when the defence are also the accused, as well as 
individuals accustomed to political performance, as we see with Milošević and 
Šešelj. The style of tragedy is seen plainly in the words chosen by both men, with 
Milošević’s opening statement firmly setting the tone for those to come after him. 
The excerpt below gives an example of how this is expressed. On the destruction of 
Yugoslavia, he states:  
Example 27: Slobodan Milošević 
1 Milošević: Whose merit was this that this sovereign state was destroyed?       
2 According to the Nuremberg principles, this constitutes the gravest            
3 international crime, a crime against peace. Whose merit was it that a war        
4 happened in which tens of thousands of civilians were killed, hundreds of        
5 thousands of people wounded and maimed? Thousands of people lost their      
6 homes and fled from their homes, mostly Serbs, and also there are millions of    
7 damage in terms of property. The -- this is -- not speak of the ecological disaster 
8 involved. The international community will have to face up to all of this. It is not 
9 only that a state was destroyed. The United Nations system was destroyed. Also 
10 the corpus of principles upon which the world civilisation was based has been 
11 destroyed. Milošević Trial Transcript (Opening statement of Slobodan 
Milošević) 31 August 2004: 32159. Emphasis added.  
 
This is very early in his opening statement, and here we see Milošević’s repetitive 
and well-paced use of words under his primary category – destruction (seen in 
bold). Interestingly, it is international political concepts that are under attack as well 
as the state of Yugoslavia (bold italics), and Milošević claims that concepts of 
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sovereignty alongside the United Nations system were victims of this destruction as 
well as the human victims of the war itself. His adversary in this is the international 
community (red text), whom he seems to separate from his previous references to 
international institutions such as the UN, giving us dual understandings of what 
international institutions and concepts are. In the centre of this, he places his ethnic 
category – Serbs (seen in blue) – embedding this ethnicity within the frame of 
victimhood (among terms like fled, wounded, maimed, disaster, damage, loss, etc).  
Milošević also uses two metaphors that beg further deconstruction (underlined). 
The first, ‘to face up to’ is consistent with the duplicity of the international 
community (the United States in particular) that he is speaking of throughout his 
opening statement (some examples of this are discussed in section 2.4 under 
Example 31). We can immediately identify this as an orientational
18
 metaphor and 
analyse it as such, but this brings up the issues of procedures of intervention and co-
creation of discourse that accompany translation that have been discussed in chapter 
2.  
Milošević’s statement remains as a direct attempt to not only reassign guilt, but to 
redefine who needs punishment while in the midst of his own trial and the 
prospective consequences that might accompany it. Milošević and his shifting of 
victimhood is reinforced by his use of ‘corpus of principles’ (or more likely, ‘body 
of principles’ as a more direct translation), giving us another victim through the 
production of a ‘body’, going beyond the original meaning of a set or grouping of 
principles to include the literal ‘embodiment’ of these principles paralleled with 
                                                          
18
 The metaphor itself seems an exception to Lakoff’s assessment of orientational metaphors, as 
Lakoff claims that ‘up’ tends to correspond with positive, while ‘down’ implies negative (Lakoff 
1989) p 15.  This, however, simply needs a more careful classification.  The phrase ‘to face up to’ 
can be categorised under the more physical metaphors for ‘up’ relating to consciousness, such as 
‘get up’ and ‘wake up’.  While Lakoff doesn’t include the ‘consciousness as truth’ link in his 
discussion, the association is a natural one.   
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their destruction. It is important to remember here that we are concerned not merely 
with Milošević’s intentions in his speech, but the effect his words have on the 
forming of the larger discourse once uttered. While he may not have intended to 
invoke the image of the human victim with ‘corpus’, it resonates within the speech 
nonetheless.  
In contrast, Šešelj does not attempt to follow Milošević’s frames of destruction 
discussed above. We see this in his closing statement:  
Example 28: Vojislav Šešelj 
1 Šešelj: Srebrenica and Zepa and Gorazde, had they been liberated immediately,  2 
we wouldn't have had all these ordeals with the international community and    
3 there wouldn't be any need to declare them safe haven. And all those who failed 
4 to listen to me, it turns out that they were in the wrong. I can only regret that I  
5 didn't hold such a position of power in which I could have forced them to     
6 listen to me. This is my sole regret. And if they had been forced to heed my     
7 warnings, many things would have been avoided (…) Šešelj Trial Transcript 
(Closing statement of Vojislav Šešelj) 14 March 2012: 17361. Emphasis added. 
Šešelj places the international community as existing on one side of an outcome 
that he sees as avoidable had he had more power (seen in bold), demonstrating that 
his hypothetical hinges not on the actions of the international community as outside 
of his influence, as we see with Milošević above, but as tied directly with him. It is 
interesting that he uses ‘force’ when discussing his power, because it refers directly 
to his hypothetical influence, making a statement on his intentions and shifting guilt 
from himself to his constrained sphere of opportunity. The absence of the language 
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of tragedy that Milošević uses in favour of less obvious language demonstrates that 
the story Šešelj is trying to tell differs greatly from that of Milošević. While 
Milošević invokes frames of destruction at the hands of the international 
community, Šešelj avoids specifics. The events in Srebrenica, Žepa and Goražde 
were ‘ordeals’ and ‘many things’ (bold italics) rather than Milošević’s specifics 
(‘wounded, maimed, killed, fled’, as in Example 27 above).  
While these two men may have several things in common, strategically they are 
placing their own narrative in very different locations. Milošević’s narrative is one 
that seeks a re-telling of events that includes histories and individuals that may have 
previously been considered by the court audience as extraneous. Šešelj, however, is 
primarily concerned with his own side-lined position in the face of international 
events. Reduced to court stereotypes one might argue that this is a case of ‘This 
isn’t how it happened’ vs. ‘I didn’t do it,’ however, the focus should remain on 
different uses of personal power within the courtroom to properly identify what is at 
stake here. Milošević attempts consistent power over narrative, while Šešelj is fixed 
within the possible space. Given the exchanges the two men had in court during the 
time that Šešelj acted as a defence witness for Milošević, we can see a shift in 
Šešelj’s narrative intent. During the seven year gap that occurred between Šešelj’s 
testimony for Milošević’s trial, we can see a shift from his tendencies to express 
things much in the way Milošević did, to the language of his closing statement that 
places international bodies and events not in a frame of destruction, but in a frame 
of ‘what if’.  
 
 
188 
 
2.2 The impact of audience  
The concept of audience has been discussed in previous chapters (briefly in 
chapters 1 and 2), but it takes on a more weighty dimension when looking at Šešelj 
and Milošević. Although international attention to both trials has tended to rise 
when something sensational occurs and quickly fall when nothing of newsworthy 
interest seems to be going on in the courtroom, the audience in court as well as 
among the communities affected by the actions of these two individuals has 
remained relatively constant (Bieber 2013; Ivković 2006; Steflja 2010). While 
Milošević certainly left a political legacy at the ICTY, it is the worrying popularity 
of Šešelj among Serb nationalists that adds a more dangerous edge to his behaviour 
in court. His party’s website (http://www.srpskaradikalnastranka.org.rs/) regularly 
reports on his trial as well as other issues relating to his freedom. At the time of 
writing, the most-read article on the site is currently Руска Дума захтева слободу 
за Војислава Шешеља – Russian Duma Demands Freedom for Vojislav Šešelj. 19 
As this site is his party’s, his face and statements are a constant backdrop, and from 
the message boards it is at times difficult to determine how many people take the 
site seriously. However, although leadership of the party has been passed along and 
subscribers to Šešelj’s party line have shifted their loyalties, Šešelj’s influence is 
still seen through the ICTY and as such he still has a strong media presence. 
This is not to claim that Šešelj’s audience is solely the Srpska Radikalna Stranka 
and those favourable to it, as he does at times attempt to define his audience in a 
broader, more historical sense (see example 29 below). At this point, however, 
Šešelj’s audience must be clarified, as there are two potential interpretations of it – 
                                                          
19
 http://www.srpskaradikalnastranka.org.rs/srbija/3822, accessed 31 August 2013. 
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the first interpretation is that his audience consists of the people who are paying 
attention to him, and the second is that his audience is the people to whom he is 
rhetorically addressing himself. The first category of audience can incorporate 
people both inside and outside the courtroom, and reflects more fully the potential 
reality of his audience. The second relates to Šešelj’s own perceptions. While both 
are important, the first category of audience is not something within the immediate 
scope of this research. Therefore, Šešelj’s audience is understood for the purposes 
of this project to be of the second category. This is also consistent with DST and 
cognitive linguistic methods more generally, as the analysis can pinpoint audience 
within the mental frame of the speaker, thus implying a more self-contained 
understanding of the concept. In short, as it is the speaker’s perceptions of audience 
that are informing the words uttered, this is the definition of audience that matters 
more from this research perspective.  
Adding to the factors that shape the perception of audience is, to put it crudely, a 
‘nothing-to-lose’ variable. Very often those who choose to represent themselves in 
these cases have already accepted a verdict that they see as inevitable. This changes 
the purpose of their court performance, and re-defines their audience. The example 
of Milošević is mentioned most often. As Judith Armatta explains, 
Of course Milošević was not really trying to defend himself against the 
charges. He assumed that he would be convicted and receive the maximum 
sentence of life in prison. His goals for the trial included establishing as 
historically correct his view of events and his role in the Balkans during the 
1990s (…) (Armatta 2010: 33).  
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It is important to note that in this example, ‘his goals for the trial’, as Armatta refers 
to them, were not of the legal framework, but of the historical one. This is a pivotal 
distinction when looking to apply linguistics to court behaviours. If Milošević 
defined the court as a historical platform while accepting the legal outcome as 
given, then he was in effect both conceding that the historical narrative contributed 
by the court was a valid one (accepting the court’s power to solidify narratives), 
while assuming that the legal decisions made by the court were a secondary, 
predetermined consequence over which he had no control (rejecting the court’s 
ability to follow classical legal process). Essentially, if he rejected the court’s 
power to solidify narratives, his behaviour in his defence would have likely been 
very different. If the court had no power in this sense, then his record of events 
would have been ignored or predetermined in the same way he categorised the legal 
outcomes in his case. Although one might argue at this point that the media 
presence created a separate platform for Milošević that simply happened to use the 
ICTY as its stage, this would still mean Milošević had to understand the power of 
the ICTY stage, which itself depends on the simple concept that the tribunals being 
held by the ICTY mattered to people who were not just Milošević. In accepting that 
he had no influence over the final decisions of the court, while insisting that he be 
allowed to represent himself, Milošević was operating in a sphere separate to the 
others present.  
In contrast, Šešelj’s goals for his trial were made plain time and time again in his 
dealings with the court, namely the destruction of the tribunal (Milanović 2009; 
Sluiter 2007; Zahar 2008). During the course of his defence, his adversaries shift 
with his subject matter, and he attacks a variety of organisations in turn, with a 
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primary focus on the West, and Western intelligence. During his closing statement, 
Šešelj very clearly defines his audience:  
Example 29: Vojislav Šešelj 
1 Šešelj: What will remain here behind me here are the transcripts from the trial.    
2 These are not going to be your personal perceptions of the proceedings. This will 
3 not be your judgement. Someday people will probably laugh at your judgement   
4 and they will laugh even more at the indictment and the closing argument of the  
5 Prosecutor. What remains is the transcript of the proceedings, this wonder of all  6 
wonders that has been taking place in this courtroom, and because of that, it was  7 
worth living. Šešelj Trial Transcript (Closing statement of Vojislav Šešelj) 14 
March 2012: 17330. Emphasis added.  
 
While the drama of this statement might make it read with an element of sarcasm 
(‘wonder of all wonders’ in particular is difficult to take seriously), Šešelj’s 
response to the power of the ICTY is consistent. While he discounts much of what 
his adversaries in the courtroom are saying, his perception of the archives as a 
powerful tool to preserve his words implies that his acceptance of the institution 
keeping and creating these archives is a solid one. It is significant that while he has 
seen conspiracies in so many aspects of his detainment, and in the politics of those 
surrounding him, he did not see the archives themselves as susceptible or 
corruptible, but as a worthy audience. He refers to this audience as a game-changer 
for his future reputation in his repeated use of ‘what will remain’ and ‘someday’, 
putting faith in not only the firm nature of the archives, but their endurance and 
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potential to interact with those outside the courtroom well after the words 
themselves have been said.  
2.3 Maintaining the leadership role: Self-representation and the 
invitation for power over process 
The ICTY, ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), SCSL (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone) and ICC (International Criminal Court) all have similar 
Articles granting accused the right to represent themselves, and these Articles are 
echoes of earlier traditions in human rights law (as found in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on 
Human Rights) (Jorgensen 2004; Schomburg 2011). Whether the ICTY firmly 
follows the adversarial model of common law systems or the inquisitorial model of 
civil law is a subject of much discussion among legal scholars, but when focus falls 
upon issues of self-representation the commentary leans heavily toward the former, 
as it is a more common practice in these systems (a primary example being the 
frequency of self-representation in American courts) (Danner 2005; Jorgensen 
2004, 2006; Robinson 2000; Schomburg 2011). 
Therefore, the opportunity for intervention by the accused is non-existent, with 
nothing to keep the accused from becoming, as Schomburg aptly puts it, ‘an object 
of his own proceedings.’ (Schomburg 2011: 191). Legal problems aside, there are 
several important symbolic issues that are quite plain when an accused chooses to 
self-represent. Most notable is the clear attempt to maintain a leadership role that 
has supposedly been stripped from the accused, and the obvious attempts to exert 
control over the progress within the courtroom that comes with this. In the case of 
both individuals, a variety of antics were employed to undercut the power exerted 
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by the ICTY, and the resulting media reports and academic discussions widely 
debated how this impacted the stability of the tribunal (Dickson 2006; Graubart 
2010; Zahar 2008). 
By the time Šešelj gave his closing statement (March of 2012), his behaviour in 
court was notorious. He had gone on a hunger strike, refused to attend court on 
crucial days (such as when he was due to give his opening statement), and had 
taken multiple opportunities to distract, delay, and otherwise interfere with the 
progress of his trial (Claverie 2009; Sluiter 2007). This type of behaviour was not 
new to the ICTY, and those writing on Šešelj have drawn easy comparisons with 
Milošević during his trial (Djordjevic 2009; White 2008). Milošević’s actions 
before the ICTY have been described as uncooperative and wilful at the best of 
times, and arrogant and insulting at the worst (Armatta 2010; Scharf 2006). 
But where Seselj’s speech leans heavily toward paranoia (as examples below will 
indicate), Milošević oscillated between personalities that suited him, reportedly 
playing a version of his political self alongside the hot-tempered detainee who was 
hard-done-by, and it is difficult to discount the anecdotal evidence regarding his 
personality when reading transcripts (Armatta 2010). While the same ingredients 
for paranoid ramblings were present in the speech of Milošević, there are important 
differences in the way in which he dealt with the court that may be attributed to his 
personality and leadership style. Much has been written about Milošević over the 
years, both biographically (LeBor 2002; Cohen 2002; Sell 2002) and relating to his 
trial (Armatta 2010; Bass 2003; De Graff 2006; Dickson 2006; Gow 2004; 
Laughland 2007; Post 2005; Rubin 2006; Waters 2013). Indeed, Milošević had 
become such a darkly intriguing figure by the mid-2000s that frequent anecdotal 
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accounts appeared detailing how his personality and demeanour impacted not only 
the politics of the region but the politics of the ICTY.  
His leadership style contrasts to that of Šešelj particularly because Milošević’s role 
as head of state brought forward (or was achieved because of, depending on the 
account) personality traits commonly associated with this role, such as easy 
charisma, a dominating presence and an uncanny ability to wilfully ignore or pass 
over attempts to steer conversation in undesired directions (Surroi 2013). Šešelj, on 
the other hand, has made attempts at Milošević-style dealings with the court, but 
has undercut himself at almost every turn due to his propensity toward paranoia 
alongside blatantly insulting digs at individuals involved with the ICTY (Gordy 
2013; Zahar 2008). Šešelj spent much of his closing statement levelling accusations 
of assassination plots within the UN facility where he was being held,
20
 and seeing 
spies at every turn (organisations such as Medicins Sans Frontieres being one of 
several examples).
21
 The point of deconstructing statements from someone as 
volatile as Šešelj may be difficult to see. However, Šešelj has reacted to the ICTY 
in two inconsistent ways that show that the court’s authority has had an impact on 
him. At times his reactions follow Milošević’s example of disregard for the court’s 
authority, and at others he reacts to the court as a body with a significant amount of 
power. These competing reactions on the part of Šešelj demonstrate that the ICTY’s 
authority is fluid in his mind, where Milošević was firm in his rejection of it 
altogether.  
When discussing the issue of authority in court discourse and struggles of power 
between the ICTY and the defendant, there is much of the discourse literature that 
                                                          
20
 See p 17340-17342 of English transcripts of Prosecutor v Vojislav Šešelj, IT-03-67-T, 14 March 
2012. 
21
 See p 17339 of English transcripts of Prosecutor v Vojislav Šešelj, IT-03-67-T, 14 March 2012. 
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seems not to apply, or to be an imprecise articulation of the exchanges taking place. 
It is difficult, for example, to claim that ‘power in discourse’ and ‘power behind 
discourse’ as described by Fairclough encompass in these instances the social 
struggles he sees moving one way or the other (Fairclough 1989, 2001). With 
Milošević, Šešelj, and the ICTY there are issues of circularity that make some 
aspects of the gaining and losing of power in the courtroom far more complex.  
For example, there is the trading of ‘victimhood’ in these statements that has since 
been echoed in other trials. The concept of ‘victim’ oscillates between the accused 
and the ICTY, and in the context of the high-profile self-representer, being a victim 
equates with innocence, and this innocence was continuously spun by Milošević to 
turn the traditional notion of power in leadership on its head. If the core principles 
of the UN system were violated at the expense of the Serbs, as Milošević claimed, 
then the platform he spoke from became symbolic of subjugation and persecution, 
meaning that guilt was necessarily located elsewhere.  
Milošević repeats his storytelling narrative, the story of the destruction of 
Yugoslavia and the duplicity of the international community, telling the court again 
and again of disaster, damage, and loss. He does not, however, identify with this 
role – he leaves references to himself either out of his speech entirely, or distances 
himself through the use of lengthy quotes from books that can tell his story for 
him.
22
 Through this, he creates a different type of victimhood that allows him to 
escape the constraints the court environment holds so strongly over others. The 
court hierarchy, therefore, remains contested through his behaviour, at times 
                                                          
22
 For example, he quotes General Wesley Clark’s book ‘Waging Modern War’ (Clark 2001) 
extensively during his opening statement, p 32249-32251, followed by an interview with the 
Canadian Daily National Post given by General Lewis Mackenzie, all the while embedding his 
opinions on the trials legality (on p 32252 Milošević states, ‘MacKenzie continues, contrary to what 
this illegal Prosecution insists on in their unfounded indictment…’for example). 
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pushing the ICTY into the role of an international legal body at the mercy of 
Milošević. Echoed again and again in the media was his initial response when 
asked how he pled – rather than ‘not guilty’ he stated, ‘That’s your problem.’23 
And, as Dickson and Jokić have said, ‘The ICTY’s problem it became.’ (Dickson 
2006: 358). The surrounding media discourse then put forward the image of the 
ICTY at the mercy of Milošević, framing the trial in terms of the ICTY’s failings 
(Bachmann 2013). Šešelj too has inspired this discourse outside of the court. So 
loud is his personality that even as an object of ridicule the same framing occurs – 
that of the ICTY as subjected to Šešelj.24 
Milošević uses both power over narrative and power over process to create an 
environment of mistrust within the courtroom, furthering the cleavages that exist 
between the ICTY as an international legal body and himself as an accused. In 
addition to his framing the destruction of Yugoslavia within the duplicity of leading 
international political powers, he argues with the court on points of process in ways 
that indicate that he sees this same duplicity taking place at the ICTY. Methods of 
attack, both verbally and physically, are well-documented ways that individuals 
seek to maintain a status of dominance, and the addition of an audience alters the 
dynamic of these tendencies (Djordjevic 2009; Tedeschi 2001). In Šešelj’s case in 
particular, the use of verbal violence is pervasive to the point of normalcy, and may 
have been a contributing factor for the court’s oft-discussed leniency with his 
behaviour (Sluiter 2007; Zahar 2008). Like Milošević, his tirades were the ways in 
                                                          
23
 This response was in fact in relation to Judge May asking him if he would like the Indictment read 
out to him, but when asked if he would enter a plea he seemed to refer again to this statement by 
saying, ‘I have given you my answer.’  (IT-99-37-I, the Prosecutor versus Slobodan Milošević, 3 
July 2001, p 2 and p 4). 
24
 See Eric Gordy’s analysis of the satirical article about Šešelj on Njuz.net, ‘The Hague Tribunal 
Sentences Itself to Šešelj’, (Gordy 2013) Chapter 8, p 159. 
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which he attempted to communicate to the court, which effectively shifted the 
standards for behaviour that officials could impose.  
Sik Hung Ng has described five types of links between language and power, the 
fifth, ‘to make an existing dominance relationship routine so it seems natural,’ 
being of particular relevance here (Ng 2001: 191). Both Milošević and Šešelj 
demonstrate this in repetitive and often not-so-subtle ways - Šešelj refused to 
address Judge Antonetti using ‘your honor,’ using instead ‘Mr Antonetti’, (though 
at times he did use ‘Mr President,’ but these references were primarily when Šešelj 
was attempting to relate to Antonetti in particular), and Milošević repeatedly did the 
same with Judge Robinson. This was frequently overlooked by the judges in 
question, as was the repeated use of hypotheticals. It was Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice 
who most often took issue with the allowance of these behaviours, but even when 
cautioned, Milošević took opportunities to work in additional disrespect:  
Example 30: Slobodan Milošević 
1 Milošević: I'm going to read some paragraphs out to you, 94 and 95, that is, of    
2 this so-called Croatian indictment. 
 
3 Mr. Nice: [Previous translation continues] ... policy of not allowing the phrase    
4 "so-called indictment." I know it's a small point but it's a matter of respect for the 
5 Court. It's an indictment and it's nothing else. 
 
6 Judge Robinson: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. An inappropriate comment. 
 
7 Milošević: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, as for the nonsense that – 
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8 Judge Robinson: I don't wish to debate it. Just move on with the -- with your     
9 questions. - Milošević Trial Transcript (Testimony of Vojislav Šešelj) 24 August 
2004: 43096. Emphasis added.  
 
While these examples may seem ordinary, they are not only pervasive within the 
transcripts of the trials of both men, but have been discussed repeatedly in both the 
literature and media reports on the Milošević trial in particular. They have therefore 
become an integral part of both the in-court discourse as well as the surrounding 
frames (Armatta 2013; Bachmann 2013). Bauchmann argues that many of the 
problematic narratives that became media frames for the Milošević trial were pre-
existing (such as issues with lengthy trials and problems with defining JCEs, for 
example), and while this may be so, it is important to look at the beginnings of 
these frames and ask why their creation was also being consistently brought 
forward with Milošević, enough to make them commonplace.  
Milošević’s refusal to treat the ICTY as a ‘real’ entity was not grounded in politics, 
but in his own understandings of his personal power within the courtroom. Michael 
Scharf addresses this logically, stating that as Milošević signed the Dayton Accords 
in 1995 (of which one of the requirements was recognition and cooperation with the 
ICTY), and then aided in the transfer of indictee Drazen Erdemović, his issues with 
its legitimacy came only after he found himself in the dock (Scharf 2006). But 
Milošević’s relentlessness in belittling the ICTY constantly invoked not only 
previous issues of legitimacy brought up during Tadić et al, but similar discussions 
that had originated during the Nuremburg trials (Laughland 2007).  
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This is something that has been cited as part of Milošević’s political style, which 
certainly finds its way into his courtroom personality. In the discussion of his 
attempts to exert power over process in the courtroom, his own duplicity in failing 
to treat the court as a real entity is more than political backtracking. It places 
Milošević’s needs central, cloaked in the guise of a problem of international law. 
As Jakoljevic explains, 
All his actions are juridico-political. If the law is posited as an end, then the 
idea of legitimacy has to rest on ethics. While Milošević scrupulously 
insisted on legitimacy, he systematically excluded ethics from his idea of 
legality. From the very outset of his political career, he used legitimacy to 
erode legal processes and institutions from within, turning them against 
themselves and transforming them into tools used in the service of his 
political ambitions. (Jakoljevic 2008: 56). 
This is not an abstract observation, but one we see again and again in Milošević’s 
court tactics: 
Example 31: Slobodan Milošević 
 
1 Milošević: Let us go back to Carrington's document, which was the first blow     
2 against the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. This is an evident deception. This is     
3 something that transformed further negotiations into a farce. After this, the       
4 secessionist republics were recognised under strong pressure from Germany and  
5 the Vatican, against the elementary principles of international law, the practice of 
6 the United Nations, and the practice of a leading power, the USA. Very well. On 
7 the basis of Smithson's declaration from the 7th of January 1932, the United      
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8 Nations -- United States promised not to recognise countries arising from violent 
9 changes. This principle first became the regional rule of the USA and then entered 
10 the universal rules of international law. This time America trampled on its   11 
own law. - Milošević Trial Transcript (Opening statement of Slobodan Milošević) 
31 August 2004: 32169-32170. Emphasis added.  
 
This relates intimately with his insistence on self-defence and his cavalier attitude 
toward the Amici Curiae assigned by the court to assist him and attempt to preserve 
some of the integrity of his defence. Self-representation invites the accused to exert 
power over process at every turn, and while this may have offered both Milošević 
and Šešelj an escape from being ‘an object of their own proceedings’, there could 
never have been an expectation that they would each approach their own power in 
court from the position of simply ‘the accused’.  
3 The treatment of history, the discourse of authority, and the power of the 
ICTY  
The defence provided by both Milošević and Šešelj refers heavily to versions of 
history interpreted by these defendants in ways that provide justifications for their 
actions, past and present. Under basic analysis, this is nothing new in terms of the 
political speech from both men, and echoes what each of them has said before in 
different contexts. However, the treatment of history before the audience of the 
ICTY differs between Milošević’s opening statement and Šešelj’s closing 
statement, and if basic DST theory is applied to excerpts from these statements, 
important patterns emerge. These types of statements are never far from linguistic 
attempts to exert power over process, which is carried out most frequently by 
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Milošević through the use of hypotheticals when referring to the court, and through 
verbal violence on the part of Šešelj. The examples and graphs below demonstrate 
how this is done, and discuss the significance of these statements. It is in this 
section that I will also examine the co-creation of narrative occurring when 
Milošević called Šešelj as a defence witness, and the two spent eight days in court 
together discussing the same sets of events.  
3.1 Milošević 
Milošević expresses power over narrative through attempts to bring the desired past 
closer to ‘now’, and he articulates this past closer to the deictic centre, as we see in 
Figure 5 and in Example 32. He does this alongside repeated references to the court 
that are distanced and placed firmly and constantly in the hypothetical, 
demonstrating attempts to exert power over process (seen in Figure 5, with 
hypotheticals highlighted in bold among statements along the m axis, with upward 
arrows to indicate the efforts to further distance the court).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
202 
 
Figure 5: DST model for Slobodan Milošević 
 
In this exchange, Milošević not only uses his words to create a bridge between two 
pasts (‘the Ustasha genocide over25 the Serbs’ and the events in Yugoslavia in 1991 
- The arrows placed along the t-axis are there simply to emphasise this attempt at 
bridging the two pasts), but constructs a version of the court that is both distanced 
from him (‘this court of yours’), and hypothetical in its existence (his use of ‘so-
called’). The implication he makes is that the court both belongs to and exists solely 
in the minds of parties that do not include him. It demonstrates efforts to weaken 
perceptions of the court’s power by painting it as something that only exists based 
on perspective. This is a defence tactic only seen in international criminal tribunals 
                                                          
25
 This use of what Lakoff {Lakoff, 1989 #158} would term an orientational metaphor is worth 
highlighting, as it places the Serbs firmly in the defeated category, as opposed to other word choices 
that could follow ‘genocide’ – for example, ‘against’. 
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(especially as a reaction to their ad hoc status), and the first time it is seen is in 
Milošević’s opening statement.  
Example 32: Slobodan Milošević 
1 Milošević: (…)there were several possible solutions that were proposed, and     
2 concessions were proposed that could be relied on. Instead of all this, Lord      
3 Carrington, at a meeting on the 18th of October 1991, set out an ultimatum, and 
4 there was no alternative to the disappearance of Yugoslavia. This was the model  
5 applied by Hitler in 1941. Nazi values won the day. (IT-99-37-I, the Prosecutor 
versus Slobodan Milošević, 31 August 2004, p 32169) 
6 After this, recognition followed by other members of the European Community 
7 in January 1992. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this happened on the   8 
6th of April of the same year. On the very date of Hitler's attack on          
9 Yugoslavia in 1941; the 6th of April. - Milošević Trial Transcript (Opening 
statement of Slobodan Milošević) 31 August 2004: 32171. Emphasis added.  
 
Here, Milošević created an abstract historical bridge between events in the 1990s 
and events from World War II. His mentioning of Hitler directly, rather than simply 
Nazis in general, serves to not only connect the supposed motives of these events, 
but summon the image of arguably the most hated criminal of the 20
th
 century and 
place his image alongside that of Lord Carrington and the European Community. 
Milošević’s historical bridge then becomes reinforced; we not only have events 
connected through time, but individuals – neither of whom are Milošević.  
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Milošević does this repeatedly throughout his opening statement, which creates a 
repetitive and therefore normalising effect. Whether or not the court takes these 
connections seriously, they have an edge of propaganda to them. Without delving 
into the extensive discussions on the sociology of propaganda,
 26
 it can be argued 
that the impact of Milošević’s statements on his political reputation in Serbia has 
demonstrated his effective separation of himself from the histories he is attempting 
to re-articulate (Gordy 2013). 
3.2 Šešelj 
Šešelj’s power over narrative is attempted through a focus on his court experiences, 
in contrast to Milošević’s attempts to drag the past into the present. Šešelj’s desired 
past is articulated without attempts to connect it with ‘now’, and he makes many 
attempts to move the audience frame closer to his own, most often using the word 
‘imagine’. As we see in Figure 6, Šešelj’s treatment of history functions in the 
opposite way to Milošević. Along the m axis are his attempts to bring a projected 
history that relates to Judge Antonetti closer to the historical perspective of Šešelj 
himself. This is in immediate contrast to Milošević, as not only is the ‘self’ more 
central to Šešelj, but he sees attempts at relating to the judge as advantageous. 
His attempts to exert power over process are apparent in his references to the court, 
some of which echo Milošević’s hypotheticals. Šešelj gives a different tone 
however, in that his language in reference to the court is often rooted in verbal 
violence. He sees the court as an opposing force to be ‘battled’ (as we see in Figure 
                                                          
26
 We might claim the discussion on propaganda begins with Timasheff (Timasheff 1943) and his 
discussion of attempts at the beginning of the Second World War to codify criteria for a 
phenomenon that they saw as quickly becoming problematic in greater world politics.  However a 
more updated discussion can be found with Walton (Walton 1997), and relevant to this discussion is 
his definition of propaganda characteristic number ten, Eristic aspects, which encompasses 
orchestration, allowing for manipulation of outlets like media over time.  
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6), which implies that for Šešelj the ICTY is more than the ‘false tribunal’ of 
Milošević. While he attempts to exert power over process, his references to his 
audience, as described above in section 2.2, reiterate the fact that the tribunal is, for 
Šešelj, an entity worth doing battle with.  
Figure 6: DST model for Vojislav Šešelj 
 
All excerpts above from IT-03-67-T, the Prosecutor versus Vojislav Seselj, 14 
March, 2012. 
 3.3 Interactions with authority influencing court discourse  
There is an interesting set of arguments laid out by Nigel Eltringham in his work on 
the ICTR that seemingly contradicts this thesis’ emphasis on the importance of 
linguistic analysis but can in fact add depth to the arguments of this chapter 
(Eltringham 2012). Leaning heavily on the work of Henri Lefebvre (Lefebvre 
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1974), Eltringham asserts that the construction of the courtroom as a physical 
privileged space is not merely created by silent spectators, but is also only possible 
because of them. While he asserts that what Lefevbre calls the ‘fetishism of the 
spoken word’ has lent research into international criminal tribunals an 
overemphasis on only what is said (leaving out all the additional metadata such as 
gestures, facial expressions, and the impact of the courtroom physicality itself on its 
human components), his arguments regarding this idea of the purity of the court 
space are in essence what Milošević and Šešelj repeatedly attack.  
The bullying of witnesses undertaken by both defendants (Zahar 2008; Surroi 
2013), and the exposing of protected witness information by Šešelj27 was an 
immediate challenge to the safety of the ICTY environment. Eltringham’s emphasis 
on the concept of ‘ritual’ as connected to the courtroom environment is an 
interesting one, especially when linked to the concepts of performance and 
theatricality discussed above. The storytelling narrative of Milošević became a 
ritualised aspect of his power in the courtroom. Though it was routinely cut short to 
conform with the court’s own ritual aspects,28 it nonetheless became accepted to an 
extent, as part of the man. As such, with Milošević’s self-representation seemed to 
come a form of consent by the ICTY to aspects of his personality as integrated into 
his defence. And this, in the archives, news articles, and impressions he left behind, 
brings us back to Milošević as an object of his own proceedings.  
                                                          
27
 For which he was sentenced to 18 months incarceration under Rule 77(A)(ii): 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/contempt_seselj2/tjug/en/111031.pdf  
28
 Procedures related to punishment as containing ritualistic aspects is a well-established discussion 
within the sociology of law, often cited to have originated with Durkheim and his connection 
between the ritual of punishment as the vehicle through which society continuously refines shared 
values.  For an interesting sociolegal discussion on how this interacts with modern legal procedures, 
see Mark Cammack, Evidence Rules and the Ritual Functions of Trials: ‘Saying Something of 
Something.’ (Cammack 1992; Durkheim 2001). 
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This process was repeated with Šešelj, and we not only see this embedded within 
the discourse of his presence before the ICTY during his own trial, it is highly 
visible during his testimony as a defence witness for Milošević. During his trial, 
Milošević called Šešelj as a witness and questioned him for eight days before cross-
examination began (he testified between 19 August 2005 and 6 September 2005). 
During this time, the two men had exchanges that were lengthy enough to be 
repeatedly cautioned by the judges. Their behaviour, however, was only dealt with 
in terms of what the court had time for, and what was immediately relevant. This 
caused repeated frustration from the prosecution, as seen in this exchange regarding 
Milošević’s leading questions to Šešelj: 
Example 33: Prosecution and Judge  
1 Mr Nice: Your Honours, on that topic I decided to let the leading question from   
2 the accused about this being a mercenary force go because I simply can't deal   
 3 with all the leading questions, and indeed Your Honour indicated earlier you      
4 didn't really want them all to be dealt with as challenges. But when we see the    
5 very careful way that the witness and the accused, in question and answer, were  6 
able to give evidence of the kind that was given, it emphasises the need that on    
7 every topic questions should not be asked in a leading form. Because but for His  
8 Honour Judge Bonomy's analysis of the answer of the witness, it might have     
9 appeared that he was volunteering at some stage that this was a paid force without 
10 ever having that knowledge himself. 
 
11 Judge Robinson: On that occasion I think you should have objected, should have 
12 brought that to my attention, because that is a matter in dispute. What I said was 
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13 that I'm inclined to be lenient where the issues are not in dispute between the  14 
parties. 
 
15 Mr Nice: It's very difficult to get it right when we're dealing with this particular 
16 manner of questioning. 
 
17 Judge Bonomy: He's also a difficult witness to lead, I would imagine, Mr.  18 
Nice, and for that reason also there might be a little more indulgence than 19 
would otherwise be the case. 
 
20 Mr Nice: I think, Your Honour, will find that the topics being dealt with have all 
21 been – 
 
22 Šešelj: [Interpretation] Most difficult, Mr. Bonomy. 
 
23 Mr Nice: I think you'll find that all these topics have been carefully prepared in 
24 the proofing sessions and that both the questioner and the witness knows exactly 
25 where they're going. - Milošević Trial Transcript (Testimony of Vojislav Šešelj) 
24 August 2005: 43179-43180. Emphasis added. 
 
Again we see a small reminder of the parody Šešelj had already become, and the 
toll this could be taking on the court. Judge Bonomy’s comment on Šešelj being a 
difficult witness to lead is a telling statement on Šešelj’s ability to drive the 
exchanges he is involved in, and his agreement with the judge on his difficult nature 
shows that Šešelj is pleased with where this exchange is going. Through his lengthy 
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diatribes, his loud speaking voice, and his insults directed at the prosecution (he 
repeatedly took opportunities to insult prosecutor Geoffrey Nice in particular), not 
to mention the jokes he shared with Milošević in court regarding his own inability 
to keep his answers brief, Šešelj almost seems like a caricature. The statement made 
by Judge Bonomy demonstrates that not only has the court accepted this caricature, 
but that this fact is something that the judges have determined to be within their 
scope of indulgence.  
Milošević was routinely cautioned for his leading questions, but when the 
prosecution objected a particular one, he was given an interesting explanation by 
the judge.  
Example 34: Prosecution and Judge 
1 Mr Nice: There's a lot of commentary and effective leading in these questions. It's 
2 now for the Court where it wants to discipline the accused, but if you look at the  
3 last three questions, re: "Can it be said that..." That's leading in tendency or       
4 nature. "Basically on the basis of the political options of the parties they voted    
5 for," and so on. We're not getting responsive questions and answer, but of course, 
6 it's very difficult at this volume actually to work out what's being said in time to  
7 raise the objections. 
 
8 Judge Robinson: These are points at issue, points in dispute, Mr. Nice? 
 
9 Mr Nice: I can't say whether they're in dispute or not at the moment. I'm not going 
10 to deal with -- 
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11 The Interpreter: Microphone, please.  
 
12 Mr Nice: I can't say whether they're in dispute or not and I doubt if I'm going to 
deal with them in detail.  
 
13 Judge Robinson: Because generally I tend to overlook leading questions where 
14 they are not matters of controversy for the Prosecution. 
 
15 Mr Nice: As Your Honour pleases. 
 
16 Judge Robinson: But, Mr. Milosevic, we have been through this several times. 
17 When you begin a question, "Isn't it true that...", "Isn't it clear that ..." it will    
18 almost inevitably be a leading question, which is not permissible. Milošević 
Trial Transcript (Testimony of Vojislav Šešelj) 24 August 2005: 43100-43101.  
 
From a legal standpoint it may seem logical that leading questions are dealt with 
only when certain issues are at stake, but from a sociolinguistic perspective this is 
very controversial. Any repetition of leading questions gone unchecked creates 
habits of exchange within the courtroom that in turn influence future responses, 
change or reinforce power relations, and allow opportunities for information to be 
presented in ways that may be contrary to the judiciary ethos. Janet Cotterill’s 
research on questions in the courtroom helps make this point, as this may seem an 
argument that sits between linguistics and legal procedure, but in this instance 
validates linguistic viewpoints (Cotterill 2004). Her work shows that through 
questions in court, interrogators can become the principle narrators of an event. 
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Building on work by others discussed earlier in chapter 2, such as Loftus (Loftus 
1981), she reinforces data that demonstrates that witness responses can measurably 
change depending on the wording of the question.  
There is more to the issue when looking at speech made by Milošević and Šešelj, 
because it gives the illusion to both the speaker and the spectators that the 
delinquent behaviour of the speaker is in the first instance (at the time of utterance), 
unseen, and in the second instance (when objected and discarded), unchecked. It is 
difficult to ignore the physical and symbolic parallels between the ICTY and 
Foucault’s discussion of Bentham’s panopticon, and while the hierarchies created 
and maintained for the purposes of discipline through the physicality of the ICTY 
have been well-discussed,
29
 there is less discussion surrounding the linguistic 
construction created in this light (Foucault 1977). If we take Foucault’s assertion 
that the panoptic institution creates on the one hand an institutional blockade of 
discipline in its purest physical form, while on the other a streamlined mechanism 
for its implementation and eventual evolution, we can immediately see within the 
exchange above some exceptional flaws. The choice by the judge to attend to some 
leading questions and ignore others shapes not only the discursive balance of the 
courtroom and transcripts, but through this creates recorded fields of documentation 
that make a statement on how information at the ICTY is categorised: not according 
to its compliance or failure to the courts codified norms, but according to its 
impactable delinquency.  
3.4 Media frames 
                                                          
29
 Several authors begin their discussions of the ICTY with analysis of the meaning of the space 
itself, for a brief overview see Graham White’s discussion of the ‘Architecture of Audience’ in his 
article ‘Narrative Indeterminacy and Public Audience’ (White 2008), and David Hirsh’s description 
of the ICTY atmosphere in his book Law Against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials (Hirsh 2003).  
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Eltringham’s emphasis on ‘silent spectators’ creating the court space is very 
relevant to both Milošević and Šešelj’s repeated attempts to draw cultural lines 
between the Western
30
 imposition they see as the ICTY, and their own concepts of 
justice. Šešelj discussed Adem Jashari31 on several occasions during his testimony 
for Milošević, and was thorough in making use of words he knew would link his 
enemy with an enemy of Western states. 
Here he discusses Adem Jashari while mentioning al-Qaeda in relation to the media 
directly:  
Example 35: Vojislav Šešelj 
1 Šešelj: There was no other choice for our police in dealing with them but to      
2 destroy the house. This was later used in the propaganda war against the Federal 
3 Republic of Yugoslavia. They claimed that we had used excessive force. That was 
4 a very disingenuous misrepresentation. Adem Jashari wanted to sacrifice himself 
5 in the same way that al-Qaeda terrorists do nowadays. He wanted to sacrifice  6 
his life in order to cause an international scandal that would be used by the      
7 Western media. (IT-99-37-I, the Prosecutor versus Slobodan Milošević, 42911-
42912, 19 August, 2005) 
 
                                                          
30
 While I would normally avoid using contested geographical demarcations to describe the 
linguistic boundaries of Milošević and Šešelj, the term ‘western’ is used repeatedly by both, and is 
significant in its choice and repetitive use.  I use the term not to be drawn into invoking the same 
geopolitical frames as they do, but to approach the lines they are attempting to draw on their own 
terms.   
31
 Adem Jashari was one of the founding members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and was 
one of 58 people killed in a three-day attack on his fortified home in Prekaz by Serb Forces.  He has 
been memorialised in Kosovo in a number of ways, and his life and death are often cited as part of 
Kosovo’s post-conflict identity (Di Lellio 2006). 
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It is significant that Šešelj does not attempt to make any sort of argument against 
the claim of excessive force, and indeed, his use of ‘sacrifice himself’ brings 
forward the image of Adam Jashari as solely responsible for his own death. He lists 
attributes assigned to Adem Jashari that resonate easily with the discourse of other 
wars, namely the US’ ‘war on terror’. His use of ‘propaganda war’, ‘sacrifice’ and 
‘al-Qaeda terrorists’ speaks directly to the media outlets that he claims were the 
audience of Jashari. His description of Adem Jashari’s motives as linked with al-
Qaeda motives does not follow on from the accusation that the Serbs used excessive 
force in the strikes against the Jashari compound. While Šešelj’s story seemed 
confused (his arguments are circular in that he invokes images of terrorists 
sacrificing their lives alongside the idea that this would be attractive propaganda for 
Western Media to use against the FRY), his attempt to draw upon a larger audience 
is plain. The idea of self-sacrifice alongside the mentioning of al-Qaeda raises 
questions, even if they are entrenched in accusations of a conspiracy involving the 
Western media.  
4 Conclusion 
The politics of international criminal tribunals never seems a more compelling topic 
than when former political leaders test the boundaries of fledgling tenets of 
international law. Milošević and Šešelj’s insistence on self-representation may have 
been the loudest and first of these tests, but alongside the difficulties they presented 
is also the pressing need for an unpacking of their own explanations of past political 
endeavours. As Gerry Simpson explains,  
…a war crimes trial can be viewed as the ‘trial’ of politics in the sense of a 
series of tribulations or tests to be undergone before a new society can 
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emerge untainted by the old. Frequently, however, particular types of 
politics are on trial. Most obviously, the trial is an indictment of the political 
project of the accused. (Simpson 2004), p 46.  
More than this, we see with Milošević and Šešelj that the trial can be viewed as an 
extension of the political project of the accused, even as these same projects are 
being held up to international scrutiny. They are frequently treated as past, when we 
might better conceive them as ongoing.  
The undertaking of linguistic and discursive analyses of the speech of these accused 
gives us two distinct ways to identify the personal power of the accused within the 
courtroom as tools of these ongoing political projects. Through the identification 
and analysis of power over process and power over narrative, we can clarify not 
only the motives of the speech in question, but how the words of these individuals 
before the ICTY (as well as within court records) may be demonstrating 
sociolinguistic relationships that have been overlooked in favour of judicial 
efficiency. The difficulties these individuals caused the court, alongside the length 
of these trials produced a necessary shifting of priorities within the courtroom, and 
through linguistic analysis, the priorities emphasised become more visible. This 
allows not only for a highlighting of the additional sociolinguistic dimensions of 
these trials, but of the intersection between sociolinguistics in the courtroom and the 
court’s agendas.  
When the question was posed at the beginning of this chapter, ‘how does the 
relationship between power and narrative change when political leadership is at 
stake in court?’, it was with the intention of opening up for discussion the idea that 
political leadership, once obtained, can have an impact on international political 
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processes even after the formalities of it have been stripped away. By framing the 
discussion of this chapter within the concepts of the self and historical and cultural 
lines, it becomes clear that the stakes of political leadership before the ICTY may 
well be closer to the ICTY’s own struggle with its authority than previously 
anticipated.  
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Chapter Seven - Testimonies of high and low rank accused: Comparing mental 
frames to conceptualise accountability  
 
1 Introduction 
The benefits of comparing the statements of high and low ranking accused are best 
understood, in the first instance, through the lens of the wider functions of 
transitional justice. At the heart of the ICTY’s aims is the drive to impress 
accountability for wartime actions onto both those who have acted during past 
conflicts and those who have yet to act, in the hopes that codified international 
systems of law will change the nature of the way people conceptualise their own 
actions during times of conflict. The ICTY publicises these aims in very clear 
terms:  
The key objective of the ICTY is to try those individuals most responsible 
for appalling acts such as murder, torture, rape, enslavement, destruction of 
property and other crimes listed in the Tribunal's Statute. By bringing 
perpetrators to trial, the ICTY aims to deter future crimes and render justice 
to thousands of victims and their families, thus contributing to a lasting 
peace in the former Yugoslavia. (www.icty.org, ‘About the ICTY’, accessed 
11 October 2014).  
Here we see the emphasis on individual responsibility as the primary way of 
categorising a perpetrator, which is a large part of the ICTY Statute.
32
 Avoiding at 
                                                          
32
 See Article 7, sections 1- 4 of the ICTY Statute, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in Appendix 
2.   
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the moment the complex discussion on what it might mean to ‘render justice’, the 
links established between an individual, his crime and trial, and the collective 
attainment of lasting peace in the region demonstrate a perpetual linear 
conceptualising of the processes of transitional justice that underlies the trials of the 
accused. What quickly becomes clear is that this linear conceptualising on the part 
of the ICTY (which I do not argue is incorrect or unsustainable, simply present and 
in need of acknowledgement) echoes traditions of criminal law in many systems 
(Roht-Arriaza 2006; Schabas 2001) and makes the links between the accused and 
the ways in which they frame their actions within the conflict discourse more 
apparent.  
Because of this, the concept of accountability becomes simultaneously more 
complex and more worthy of study. It is not something plainly seen in the 
statements of those putting forward a defence, but the aims of the ICTY and its 
ethos resonating within the courtroom have set the tone for a variety of 
interpretations of what the court might deem as ‘less’ accountable, and how this 
type of language might be aspired to by the accused.  
The speech of the accused facing international criminal tribunals is a perspective 
that has been critically under-researched. As seen in the research surrounding the 
reception of ICTY tribunals and judgements mentioned in the introduction to this 
thesis, literature on its achievements and pitfalls are plentiful, but accused on trial 
are commonly only discussed in terms of the legal challenges their cases bring to 
the ICTY (Akhavan 1998; Côté 2005), and in terms of their rights (Sjöcrona 1995; 
Sloan 1996; Zappala 2010). Little, if any, attention has been given to understanding 
the social psychology or sociology behind their statements in court. What this 
research does therefore, is call for an increase in emphasis on understanding issues 
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like accountability and responsibility, and offer that one way of doing this is 
through the examination of these concepts as part of the in-court speech of accused. 
In looking at speech of accused, it is possible to learn more about how the process 
of explaining past actions is understood by those at the centre of proceedings. This 
chapter therefore compares excerpts of testimony from six individuals who stood 
trial at the ICTY in an effort to better understand what linguistic phenomena are 
most commonly found within testimonies of the accused, and what this language 
might mean (in particular, the ways accused create categories in speech and how 
blame can be shifted – when this is done, how and who does this, and how often) in 
a wider sociolinguistic and sociolegal sense. This not only gives further insight into 
the perceived power of the ICTY from the perspective of those standing before it, 
but has demonstrated norms of communication that are emerging from the accused 
when it comes to speaking about events, places, people, and time.  
While it may initially seem that this type of analysis would simply be one of 
comparative legal strategy, the linguistic and discursive theoretical platforms this 
thesis utilises have shown that the speech of the accused cannot and should not be 
viewed as simply contained within the strategies of various defence teams. While 
the individual on the stand might have been ‘prepped’ beforehand, and may indeed 
alter responses in reaction to the line of questioning being put to him or her, these 
responses still exist as evidence of processes – both social and symbolic in terms of 
the effectiveness of transitional justice – occurring within the courtroom that 
demonstrate more deeply how those on trial perceive their own actions in the face 
of a larger, more structured morality.  
There are commonalities within testimonies of the accused analysed in this chapter, 
with two primary phenomena being demonstrated that are relevant to discussing 
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accountability. First, there are discussions of rank as a constraint in the decision-
making process, used by both high and low ranking individuals in ways that attempt 
to shift blame. Second, there are separate cognitive linguistic frames that the speech 
of high and low rank accused occupy, and these have remained consistently distinct 
through the excerpts I have analysed. High ranking accused occupy spaces that 
exist well beyond the self,
33
 identifying with larger political spaces or ‘selves’, or 
by carefully attempting to remove any aspect of ‘self’ from the situation. They 
compare and categorise only slightly inward, by comparing history with military 
tactics for example, or comparing international politics to regional politics. Low 
ranking accused consistently occupy spaces that categorise the ‘self’ relative to 
other people close to them, such as neighbours or fellow military personnel.  
The analysis of speech of low ranking accused alone has shown significant ways in 
which perpetrators categorise and understand themselves, ethnicity in general and 
broader concepts of time and space relative to their own actions, revealing more 
about defence strategies alongside broader ways in which actions and situations are 
spoken of in court. The three low ranking accused analysed show how speech is 
used to shift blame (shown through the speech of Duško Tadić), diminish violent 
actions (shown through the speech of Esad Lanždo), and do a combination of both 
(shown through the speech of Miroslav Kvočka). Adding the comparison of high 
ranking accused has allowed for significant similarities to appear in places – 
namely the type of logic used to dismiss or diminish an action by re-naming it – and 
has demonstrated that high ranking individuals are capable of a type of storytelling 
absent of their own agency. All three high ranking accused make use of narrative 
                                                          
33
 This is also interesting in terms of precedent set by the ICTY in favour of individuals being seen 
as culpable for their own actions – controversy surrounding this centres on the idea that this 
overlooks the criminal behaviour of states.  
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framed within larger political or military ideas, and this is used to shift blame by 
Tihomir Blaškić, Momčilo Krajišnik, and Milorad Krnojelac, but each do so in a 
slightly different way.  
2 The accused on the stand 
I have defined a high ranking individual as someone who had authority over others, 
and was known outside of their own community, even by people who had never 
met them. In my analysis of high ranking individuals, I chose three individuals who 
had different types of power – one military colonel, one camp authority, one 
politician. I have defined a low ranking individual as someone who had little or no 
authority over others, and was known only to their own community. These people 
often had direct contact with the groups being abused, participated in crimes 
themselves, or were present during these types of abuses and demonstrated no 
objections to them. The low ranking individuals I chose to analyse were all 
involved in camp guard positions of some form, two of them Serbs working in a 
camp detaining primarily Muslim men, and one Muslim guard at a camp whose 
inmates were primarily Serbs.  
The individuals of low rank I have chosen to compare are Duško Tadić, Esad 
Landžo, and Miroslav Kvočka. Duško Tadić was the first individual brought before 
the ICTY, and as such, his case has been studied and discussed more frequently 
than the cases of Kvočka and Landžo (Kerr 2004; Scharf 2006). Although Tadić’s 
position as president of his local branch of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) may 
imply he was a higher ranking individual, he did not in fact carry much weight 
politically or militarily (Scharf 1997, 2006) . A former café owner, his actions 
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during the attacks on Kozarac included murder, aiding in forcible transfer of 
Muslim civilians, and beating and intimidating the Muslim civilians in the area.  
Esad Landžo was a guard at the Čelebići camp, a detention centre in the Konjic 
municipality which held Serb prisoners, and was run by both Muslim and Croat 
men. Landžo was convicted of wilfully killing, torturing and causing serious injury 
to the detainees of Čelebići camp, and his actions there were of the more disturbing 
crimes committed within detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Miroslav Kvočka was a police officer who was recruited to work as a guard at the 
Omarska camp, a detention centre that held non-Serb prisoners in the Priejedor 
region in north-western Bosnia and Herzegovina. While he had authority over 
several of the guards there, his command was limited to a small group of people 
and he reported to several other higher-ranked officers regularly. Kvočka was 
present for, or aware of, many of the crimes committed in the camp, and was found 
to have instigated or aided and abetted the crimes committed by those under and 
around him.  
The individuals of high rank I have chosen to compare are Tihomir Blaškić, 
Momčilo Krajišnik, and Milorad Krnojelac. Tihomir Blaškić was a Colonel in the 
Croatian Defence Council (HVO), who later became General and commander of 
the HVO for the central Bosnian region. He was responsible for the use of Bosnian 
Muslim civilians as human shields for the HVO, the inhumane conditions and 
treatments of prisoners in detention facilities in the Kiseljak, Vitez, and Busovača 
areas, and attacks on populations in the Ahmići area.  
Momčilo Krajišnik was a Bosnian Serb political leader who held a number of 
political positions during the war, among them President of the Bosnian Serb 
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Assembly and member of the board of the SDS. He was a key individual in the 
forcible transfer and deportation of thousands of Bosnian Muslim and Croat 
civilians in areas throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Milorad Krnojelac was the commander of the KP Dom detention camp in Foča. He 
was aware of torture and inhumane treatment occurring within the camp and failed 
to prevent it, and he allowed persecutions, forcible transfers and cruel treatment to 
take place throughout his command.  
I have chosen these particular individuals for several reasons. First, not all accused 
took the stand in their own defence, limiting the options for analysis. This is not a 
compulsory action at the ICTY, and it is clear that in several instances the defence 
counsel for the accused may have advised against it, as testimony could quickly 
work against the accused during cross-examination. Additionally, the accused who 
pleaded guilty simply made statements of guilt, remorse and apology, which served 
as their only direct communication with the court.
34
 While this was more common 
for low ranking individuals, high ranking individuals did this as well.
35
 
I chose statements from individuals whose crimes were committed in a variety of 
locations, although this is more clear-cut with low ranking individuals than high 
ranking ones, as individuals of higher rank frequently exercised influence over 
multiple regions (Krajišnik being a main example of this). I made a point to avoid 
choosing low or high ranking individuals whose actions were concentrated 
exclusively in the same areas, because overlap could indicate that patterns found in 
testimonies were common only among accused with shared conflict experiences.  
                                                          
34Dražen Erdemovic (IT-96-22) was the first example of this.  Erdemović was one of the executors 
of Muslim civilians at Srebrenica, and his guilty plea and statement have been referenced and made 
example of repeatedly (Meernik 2003; Weigend 2012).  
35
 See Biljana Plavisić (IT-00-39 & 40/1), for example. 
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2.1 Why compare high and low ranked accused? 
As mentioned above, Article 7 of the ICTY statute does not link rank and action in 
ways that impact accountability. An individual is considered responsible for his 
actions regardless of having been under orders (to an extent, the court gives room 
for mitigating circumstances in terms of being ordered to carry out violence, as in 
the case of Erdemović cited above, and mentioned in Section 4 of Article 7, but this 
is not a guarantee), and those of high rank are not exempt from responsibility 
because of their position and are considered responsible for the actions of those 
committed with their knowledge by those under their command (Sections 2 and 3 of 
Article 7) (McGoldrick 2004; Updated Statute for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2009). In light of this, what use is categorising 
the statements of these individuals according to their rank?  
First, the testimonies of the accused bear similarities that are contained within their 
respective ranks. This not only indicates that there are similarities between legal 
strategies that are rank-specific (showing that precedent is helping defence strategy 
evolve in favour of what ‘has worked’ in terms of defence), but that patterns of 
individual expression are similar within these categories as well. Second, the 
assumption that conflict experiences might be of greater similarity not within ethnic 
categories, but within military categories, has proven a valid one in the instances 
examined here. The accused chosen for this study are from a variety of ethnic 
backgrounds, but descriptions of conflict experiences, expressions of choice making 
patterns, and situations of ‘self’ with respect to communities and ‘others’ display 
similarities across these groups.  
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3 Understanding accountability 
 
Literature on accountability as it relates to the ICTY and ICC perspective is, to a 
large extent, rather general and often brief. Much of it is from the perspective of the 
potential pitfalls of completion strategies, or the complicated nature of prosecution 
cases and limitations of who can be charged (Barasin 2011; Raab 2005; 
Schwendiman 2009; Zoglin 2005). This is not to confuse types of accountability – 
accountability changes depending on the perspective, as there are two levels of 
accountability at stake when we look at the speech of accused. There is 
accountability for speech and behaviour in court (thus allowing the term to take on 
a regulatory dimension), and accountability for past actions that relate to the 
charges brought upon the individual.  
 
Large concepts such as accountability or responsibility are not properly defined or 
deconstructed in much of the literature. Williams and Scharf (Williams 2002), 
equate accountability with justice in their book Peace With Justice: War Crimes 
and Accountability in the former Yugoslavia, demonstrating the structural direction 
that literature on accountability has taken. When accountability and justice are used 
interchangeably, there is a problematic perspective that emerges. Accountability is 
a concept associated not with those who are accused of crimes, but with those who 
are convicted. When accountability is (as it is for Williams and Scharf) reflected 
only in the systematic processes the courts undertake in dealing with accused, any 
social elements that the concept might encompass are overlooked. This might, in 
many ways, point to a gap in the literature that needs to be filled with 
interdisciplinary perspectives, and the intersection between the legal, philosophical, 
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and social psychological literature gives a more applicable understanding of 
accountability.  
 
Social psychology has been grappling with questions of groups and accountability 
for quite some time. V. Lee Hamilton’s 1978 article on the subject (Hamilton 1978) 
was at the beginning of a call to bring the social aspects of accountability more 
firmly into understandings of its definition and function. This work challenged 
perspectives on responsibility that were merely, as Hamilton states, ‘a decision 
about liability based on a rule,’ (p 316) and called for ‘a role-based’ view of 
accountability that leant heavily on popular notions of the time (mostly due to 
Milgram’s (Milgram 1963) study on obedience to authority). Though Milgram’s 
conclusions are now disputed for several reasons, ethical concerns among them
36
, 
this view of accountability nonetheless finds its ways into low ranking defence 
strategy and testimony at the ICTY. More than simply claiming to have acted 
violently because they were ordered to, some accused analysed in this chapter 
defend their actions as being a result of who they were (particularly Esad Landžo, 
analysed in section 5.2, but the opposite is shown with Duško Tadić, in section 5.1). 
This corresponds with Hamilton’s thoughts on the origins of responsibility. He 
states, ‘(…) it's not what you did, but what you did given who you are, that 
determines which sanctioning rules apply.’ (Hamilton 1978: 321). The legal 
standpoint of the ICTY and more current studies on group violence and issues of 
command responsibility (such as work done investigating abuses at Abu Ghraib by 
Mestrovic and Romero (Mestrovic 2012), and Snow (Snow 2009), who each apply 
                                                          
36
 Milgram’s experiments are now largely considered to have violated ethical standards of how 
psychological experiments should be carried out, which may have impacted findings – similar 
experiments are now undertaken digitally (Slater 2013), but it could be argued that Zimbardo’s work 
(Zimbardo 2009), while inheriting some of the ethical problems of Milgram, still maintains that 
people can be ‘led’ to act in certain ways.   
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more traditional philosophies to the analysis of group dynamics there, using 
Durkheim and ethics, respectively) have not taken this view. As stated earlier, 
precedent at the ICTY has gone in favour of individual responsibility
37
, and the 
social psychological perspectives cited above focus on the lack of prosecution for 
military individuals violating human rights.  
 
Much like Browning’s ‘ordinary men’ (Browning 1992), soldiers in Abu Ghraib 
were not threatened with violence or consequences that made them feel they didn’t 
have a choice in terms of their violent actions, and interestingly some of the 
research into their testimonies during court-martials demonstrate findings that are 
similar to those in this chapter. Again, it is Esad Landžo whose testimony seems to 
echo patterns also present in other testimonies, and his tendency to use language to 
lessen his violent actions (using ‘slap’ instead of ‘hit’, for example) is similar to 
testimony of Sabrina Harmann, a soldier court-martialled for her actions in Abu 
Ghraib.
38
 The important social psychological phenomenon to come out of this is the 
discussion of what is referred to as a ‘magnitude gap’ by Snow (Snow 2009), a 
concept that originates with Baumeister and Campbell (Baumeister 1999), that 
findings in this chapter indicate is present among narrative of ICTY accused as 
well. The magnitude gap is the difference in the perception of the seriousness of a 
crime that occurs between victim and accused. The use of language in the 
courtroom that not only expresses a magnitude gap but displays its use as intended 
for defence (as in, not simply explaining how the crime was viewed by the 
                                                          
37
 Though, as mentioned before, there are aspects within Article 7, Section 4 of the Statute that 
address mitigation, as applied to the case of Dražen Erdemović (IT-96-22).   
38
 ‘I knew he wouldn't be electrocuted ... So it really didn't bother me. I mean, it was just words. 
There was really no action in it. It would have been meaner if there really was electricity coming 
out, and he really could be electrocuted. No physical harm was ever done to him (Gourevitch 2008: 
177).’  
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perpetrator but an active attempt at convincing the court that this perception is the 
correct one) is therefore something that can offer insight into accountability. It 
relates back to understanding the accused’s mental space as constructed through 
language, showing how perceptions not only impact actions, but impact feelings of 
responsibility.  
 
The implications of the literature addressed above are that accountability as a 
concept is something that is socially situated. However, the term implies that the 
ways in which the actions of a criminal are dealt with systematically have to then 
meet some measurement of adequacy. This leads to an inherent need for the 
intersection of sociological understandings and the mechanisms of legal process. 
The legal side of the equation deals with questions of responsibility in an 
institutional, outcome-centred way. This means that the process of being held to 
account is being carried out, but that further discussions of what it means to truly be 
accountable are not addressed. And indeed, this is not the job of the court. 
However, this is not to say that further understandings of this cannot be achieved 
through other avenues. This chapter looks at how responsibility might be further 
defined through discussions that exist under the surface of the transcripts, and the 
analysis offered here demonstrates how new understandings can be achieved.  
 
What is being examined here are explanations of past actions, categorised and 
understood through the lens of cognitive linguistics, which are then held up against 
the question: what might these conclusions say about how accountability is being 
defined, tested, and understood through the experiences of the accused? As these 
are individuals who are mounting a defence against the charges laid upon them, the 
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ways in which they explain their choices in past conflicts is developed with a 
specific purpose (defence). It tells us not why they actually acted the way that they 
did, but how they chose to explain their actions in the face of the ICTY, which 
gives a closer understanding of what they may feel.  
 
3.1 Separating individual expression from legal strategy 
Examining statements made by accused brings with it immediate implications that 
these statements may not truly be those of the accused, but strategically rehearsed 
statements authored primarily by defence counsel. The ICTY system is one in 
which all witnesses are allowed to be ‘prepped’ by the side for which they are 
appearing, which has been seen as controversial at times, but ultimately a necessary 
practice (Karemaker 2008). There are, however, several reasons why this issue is 
not a major impediment to examining statements of accused. First, this practice is 
relatively uniform, and not exclusive to certain witnesses over others. Victims and 
accused alike are allowed to have rehearsed the questions they will be asked with 
the team who will be asking them in the first instance, and this is done to alleviate 
psychological stress and trauma on the part of victims, and aid in more timely 
testimonies from both sides (Karemaker 2008).
39
  
Second, and perhaps more of a technical point, is the fact that while there may be 
linguistic tools to help discern which statements of accused might be rehearsed and 
which might be spontaneous, the perspective of this speech as contributing to court 
                                                          
39 This is covered in very general terms in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal, in 
rule 65ter (Eii and Gi, referring to the advance requirements of prosecution and defence when 
calling witnesses, and rule 92ter, which gives conditions for presenting written testimony), found in 
Appendix 3, but the clearest articulation of this practice is found in the Trial Decisions of several 
cases that challenges these procedures, such as the Limaj et al Trial Decision, specifically the 
decision of 10 December 2004, found at http://icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tdec/en/041210.pdf.    
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discourse is not shaken. That is to say, what matters more than which statements 
might have been authored by whom is the fact that these statements have been said 
in the first place. Rehearsed speech is an integral part of court environments; judges 
and lawyers, for example, rehearse and write opening and closing statements before 
they are said in court, and what is said is often carefully calculated with specific 
audiences in mind (Conley 1990, 2005; Matoesian 1993; Philips 1998). For these 
reasons I have chosen not to endeavour to separate rehearsed speech from 
spontaneous speech, as both contribute to court discourse in equal measure.  
4 Low ranking accused: Three different stories of categorisation 
 
While Tadić, Landžo, and Kvočka each explain the choices they made through 
storytelling of a different kind, all three of them go to considerable effort to situate 
these actions in a way that ultimately reflects categorisation. Tadić’s categorisation 
splits his understanding of his situation three ways: Tadić relative to his neighbours, 
Tadić relative to the town of Kozarac, and Kozarac itself. Tadić consistently fails to 
connect his neighbours to Kozarac, demonstrating estrangement even in the midst 
of his overt efforts to be inclusive in his memories. Landžo and Kvočka categorise 
with positive/negative duality. Landžo categorises his actual actions relative to his 
potential actions (he explains how he was doing something good by way of also 
doing something bad), and Kvočka categorises his actual actions relative to the 
actions of others (doing something good in the face of others doing something bad). 
Each accused does this alongside other more subtle indicators of how they see 
themselves within their memories that give us a more detailed understanding of 
how low ranking accused explain their actions. 
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 4.1 Duško Tadić: Categorisation, time, and conceiving Kozarac  
 
As mentioned above, the case of Duško Tadić was highly publicised. It was the first 
major test of the ICTY’s ability to try someone accused of crimes that were still 
being felt within the region, which widened the audience of those speaking in court. 
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution brought to light some of the 
most harrowing experiences that the ICTY would hear, and many of the instances 
of torture described by witnesses in Tadić alongside the photo exhibits brought 
forward became the images of the conflict itself in the international press (Hayden 
1996)
40
.  
 
The primary focus of Tadić’s testimony is the events before, during and after the 
attacks on Kozarac. He tells of his relationships with the people in the town, his 
café, and his attempts to avoid military service at several junctures. Tadić’s 
narrative attempts to place him in a passive role regarding political and military 
events in Kozarac, and this attempt at passivity is common among testimonies of 
accused and fits with a logical legal strategy. However, when looking at his speech 
more closely, there are boundaries created indicating that his logic for behaviour 
went beyond the separation of us/them or self/other, to include a separation between 
the people of Kozarac and Kozarac itself.  
 
                                                          
40
 I cite Robert Hayden and later, James Gow in this thesis, but it is important to note that these 
authors did not take a passive role in Tadić.  Both were expert witnesses in this case; Hayden 
testified as a witness for the defence, while Gow was a prosecution witness.  While this may not 
have impacted the statements of Tadić himself, I nonetheless acknowledge that using the work of 
these experts extensively to analyse this case could potentially angle the analysis in the same ways it 
was split during the case itself.  As such, I have only cited where I deemed it absolutely necessary.   
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As illustrated below, Tadić’s description of events can be categorised in three ways: 
himself relative to his neighbours, himself relative to his town, and his town as a 
separate entity. Rarely do we see Tadić connecting his (non-Serb) neighbours to his 
town (and these exceptions happen primarily during cross-examination – see 
Appendix 4). This demonstrates that the conceptualisation of spaces alongside 
ethnic lines is strong. This is not simply language referencing a sense of belonging 
in a territorial, symbolic or ethnic sense, but a separation implied between an ethnic 
group and a physical space. This is a way of expressing ‘otherness’ through 
omission, or failed connections, which is not something that has previously been 
discussed in other research.  
 
Tadić’s categorisation of himself, his neighbours, and his town can be understood 
better when the statements are pulled from the text and examined side-by-side. A 
sampling of these statements is demonstrated in the chart below, but full excerpts 
including the questions posed to Tadić that elicit these responses can be found in 
Appendix 4. Many of these categorisations occur within the same responses, 
demonstrating that Tadić’s story of Kozarac has three firm points of reference:  
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Table 2: Statements of Duško Tadić 
 
Tadić and his 
neighbours 
Tadić (and his ethnic 
group) and Kozarac 
Kozarac 
‘they sided us somehow 
with them’ (28 Oct, p 
7836-7837) 
 
‘knew each other from 
before’ (28 Oct, p 7852) 
 
‘There was silence, 
apprehension, and a very 
strange feeling’ (28 Oct, p 
7852) 
 
‘some neighbours of 
mine of Muslim 
nationality’ (Oct 28, p 
7909-7910) 
 
‘We used to play football 
there… me and my 
neighbours’ (29 Oct, p 
7949) 
 
‘us who were living in the 
centre of Kozarac’ (28 
Oct, p 7836-7837) 
 
‘what kind of perspective 
my native town had’ (28 
Oct p 7909-7910) 
 
‘they were my neighbours 
or my brothers, the people 
from the centre of 
Kozarac, who were 
considered to be the 
natives’ (28 Oct, p 7832) 
 
‘They just organised some 
groups themselves and 
they were doing 
everything they pleased. 
So that created an image 
of Kozarac.’ (28 Oct, p 
7838-7839) 
‘Kozarac was in a pitiful 
shape. It was not so much 
destroyed, but there was a 
stench in the air’ (28 Oct, 
7863-7864) 
 
‘you could feel something 
in the air’ (28 Oct, 7863-
7864) 
 
‘the town itself was 
ghostly’ (28 Oct, p 7864) 
 
 
Interestingly, the topic of physical spaces and their uses was focused on by both 
prosecution and defence, and the example that was discussed most frequently by 
Tadić during his testimony was the use of the Serb Orthodox church as a meeting 
place to hold a plebiscite (named repeatedly by Tadić as the only ‘communal 
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object’ appropriate for the meeting). Tadić’s response to questions regarding this 
during his cross-examination reveals much about his conception of communal 
spaces:  
 
Example 36: Duško Tadić 
 
1 Q. You indicated in your testimony that the plebiscite itself was conducted in the 
2 churchyard of the Serbian Orthodox church because, you said, you did not want   
3 the plebiscite conducted in a private home and "there were no other communal   4 
objects". In fact, there were a variety of communal objects and buildings in      
5 Kozarac, but the Orthodox church was the only exclusively Serbian communal   6 
object, isn't that right? 
 
7 A. No, the Orthodox church in Kozarac is over 120 years old, and all people  8 
visited, not only the church but also the churchyard, Muslims, Croats and others. I 9 
remember. I grew up there. We used to play football there. We spent a lot of    
10 time there in the churchyard, not only of the Orthodox church, but of the 
11 mosque as well -- me and my neighbours. 
 
12 Q. So the mosque was a communal object or building, the Mjesna Zajednica was 
13 a communal building, the post office was a communal building? 
 
14 A. Yes. 
 
15 Q. But the Serbian Orthodox church was the only Serbian communal building? 
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16 A. Yes. - Tadić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Duško Tadić) 29 October 1996: 
7949. Emphasis added. 
 
The fact that Tadić responds to the first question with the age of the church is 
significant. While he tries, in the remainder of his response, to indicate that the 
churchyard was visited by other ethnicities and that other ethnic ‘communal 
objects’ were visited as well, the remark about the age of the church asserts a 
dominating history. Tadić may be assuming that the fact that the church is old 
aligns it with a history that relates back to communist Yugoslavia, when religious 
affiliations were not overtly expressed, but this does not truly match the phrase, 
‘over 120 years old’. The fact that Tadić responds to the statement, ‘[it] was the 
only exclusively Serbian communal object’ with, ‘no, it is old’, points to an 
inevitability underlying the fact that other ethnicities would have visited the church 
over time. Additionally, the image of an old church implies landmark status – 
something preserved and powerful that stood as a backdrop for life in Kozarac. 
Tadić’s responses, ‘I remember. I grew up there,’ reiterate this.  
 
Also important is the use of ‘before’, when Tadić talks of seeing an old school 
friend of his brother’s in Banja Luka. In court, he takes the time to describe his 
connection to this acquaintance, and says, ‘the families knew each other from 
before’. The reference to ‘before’ as meaning ‘before the war’ is a recurring 
expression that has become common when referring to pre-conflict Yugoslavia both 
in and out of the courtroom, but it is by no means insignificant. Rather than stating, 
‘the families have known each other for years’, or ‘the families have known each 
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other since we were children’, etc., it is ‘before’ that marks the important sections 
of time. Statements of time that have been explored in previous chapters can give 
this greater context. Through the course of this research, this type of expression has 
now been echoed in two distinct ways, by individuals with different roles in court: 
accused and interrogator.  
 
The accused (Tadić) tries to speak to a connection between families that pre-dates 
the conflict they found themselves in the middle of at the time he is referring to, and 
‘before’ becomes the category that indicates that his history is one of inclusion. The 
interrogator demonstrates this barrier in time as one that disrupts ‘normalcy’, or 
implied peace. As in the quote used at the opening of chapter 3 on memory, ‘so that 
we can all go back to normal’ is the aim of forgetting, solidifying the ‘before’ as 
something better and necessary that the court itself is directing memory toward.  
 
This demonstrates that the concept of time as defined by the war is something 
common across roles at the ICTY, but that each person who refers to time relative 
to the war does so in a way that anchors the aims of their speech. Bringing the 
discussion back to Tadić, and in light of the above analyses of his testimony, the 
question remains: what does this reveal about the relationship between the accused, 
the ICTY, and perceptions of accountability? Tadić’s testimony is in a large sense, 
‘outward-facing’ - that is, he speaks of himself and his actions only within the 
larger story of his town, his neighbours, and the timeframes guiding his story, 
indicating that he and his defence are attempting to shift accountability from a 
personal sense to a contextual one. However, if we look at some of his speech 
closely, his separations of us/them demonstrate an attempt to shift blame to other 
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Serbs, and he assumes the role of victim briefly when describing how he was 
thought to have ‘sided’ with these other Serbs. The text examples41 and DST 
analysis below explain this in greater detail: 
 
Example 37: Duško Tadić 
 
1 I did not know about the real goals of this forum. I was afraid that all people     
2 would be manipulated by any which party. It was risky to get involved because    
3 you did not know what was behind it. - Tadić Trial Transcript (Testimony of 
Duško Tadić) 28 October 1996: 7831. Emphasis added.  
 
Example 38: Duško Tadić 
 
1 So there was a kind of agreement but, as I say, our group was not allowed to do 
2 anything. We could just listen to the proposal and propose something, but we    
3 were not in charge. We could not say, "OK, it is going to be implemented"      
4 because there was a very strict group of people in Kozarac, people with criminal  
5 records, such as Suljo Kusuran who had a group of people under weapons. That  6 
was this Cirkin person, I do not know his name, but he was in Kozarusa, who also 7 
had a criminal record. They just organised some groups themselves and they were 8 
doing everything they pleased. So that created an image of Kozarac. Well,    
 9 whether the official authorities of Kozarac could prevent such kind of organising 
10 of people, that was a question. - Tadić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Duško 
Tadić) 28 October 1996: 7838-7839. Emphasis added.  
                                                          
41
 Extended versions of these examples can be also found in Appendix 4. 
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Example 39: Duško Tadić 
 
1 Q. At this stage, it was obviously well-known that it had been a Serb takeover of 
2 power in Prijedor, and you referred to your difficulties in being able to attend that 
3 meeting. Was that because lines were being drawn now between Serbs and the  
4 Muslims far clearer than they had been in the previous time? 
 
5 A. Well, the takeover in the municipality of Prijedor did create a certain         
6 animosity towards us who were living in the centre of Kozarac, a certain      
7 mistrust, because it all took place quite unexpectedly in Prijedor. It was a shock  8 
for everybody, because the local government was in the hands of the SDA, a      
9 Muslim party in Prijedor, and something like a coup had happened. Of course,  10 
people no longer believed anyone. They would simply turn their heads away   11 
because it was difficult to believe, to trust, someone, they identified the power 12 
with someone who had done something terrible. They sided us somehow with 13 
them, identified us with them. So what I was trying to do, I was just trying to 14 
help, as far as it was possible for me, because I was from the centre of       
15 Kozarac because my parents had been living there and I thought that I     
16 could do something, and it was my duty to do something. But, as I say, there 
17 were many groups of people who were spreading lies. I don’t know if it was all 
18 on purpose, but simple people were disappointed. Power had been taken away 
19 and, on the other hand, everybody was acquiring weapons in Kozarac. - Tadić 
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Trial Transcript (Testimony of Duško Tadić) 28 October 1996: 7836-7837. 
Emphasis added.  
 
Figure 7: DST model for Tadić 
 
 
 
Here we see how Tadić attempts to distance himself from other, more guilty Serbs, 
whose motives were the creation of the counter-reality of Kozarac expressed along 
the M axis – an ‘image’ of Kozarac, unknown ‘real goals’, and possible 
manipulation. The bringing up of ‘other’ Serbs with criminal pasts was something 
commonly used in defence cases, in attempts to bring ideas of power being in the 
hands of thugs and gangsters running riot, and not from someone with an interest in 
his hometown, as Kozarac maintains. It is interesting that his distancing includes 
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subtle victimhood – the injustice of having been ‘sided with them’ (‘They [his 
Muslim neighbours] somehow sided us [Tadić and his Serb neighbours] with them 
[other Serbs]’, p 7837) when really he ‘was trying to help.’ His use of Kozarac as a 
weighty symbol of implied innocence allows him to connect his identity (‘my 
parents had been living there’) and his ‘duty to do something’, demonstrating that 
his will to help (implied innocence) is not simply tied to what he did or didn’t do, 
but who he was. This is an interesting contradiction to the social psychological 
argument between linking identity to violent action discussed above in section 3, 
and also contrasts to the strategy of Esad Landžo, discussed below in section 5.2. 
This gives two different ways of dealing with accountability – Tadić’s attempts to 
remove himself from it, and as shown below, Landžo’s addressing of the issue 
alongside attempts to diminish actions.  
 
4.2 Esad Landžo: The diminishing of violent actions through examples 
of restraint 
 
The testimony of Esad Landžo contrasts greatly with that of Duško Tadić, as 
Landžo and his defence presented a case focusing on his lack of self-confidence and 
personal problems that allegedly made him prone to obeying any order given to 
him. Landžo’s testimony includes within it repetitive explanations about his 
restricted choices, many of which demonstrate ways he felt constrained by rank, 
which is something not uncommon in accused testimonies. He says over and over 
again, ‘I just followed orders’ or ‘I did as I was told.’42 Landžo and a string of 
defence witnesses spoke of his frailty both physically (he reportedly suffers from 
                                                          
42
 For one out of many examples of this, see p 15253, July 29 1998, lines 21-25.   
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chronic health problems such as asthma) and mentally (he was said to have been 
withdrawn as a child, was prone to things like self-harm, and suffers from anti-
social personality disorder)
43, and Landžo’s responses echo this line of argument.44 
 
In contrast to Tadić’s outward-facing testimony, Landžo’s testimony focuses on his 
actions almost exclusively, and he (and his defence) situates these actions within 
the context of Esad Landžo, rather than in any social or historical sense. He gives 
the court an inward facing narrative, and storytelling as we see with Tadić (and later 
Kvočka) is rare, as the overall defence for Landžo is psychological. But more than 
this, Landžo’s speech is focused on diminishing his violent actions. He does this in 
a literal linguistic sense (using qualifiers), he does this through the placing of his 
actions alongside those of others in the same situation, and he tries to demonstrate 
positive choice-making within negative scenarios by describing choices he could 
have made that would have been worse. 
 
His first attempts at diminishing his actions are seen though his use of qualifying 
statements – he uses ‘sort of’, ‘just’, or ‘slightly’ in an attempt to lessen the 
seriousness of the act itself, and we see this alongside denial. He states: ‘I didn’t 
really hit him’, ‘I didn’t say he was tied up’, and gives alternatives: ‘It was a slap’ 
or ‘I helped him up’, and ‘I just said there was a cord on his hand’. Landžo tries to 
allow accountability into his testimony by conceding some acts of violence, but 
                                                          
43
 See p 14911, 24 July 1998, which is the testimony of Gogic Damir, who grew up with the 
accused.  Another example can be found in the testimony of Dr Edward Gripon, July 28 1998, 
beginning on p 15129. 
44
For example: ‘Q. (…) tell me when did you allow others to give you orders? 
A. Until some two years ago, perhaps. Yes, to tell me what to do. Until I have sufficiently stabilised 
my personality to be able to assume the responsibility for myself, instead of others doing this on my 
behalf.’  (p15254-15255, 29 July 1998.) 
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only where they were attached to an order to do so. At times, Landžo takes the 
approach of admitting to an action but trying to assert that it was the action itself 
that was misunderstood. He adds the actions of others into the frame, as shown 
underlined in example 41, to demonstrate that his actions were the least dangerous 
within the groups in which he found himself.  
 
Example 40: Esad Landžo 
 
1 Q. (…) you said that Draganic was tied up and beaten up, he couldn't get up and  
2 the guard told you to lift him up and that he couldn't get up himself. Furthermore, 
3 you said that you hit him without having received an order to do so; is that true? 
 
4 A. I didn't say that he was tied up. I just know that he had a cord on his left hand. 
5 I didn't see him tied up, I just saw a cord, a rope on his left hand. I got to him,     
6 slightly kicked him with my foot to make him get up. I did it three times. Then  7 
he couldn't get up, so I sort of pushed him up, but I didn't really hit him. I just 8 
helped him to get up. - Mucić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Esad Landžo) 
29 July 1998: 15260. Emphasis added. 
 
Example 41: Esad Landžo 
1 A. Tunnel No. 9, I hit him twice, but other guards hit him more often. I was not  2 
standing in a position from which I could really hit him hard, but there were other 3 
guards standing next to me. I did hit him twice, that's true. 
 
4 Q. In the direct you did not mention that you were ordered to beat him; is that     
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5 true? 
 
6 A. If I got the order to hit him, I would have hit him more often. It was      
7 actually just pushing, it wasn't really hitting him. Because when the others     
8 started hitting him, I was told to take him to the hangar and not to hit him. So I   9 
was supposed to take him there. If I had been given the order to hit him, then it 
10 would have been a different story. I was just doing what I was told to do. - 
Mucić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Esad Landžo) 29 July 1998: 15257-
15258. Emphasis added.  
 
 
Example 42: Esad Landžo 
 
1 Q. (…) you said you hit him at least once because he took the food away from the 
2 rest of the detainees. In the course of the examination-in-chief, you never said that 
3 you were ordered to hit him. 
 
4 A. I slapped him, maybe I was not precise. It was a slap on the face and not a  5 
hit. Because how can you explain to an old man in front of you, crying, who a    
6 night before was hit in his head and the person who took away food from him    
7 standing next to him, how can you explain to him that the guy who took away the 
8 food from the older man was right. So I slapped Mr. Miljevic to show older       
9 detainee that the same law applies to old. But I didn't hit him, I just slapped 
him. 
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10 Q. Do you think that slapping is not beating up? 
 
11 A. One slap on the face? I wouldn't say that. I mean, it was done simply to     
12 comply with the old man's insistence on justice be done. Imagine what would 
13 have happened if I reported Miljevic, if this happened, then I guess Miljevic 
14 would never have been able to come here and testify. It all finished and ended 
15 with a single slap. And, in a way, I wanted to satisfy the old man's desire to    
16 bring peace to the hangar because it would have been, perhaps, easier to me to 
17 go to the headquarters and report Miljevic taking food away. Had I done this, 
18 Miljevic, would never be able, I guess, to come here and testify. - Mucić et al 
Trial Transcript (Testimony of Esad Landžo) 29 July 1998: 15258-15259. 
Emphasis added. 
 
 
While certainly interesting, this is not the most significant aspect of Landžo’s 
speech. The two basic attempts at lessening his actions – the denials in black bold 
and the comparisons to the actions of others, underlined, are not an unexpected 
response to accusation. It is the fact that these responses occur together alongside 
strong hypotheticals that imply that in doing something bad, Landžo did something 
good. These statements are in red bold, with the one in example 39 being the lesser 
important of the two examples made. In example 39, Landžo is attempting to 
reinforce his ties to following orders, demonstrating that his need to follow orders 
was so strong that even when he isn’t asked about whether he would act violently if 
ordered, he volunteers this information. He states, ‘If I got the order to hit him, I 
would have hit him more often.’ On the surface it gives the impression that he 
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could have been worse, so to speak, if ordered. This seems to counteract his earlier 
statements diminishing his actions, but it also reinforces his attempts to assert that 
his choices were made solely on the basis of orders from others.  
 
In example 40, Landžo’s true detachment from accountability is made plain. In red 
we see him offer a hypothetical scenario in an attempt to assert that in doing 
something bad, he did something good. In addition, this explanation is framed in 
very broad symbolic terms that reference concepts upheld by the international 
criminal court specifically. Within his story about the stolen food are positive 
concepts highlighted in blue, situating Landžo as the satisfier of someone else’s 
desire for peace and justice. The larger implication is that his choice to settle the 
dispute with ‘a slap’ could have, perhaps, saved a life. Twice he states that had he 
not done this, ‘Miljević wouldn’t have been able to come here and testify.’ The 
assumption here is that Miljević would have been punished so severely by others 
that it would have resulted in his death, or at the very least, some form of 
incapacitation. Landžo then completes his explanation by framing this choice in 
terms of its use to the court – the issue isn’t that Miljević wouldn’t have been 
around, the issue is that he wouldn’t have been able to ‘come here and testify.’  
 
This is a method of explanation that has been used by other accused of relatively 
low rank. Goran Jelisić, who had a moderate level of authority at the Luka camp, 
was reported to have given similar examples during interrogation. Expert witness 
Bernard Patrick O’Donnell, testifying regarding interviews with the accused, stated:  
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‘[Mr. Jelisić] He claimed that he stayed in Brčko because he was told to, 
and again he feared that if he disobeyed orders, he would have been killed. 
He claimed that he only killed people that he was told to and that he never 
killed anyone of his own free will. In fact, he said that where he had the 
opportunity of not killing someone, then he didn't kill them, and he saw 
that as a personal triumph.’ - Jelisić Trial Transcript (Testimony of 
Bernard Patrick O’Donnell) 1 Sept 1999: 2085-2086. Emphasis added. 
 
There are several reasons that these methods of explaining actions are important. In 
the most basic sense, it demonstrates a commonality in the ways in which some 
accused are situating their past choices in their own minds, giving us a better 
understanding of how individuals perpetrating ethnic violence might have 
conceptualised their own personal power. This, however, should not be taken as 
evidence of the ways in which they actually made choices, but as evidence to how 
they explain choices already made. This is pivotal in looking to understand issues 
surrounding accountability.  
 
As section 3 above has already discussed, accountability is too abstract to measure, 
and is not demonstrated plainly enough (even when statements of apology and guilt 
are made) to be verified or authenticated. Yet, its presence as a cornerstone of 
transitional justice implies that expectations regarding accountability assume this 
sort of verification, while those taking part in tribunals are wrestling with a more 
complicated reality. Refusing the opportunity to act more violently, while still 
displaying widespread violent behaviour, demonstrates that the basic concepts of 
human rights are not misunderstood by these individuals, but blatantly disregarded.  
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 4.3 Miroslav Kvočka: The constraints of rank, and the symbolic nature 
of positive action 
 
Miroslav Kvočka testified to the constraints of his rank when it came to doing his 
job at Omarska, and he explained at length during his testimony what he thought it 
meant to be a police officer and how the structure at Omarska made it impossible 
for him to live up to his self-imposed standards. When asked about how he might 
have stopped abuses in the camp, he responded:  
 
Example 43: Miroslav Kvočka 
 
1 Kvočka: ‘…I have to provide them with the information, with the things I know  
2 in cases of, I don't know, murder or beatings. And here the situation was absurd  3 
because I was supposed to inform that inspector on the beatings  that he himself 
4 was involved with and that he himself committed.’ - Kvočka et al Trial Transcript 
(Testimony of Miroslav Kvočka) 13 February 2001: 8108. 
 
This is an interesting variation on what we have seen with Landžo, and his stating 
that he only followed orders. Kvočka’s defence focuses on not only the flaws in the 
structure, but the flawed morality of those of higher rank. With discussions of rank 
as a constraint in the decision-making process, there are consistent and opposite 
arguments from high and low rank accused. Low rank accused, such as Kvočka 
demonstrates above, give bottom-up responses. Essentially, he couldn’t report the 
abuse of prisoners because the person in the chain of command above him was the 
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person responsible for the abuse. So in Kvočka’s understanding of his choices, the 
chain of command was the constraint, and the fault was above. With the higher 
ranking individuals, such as the examples given in section 6.1 on Tihomir Blaškić, 
we see the opposite. Blaškić gives explanations that are top-down. As will be 
discussed in greater detail in that section, he gives the same basic reasons for his 
unaccountability – the chain of command was the constraint – but he places the 
fault below, stating that he had little or no power over people.  
During his testimony, Kvočka’s defence often adopts strategic storytelling that uses 
powerful symbols to explain his choices. His closeness to his Muslim neighbours is 
not repeatedly mentioned in ways similar to Tadić, but featured as an ever-present 
moral compass for how Kvočka assessed his choices. The picture painted by the 
defence is one of a man who kept a begrudging presence at Omarska, and who 
helped inmates whenever he could. Kvočka’s wife testified about inmates giving 
her husband copies of the Qu’ran for safekeeping, and she explains that they kept 
forty or fifty of them, waiting to return them to the inmates who had given them.
45
 
At one point, he explains an encounter with the wife of an inmate, and the choices 
he made as a result of it:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45
 See p 7969, testimony of Jasminka Kvočka, 12 February 2001. 
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Example 44: Miroslav Kvočka 
 
1 Kvočka: She gave me a bag full of things. She gave me a loaf of bread. I        
2 remember that because the guards complained about that. They said that a pistol  
3 or a knife could be hidden in that loaf of bread, and they told me that I should     
4 break it in two.  
 
5 Q. Did you break the items in two to the guards' satisfaction? 
 
6 Kvočka: No, I did not. - Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Miroslav 
Kvočka) 13 February 2001: 8050.  
 
The story Kvočka tells here is ultimately about a symbolic act of trust, and the fact 
that this act went against the wishes of his peers or subordinates. His refusal to 
break the loaf of bread to check for weapons is a highly symbolic act, and it sits 
effectively alongside the other stories about Kvočka attempting to help inmates. 
The importance of this example in terms of understanding testimonies of lower-
ranked accused goes beyond the fact that this makes for a more compelling defence 
strategy. It is yet another example of attempts to demonstrate positive choices 
within negative scenarios, but this time the decisions are not encapsulated within 
the possible space, as with Landžo’s explanations that he could have been worse, 
but he wasn’t. Kvočka’s defence takes an almost tallying approach, bringing to 
light lists of relatively good things he did to try to outweigh the bad things 
presented by the prosecution.  
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4.4 Low ranking accused: Conclusions 
 
Although the persuasiveness of the speech of these particular accused is difficult to 
measure, the interesting conclusion to be drawn is that explanations of actions by 
low ranking accused take several significant forms – the bottom-up explanation of 
rank as a constraint, attempts to demonstrate positive choice-making within 
negative scenarios, failed attempts at concealing categorical frames, and attempts at 
diminishing violent actions. The ways that Tadić expressed his sense of self relative 
to others, his town, and described his town alone was significant in his failure to 
connect others to his town, demonstrating a way of categorising ‘other’ through 
omission that has not commonly been seen in previous transcript research. Tadić 
shifts blame, however, through his description of ‘other’ Serbs, and brings forward 
the idea that he was victim of being thought to be aligned with them. The testimony 
of Esad Landžo has traits within it that share similarities with the testimony of 
higher ranking accused, shown below, and additionally displays features that social 
psychologists have identified in other testimonies (such as those during court-
martials on Abu Ghraib prisoner mistreatments). But Landžo’s testimony contrasts 
with Kvočka’s – rather than speak of his bad behaviour in terms of what it could 
have been, Kvočka spoke of his good behaviour as what it was, to offer contrast to 
a bad environment. The comparison of these testimonies gives us a more complete 
picture of the social psychological side of accused testimony and how this interacts 
with explanations of violent behaviours, demonstrating the strength of the methods 
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applied and the potential of the findings. These examples are even more revealing, 
however, when examined alongside testimonies of higher ranking individuals.  
 
5 High rank examples: Outward-facing testimony and political/historical 
cognitive frames 
The testimonies of high ranking accused tell a very different story from those of 
lower rank analysed above. Because of the nature of their crimes, accused of higher 
rank were questioned regarding a different type of event – larger-scale military 
events, as we see with Tihomir Blaškić, larger political events, as the examples of 
Momčilo Krajišnik below demonstrate, and a combination of the two as we see in 
the testimony of Milorad Krnojelac. What is revealed through comparison are three 
examples of situating political or military issues in ways that are very outward-
facing (the self is only articulated relative to larger, more abstract concepts, rather 
than relative to distinctive definable nouns, as seen with low ranking accused), and 
in some cases pointedly exclude agency. 
 
5.1 Tihomir Blaškić: Military framing 
 
Tihomir Blaškić works diligently during his testimony to remove his military 
persona from politics, repeatedly arguing that military decisions can in fact occur 
separate from the political choices they may be embedded in. Central to his 
argument are claims that his own power meant little to the soldiers he commanded. 
Below, he discusses what it means to be a soldier, with an interesting treatment of 
both history and reason:  
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Example 45: Tihomir Blaškić 
1 Q: Now first, General, you have made comments before in your documents about 
2 historic interests and historic responsibility. What is this essence of historic       
3 interest or historic responsibility of the Croatian people? What does that mean to 
4 you? 
5 A. As a soldier, within the framework of preparations to raise the combat morale 
6 of our soldiers, I would stress that in the sense that you must be up to your       
7 historical responsibilities, thinking that the history would re-examine the role of 
8 each and every soldier and each and every commander in relation to every    
9 order they received and the method and quality of the performance of their tasks. 
10 That is how I understood these historical responsibilities in the sense of raising 
11 morale. - Blaškić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Tihomir Blaškić) 4 May 1999: 
20869. Emphasis added. 
Blaškić personifies history, putting faith in it as a force to judge action. More than 
this, his use of ‘each and every soldier’ demonstrates his emphasis on individual 
action over collective action, which is consistent with his arguments that he had 
little actual control over the decisions of his soldiers, implying that they were the 
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ones directing their own actions.
 46
 The fact that he twice refers to this concept of 
history as a tool for raising morale is an interesting one. This is an attempt to bring 
the actions of those he commanded into a much larger relevance, with history 
acting as its own courtroom, with the power to ‘re-examine’, as Blaškić puts it. 
History, however, remains politically ambiguous in this context, and the subtext 
here for scholars of transitional justice is that Blaškić interacts (albeit likely 
unintentionally) subtly with issues of victor’s justice47. The situational metaphor 
(‘you must be up to’, in italics), is an additional indicator that Blaškić places history 
in a high moral position, as an overseer of action.  
His separation of military decisions from political objectives assumes a moral 
perspective, in an effort to exonerate himself from crimes such as ethnic cleansing. 
He states: 
Example 46: Tihomir Blaškić 
1 Q: (…) So if the political directorate were, for example, to set a task of ethnic     
2 cleansing, that depoliticised army would, nevertheless, implement that political   
3 objective. Do you recognise that situation? 
4 A: (…) I never was in a position to accept such a task of ethnic cleansing because 
5 I would not have accepted it because an obedient soldier must also be a        
                                                          
46 This argument was the basis for much of Blaškić’s appeal, which reversed his sentence of 45 
years and set important precedent on the way the ICTY dealt with issues of command responsibility 
(Gordy 2012).  
47
 See Peskin: Beyond Victor's Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and Meernik: Victor's 
Justice or the Law?: Judging and Punishing at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia for elaborations on this discussion (Meernik 2003; Peskin 2006).   
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6 reasonable soldier to be a good one. - Blaškić Trial Transcript (Testimony of 
Tihomir Blaškić) 4 May 1999: 20876-20877. Emphasis added.  
This differs greatly from the testimony of the lower ranking individuals analysed 
above, particularly Landžo, whose explanations of his actions demonstrate opposite 
explanations for similar outcomes. These two explanations of action, ‘I just 
followed orders’ and the construction of Blaškić’s defence centring around, ‘I could 
not expect my commanding to be effective’ typify many of the accused defence 
strategies, though neither line of defence has proven consistently successful. What 
is unique in Blaškić’s explanation above is his understanding that obedience in a 
soldier requires reason, which then makes for a ‘good’ soldier. Based on the 
comparison of the high rank and low rank individuals I have examined, it becomes 
clear that the tendency for high ranking accused to link and define broader moral 
concepts is much more frequent than it is for the lower ranked accused. However, 
this can also be interpreted as strategic defence on Blaškić’s part, and that his 
emphasis on his identity as a professional soldier was a way of simultaneously 
implying that he was not a politician (Gordy 2012). This is reinforced by the fact 
that his statements on military decisions as separate from the sphere of politics can 
be found throughout his testimony.  
 
 5.2 Momčilo Krajišnik: Problematising Sarajevo 
This contrasts slightly with the words of Momčilo Krajišnik, whose testimony gave 
detailed accounts of his relationship with the city of Sarajevo (much like we see 
with Tadić and Kozarac), but also with the politics of dealing with the separations 
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of ethnic groups there. In example 47 below, Krajišnik gives a lengthy explanation 
of how he saw ‘the complexities affecting Sarajevo’, as the interrogator phrases it:  
Example 47: Momčilo Krajišnik 
1 Q. Was it contemplated at that time that that was a separate decision which would 
2 follow quite soon, or was it that the complexities affecting Sarajevo would      
3 probably require a very considerable time to sort out? 
4 A. Sarajevo, from the very outbreak of the crisis, was a separate problem. And 
5 to the end of the war it was always on the agenda, so to speak. I can say that in   6 
most proposals there was the proposal to transform Sarajevo into two wholes, not 7 
to divide it as some people have imputed, but two parts where there would be     
8 municipalities with a Serb majority and a territory with a Muslim majority. Two- 
9 thirds would belong to the Muslim majority municipalities and one-third to the  
10 Serb majority municipalities. And that is why it was stated here that the        
11 question of Sarajevo would be resolved in due course because that was the    
12 most painful issue of all. Every agreement envisaged that later. (…)I'm talking 
13 about all plans where it had been envisaged to have a solution for Sarajevo that 
14 two-thirds of this Sarajevo without Pale should belong to the Muslim/Croat   15 
entity, the Muslim/Croat side, so to speak, and one-third would belong to the  16 
Serb side. And you have that in every agreement that was reached. Until that is 17 
reached -- now, why was I saying all of this? The UN, the United Nations,     
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18 administration was supposed to be there until a solution is solved because it was 
19 impossible to resolve the issue of Sarajevo together with all of Bosnia-        
20 Herzegovina. - Krajišnik Trial Transcript (Testimony of Momčilo Krajišnik) 27 
April 2006: 23191-23193. Emphasis added.  
In bold, the problematising of Sarajevo becomes immediately clear as a focus. 
Sarajevo is in turn a problem, a question, and an issue, requiring proposals, 
agreements, and plans (seen highlighted in red) for transformation, resolution, and 
solution (seen in italics). Krajišnik’s speech on the subject of Sarajevo is one that is 
clearly equating solutions with separations, but he tries to avoid the terminology by 
arguing that transformation into two wholes is not the same as dividing. Here he 
uses similar logic to that of the low ranking Esad Landžo, who used phrases like, ‘it 
was a slap and not a hit’ to diminish his actions, but Krajišnik’s use of this logic fits 
with the attempts to speak to grander concepts more common to high ranked 
accused. Krajišnik attempts to elevate ‘division’ to ‘transformation’, a process 
linked to resolution that would have given us ‘this Sarajevo’ and ‘that Sarajevo’.  
But once Krajišnik tries to bring this problem into the context of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, his speech shows similarities to that of Milorad Krnojelac, analysed 
below. He places the UN – specifically the UN’s absence – as the deciding factor 
for the failure to ‘resolve the issue of Sarajevo’, and the collective of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as the secondary, but more immediate reason for the solution’s 
impossibility. His final sentence in the excerpt, ‘it was impossible to resolve the 
issue of Sarajevo together with all of Bosnia-Herzegovina’, may seem the most 
confused, but it is also the most telling. The subtext is that it was impossible to 
divide Sarajevo because the greater decision-making force of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina was itself divided. While this may read as a microcosm of the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia in general, it is also evidence to the fact that 
Krajišnik’s solution of dividing sat within a greater divided space that he could also 
problematise. Ultimately, however, the question of whose problem Sarajevo was is 
also answered by Krajišnik within this sentence. The United Nations, Krajišnik 
states, ‘was supposed to be there’, which again leaves any expressions of 
Kraijšnik’s own agency in the situation firmly out of view. This is significant in 
that he is shifting responsibility for his actions away from himself and onto larger, 
less-definable entities. This is similar to Tadić shifting of guilt away from himself 
and onto ‘other’ Serbs, and we see here how the comparison between the two 
demonstrates similar tactics but different frames (one large, institutional frame 
devoid of agency used by Krajišnik, and one more localised frame, with the ‘self’ at 
the centre, used by Tadić).  
5.3 Milorad Krnojelac: ‘Using’ Geneva Conventions 
In contrast, the testimony of Milorad Krnojelac is more informal, and he attempts to 
place himself in the same mental space as those of lower rank when it comes to 
command responsibility, but with little consistency. Much of his defence focused 
on his lack of knowledge, both in terms of what was going in the KP Dom Camp 
that he commanded, the surrounding area of Foča, and in terms of the broader 
conduct of his subordinates.
48
 His defence, like Krajišnik, introduced the idea of 
international influence contributing to Krnojelac’s faulty logic when running his 
camp. He addresses the gap in his knowledge regarding the Geneva Conventions as 
                                                          
48 For one of many examples, he states in his testimony on p 7888, 28 June 2001:  
‘Q. You also know that Muslim flats were being searched at this time, right? 
A: Believe me, I learned that afterwards.  I didn't know it at that time.’ 
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something that just simply wasn’t taught, and we can see by the way his defence 
phrases the question that this is the clear intention:  
Example 48: Milorad Krnojelac 
1 Q: During that time, that is to say, these four and a half months in Bileca, and     
2 then later for a few months every year, was a doctrine seriously studied by such   
3 officers? Did you study the Geneva Conventions, et cetera? Tell me, what was    
4 done at these courses? 
5 Krnojelac: (…) We studied these military rules, the code of conduct. Then we    
6 were trained as to how to handle weapons. As for these Geneva Conventions,   7 
believe me, I cannot remember that they were ever mentioned while I was in 8 
the army in Bileca. However, forgive me, please, perhaps I should tell you why  9 
it was not necessary, even later, for someone to do that. All these military       
10 exercises that I took part in had the character of all national defence. The     
11 officers would only be told, "The possible attack by the blue ones could take   12 
place in that area," and how should defence be organised. So it was all national 13 
defence, how to defend all of one's own people. Not to attack somebody else's 14 
territory and go somewhere else. That is how I understood it from day one.  15 
Believe me, I never thought that it would be used in any other way. In this case, 16 
how it was used in this unfortunate Bosnia-Herzegovina of ours, and we see 17 
what is going on nowadays throughout the Balkans, and what happened in     
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18 Yugoslavia too, and we see what came out of all of this. So as for the Geneva  
19 Conventions, I think that for a long, long period of time, even in the active     
20 military where education and training go on for five or six years, they were not 
21 used for a long time; that they were not specifically studied as a subject. - 
Krnojelac Trial Transcript (Testimony of Milorad Krnojelac) 25 June 2001: 7578-
7579. 
This excerpt is particularly complex to analyse, as Krnojelac is speaking in two 
distinct cognitive frames – the past, in the frame of international relations (IR), and 
the possible space, in a domestic territorial space (one of implied unity). Looking at 
pieces of the excerpt within the DST graph allows for greater comparison and 
understanding: 
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Figure 8: DST Model for Milorad Krnojelac 
 
The words in the past space on the left fall within the frame of the Geneva 
Conventions, demonstrating the Krnojelac’s discussion of their ‘use’ brings the 
‘unfortunate’ Bosnia-Herzegovina nearer to his own identity, which he names as 
‘ours’. On the right are words relating to his explanation to the court as to why he 
thought the knowledge of the Geneva Conventions wasn’t necessary to military 
training. This fills a territorial frame, but the references to territory are less specific 
than those on the left. Whereas on the left, we see an international frame being 
brought into a similar territorial frame, and he names Bosnia and Herzegovina 
specifically under the discussion of the Geneva Conventions. On the right he uses 
the word ‘nation’, and rather than use ‘ours’, as he does on the left, he says ‘one’s 
own’. Embedded within both examples (in italics in example 46) are the same 
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attempts to bring himself back into the conversation, with ‘believe me’. While it 
may be an informal and common turn of phrase, a gap-filler at the very least, 
Krnojelac’s use of it shouldn’t be ignored. Throughout his testimony he implores 
the listener to ‘believe me’, which in discursive terms and in the legal space is an 
indicator that it is not simply truth that is sought, but verification through belief.  
Krnojelac’s speech, therefore, demonstrates two separate realities – one where 
national defence was prioritised for military teaching, and one where international 
rules impacted a nation in an unfortunate way. The causal link between these two 
realities is his explanation: ‘I should tell you why it was not necessary’, underlined 
in the excerpt, and illustrated in the model at the top. A key point in this 
comparison of frames is that Krnojelac is more present in one than the other. That 
is, his use of greater specifics and the word ‘ours’  
Krnojelac’s explanation also implies the same detachment from responsibility that 
we see with the lower ranking individuals, but opposite to Blaškić – the chain of 
command was to blame, the fault was above - with the rules set by forces outside, 
out of reach, and meddling, in turn. However, his argument as to why this 
knowledge was unimportant indicates that he understood the Geneva Conventions 
not in terms of his own actions, but in the broader military sense. In bold blue are 
references to how he conceptualises the Geneva Conventions as something to be 
used, rather than upheld. This is an interesting distinction, and coupled with the 
assessment of national defence being something related to territory rather than 
ethnicity (highlighted in red bold, with the exception of the more vague ‘one’s own 
people’ in red italics), demonstrates an inconsistency with his framing of its ‘use’ in 
‘this unfortunate Bosnia-Herzegovina of ours’.  
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Shortly after this response, he gives an answer that allows a more detailed look at 
his concepts of conceiving events:  
Example 49: Milorad Krnojelac 
1 Q. Did you ever expect a war to break out in the territory of Yugoslavia, that      
2 Yugoslavia would be at war with anyone, let alone that there would be a war      
3 within Yugoslavia itself? 
4 Krnojelac: I cannot understand until the present day. As I said, I have been    
5 here for 1.108 days, and I still cannot understand that that happened. And that a 
6 person can be so deluded to think that something like that could ever happen, I   
7 see that only now. Because I could not in any conceivable way think of this   8 
kind of thing happening, like what actually happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It 9 
did happen. Believe me, on the 18th of April, 1992, I said -- well, you're not     
10 asking about it now so I don't want to talk about it, but I did say even then that it 
11 is unbelievable that it actually happened, and I said who I actually blamed for  
12 that. - Krnojelac Trial Transcript (Testimony of Milorad Krnojelac) 25 June 
2001: 7579. Emphasis added. 
This is not the only time that Krnojelac lists how many days he has been 
incarcerated,
49
 and he mentions this alongside the fact that he ‘still cannot 
understand that that happened’, the implication being that his presence at the Hague 
for such a duration should have led to greater understanding of the situation. There 
                                                          
49
 He does so again on p 7865 of his testimony from June 27th 2001 (1111 days). 
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is an interesting distinction here – Krnojelac does not indicate that he doesn’t 
understand what happened, but that that (war) happened at all. This moves his 
knowledge, or in this case lack of understanding, out of the singular events that he 
might have had involvement in, and into the act of not being able to conceive a war 
in Yugoslavia in general. These are expressions of disbelief embedded within a 
frame of war itself, which again demonstrates the consistent pattern of 
conceptualisation illustrated below: 
Table 3: Frames of accused 
Accused Frame 
Tadić (low ranking) Self/others 
Landžo (low ranking) Self/others 
Kvočka (low ranking) Self/others 
  
Blaškić (high ranking) History/military 
Krajišnik (high ranking) 
Krnojelac (high ranking) 
International relations/politics 
International relations/politics 
 
 
5.4 High ranking accused: Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the testimonies of high ranking accused demonstrates that attempts 
to shift responsibility for actions are equally as common here as they are among 
low ranking accused, but are carried out differently. All three high ranking accused 
distance themselves from the situations on which they are speaking, but do this 
through exclusion of references to the ‘self’ in terms of these events, rather than by 
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voicing the nature of their relationships, as the low ranking accused have done. 
Their speech also echoes the arguments made by low ranking accused – that the 
chain of command was to blame, the fault was either above (as in Krajišnik and 
Krnojelac’s defence, using the UN and Geneva Conventions, respectively) or below 
(as in Blaškić’s defence), with the behaviour of soldiers under his command being 
disconnected from his authority, and his insistence of his own disconnection from 
politics through his constant references to being merely a professional soldier. 
Through the analysis of testimonies of high-ranking accused, we can get a more 
complete picture of how defence strategies embed themselves in the speech of 
accused, but also ultimately how connected the accused are to the actions in 
question, which is the closest identifiable indicator of how accountability is 
functioning within the courtroom space.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
With the three low ranking individuals examined in this chapter (Tadić, Landžo, 
and Kvočka), three distinct narratives emerged. Tadić tells the story of himself and 
the town of Kozarac, with references to his neighbours absent in connection to the 
town itself, and he attempts to separate himself from a group he determines to be 
the real perpetrators of violence in Kozarac. His outward-facing testimony 
(attempts to shift accountability from a personal sense to a contextual one) bears 
some similarity to testimonies of higher-ranked accused but remains rooted in the 
‘self’. Landžo repeatedly attempts to ‘re-frame’ his actions, changing the words 
used to describe acts of violence to diminish their seriousness. His re-framing 
extends to the idea that he had done something good through doing something bad, 
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a method of explanation common also to testimony of high ranked accused such as 
Jelisić (discussed in the section on Landžo) and is undertaken to opposite ends by 
Kvočka, who tries to demonstrate positive choice-making within negative 
scenarios. Kvočka also speaks to rank as a constraint to his decision-making 
processes, citing bottom-up (the fault lay with command) problems. All three 
individuals spoke from self/other cognitive frames, defining their choices and past 
environments firmly within those spaces. 
 
The political and moral space of the conflict itself became much more prominent 
among accused of high rank, and Blaškić, Krajišnik, and Krnojelac all speak from 
the larger, more abstract frames of history and international politics, something that 
is easy to see when we place the DST graph of Krnojelac alongside a DST graph of 
Blaškić:  
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Figure 9: DST Model of Blažkić and Krnojelac 
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All three also use the arguments of rank as a constraint in the decision-making 
process, but far more subtly. Blaškić is the most direct in this, arguing that his 
command wasn’t effective and that the actions of the soldiers under him therefore 
did not originate with his orders. Krajišnik and Krnojelac both bring international 
institutions – the UN and Geneva conventions, respectively – as higher ranking and 
faulty overseers.  
 
In the case of those of low rank, this analysis demonstrates how categories of the 
self are functioning within explanations of the accused, and in a subtle way 
potentially demonstrating that low ranking accused are attempting to answer to their 
own crimes, while the higher-ranking accused speak to their perceptions of the 
crimes of others. In the larger relevance of the aims of the ICTY, this shows that 
accountability for crimes may not only differ with the role one played during 
conflict, but how one attempts to define, justify or explain this role relative to 
others. With deeper understandings of the constructs of the mental spaces of the 
accused, it follows that the greater problem of defining accountability with the 
accused in mind needs to be undertaken by scholars, while not overlooking the fact 
that courtroom interactions may be key to understanding this in greater detail.  
 
This chapter has shown that a productive first step in doing this is examining 
existing intersections between the social psychological literature and the limited 
literature on courtroom accountability, and applying CL and DST methods to bring 
more emphasis on the sociological aspects of accused courtroom testimony. The 
current state of research into the actions of those acting violently during conflict 
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looks at actions rather than explanations, and if accountability as a concept is to be 
understood more fully, it is explanations that we must focus on. 
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Chapter Eight - Conclusion  
1 Introduction 
It is important to remember that at the centre of this project are discussions of 
violence. Ultimately, the court and its records exist as an international legal 
response to conflict, and it therefore creates a space where the accounts of 
experiences of individuals intersect with the objectives of legal process. The aim of 
this project was to change perceptions of the transcripts of individuals in court, 
seeing them as a body of data offering unique insights into the courtroom 
environment. This project has analysed transcripts from the ICTY, asking, what do 
applications of cognitive linguistics reveal about social processes within the 
courtroom? Applying Discourse Space Theory (DST) to transcripts has not only 
demonstrated that unstudied social processes are apparent, but that they are also 
significant. They provide evidence suggesting struggles for power over memory 
and narrative during victim testimony, and give greater insight into how accused 
categorise themselves, others (victims and the court), history, and politics. The 
situating of these results within social psychology and discourse analysis has given 
greater insight into the victim-witness experience, and shown how power as 
expressed through language can vary within the courtroom space, exploring the 
beginnings of why this might be so.  
1.1 Situating the project: Its place in existing literature 
This research addresses multiple gaps in the literature of several disciplines in 
particular. In terms of work done analysing the ICTY, it exists as the first analysis 
of transcripts from a cognitive linguistic perspective, and sits among a small 
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selection of literature examining courtroom interaction sociologically, much of 
which focuses on aspects of the courtroom that while marginally related to the work 
done here, have different priorities. As mentioned in chapter 3, most analyses of 
ICTY tribunals from a sociological perspective do not place emphasis on the 
uniqueness of the court space linguistically, and therefore bring together interviews, 
media reports, and more general courtroom analyses, leaving conclusions made to 
be of a different type. Examples of this can be found in the work done by John 
Hagan and Ron Levi, Eric Stover, and Dembour and Haslam (Dembour 2004; 
Hagan 2003, 2005; Stover 2005).  
There are several strong platforms of research into courtroom interactions that this 
project leans heavily upon, adding a practical dimension to the larger theories put 
forward. In particular the work done by Conley and O’Barr, Gumpertz, Cotterill, 
and Matoesian (Conley 1990, 2005; Cotterill 2002; Gumpertz 1982; Matoesian 
1993) has informed this research, and the aim of this project’s contribution to 
analyses of courtroom interactions is to see how a specific set of transcripts can 
build upon ideas that have been functioning well theoretically in slightly different 
disciplines. Much of this work, however, also encompasses the discursive aspects 
of court transcripts and environments. The writings of Conley and O’Barr and the 
work of Cotterill have been influential to how the legal environment has been 
understood for this thesis. Literature on discourse analysis is extensive, and as 
noted in chapter 3, definitions and methods are therefore drawn primarily from 
work that looks at the interaction between language and courts, such as selected 
work done by Ruth Wodak (Wodak 1981). This is alongside work done by scholars 
such as Jenny Edkins on trauma and memory (Edkins 2003), and this thesis seeks to 
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bring together ideas about court discourse with the subjects of this discourse (such 
as trauma, memory, emotion, and political and military power).  
The primary work influencing the approach of this thesis was the work on political 
discourse by Paul Chilton, in particular his book Analysing Political Discourse: 
Theory and Practice (Chilton 2004) and work presented by him at Oxford in 2011 
(Chilton 2011) along with his paper Discourse Space Theory: Geometry, Brain and 
Shifting Viewpoints (Chilton 2005). Again, the aim of my research was to add to the 
potential applications for Chilton’s theories, adapting the degree of analysis to 
make way for a second-level interdisciplinary set of interpretations to expand the 
initial results. As such, my research sits between Chilton and his contemporaries’ 
cognitive linguistic approaches and those of broader discourse theorists and social 
psychologists.  
The social psychological literature this project draws upon is the body of work on 
ethnic conflict, and work done by Browning, Chirot, and Valentino helped shape 
the beginnings of this thesis into its present form (Browning 1992; Chirot 2006; 
Valentino 2004). Literature on group theory in particular allowed for a productive 
intersection between cognitive linguistics and studies of ethnic conflict, as it 
brought together elements from both (Pynchon 1999; Ross 1986; Tajfel 1982; 
Tedeschi 2001; Taylor 1994).  
2 Main findings 
The findings of this project demonstrate that tribunal transcripts from the ICTY 
contain within them evidence of social processes occurring within the courtroom. 
This evidence has not only been previously overlooked, but is important in 
deepening understandings of how power relationships impact victim testimonies, 
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and how the accused explain their actions in the face of international accountability. 
Ultimately, this project calls for changes in the way interactions are perceived at the 
ICTY. Therefore, the results of this research are relevant to cognitive linguists and 
scholars of the sociology of law, as well as those interested in transitional justice 
more generally. This work expands methodological applications to create a 
practical approach to a specific data set, demonstrating the versatility of cognitive 
linguistic methods when situated within larger insights of social psychology and 
discourse analysis.  
2.1 Chapter Four - In-court references to memory: Issues of control 
over narrative 
Utterances at the ICTY on what to remember and what to forget are often made in 
passing, and are therefore easy to overlook. The concept of memory, however, has a 
large place in studies of transitional justice, and brings together work from 
philosophy as well as psychology and linguistics to form the growing discipline of 
memory studies. This chapter aimed to stand apart, while still building on previous 
work, asking, ‘what does in-court speech on memory tell us about the relationship 
between witness and interrogator at the ICTY?’  
The results of this chapter indicate that speech on what to remember and what to 
forget are frequently found alongside struggles between the witness and 
interrogator over control of these memories. The witness statements analysed were 
from Witness B (Kvočka et al), Emir Beganović (Tadić), Edin Mrkalj (Kvočka et 
al), and Witness 87 (Kunarac et al). The testimony of Witness B contains within it 
requests from the interrogator that the witness forget, alongside references to a 
collective sense of ‘normalcy’ – ‘I would like you to forget this, and that we can all 
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go back to normal.’ This particular statement demonstrates that there is an assumed 
power for the interrogator to be able to tell the witness how her memories should be 
treated, with the reference to the collective implying that her memories are serving 
as a barrier between the larger group and their ideal destination – normalcy. This is 
echoed again with Emir Beganović, who testified in a different case and was 
spoken to about forgetting by the presiding judge. Significant also is the fact that 
the label of ‘witness’ was invoked for both, following the statements on forgetting, 
demonstrating that hierarchies were points of reference in court, and the 
interrogators in these instances felt the need to impose their definition on the act of 
witnessing on the witnesses themselves.  
The issue of ‘I cannot remember’ is also recurring, signifying a struggle for control 
over memories in a slightly different way than discussed above. Edin Mrkalj is 
instructed by the presiding judge on the role of forgetting in court, which leads 
Mrkalj to use the option of forgetting as a way to conclude his testimony. Through 
Mrkalj’s statements, it is apparent that his perspective of the proprietary role 
memories play in the courtroom is one that is shifting – that narrative, once given, 
becomes the property of the court and should not have to be given again. This is 
reinforced from the point of the view of the court with the example of testimony 
from Witness 87, where the use of phrases like ‘let me refresh your memory’ 
alongside questions of discrepancies in past interviews imply that the interrogator 
sees the witness’ knowledge as suspect, and the role of forgetting as a more genuine 
state of mind than producing an answer after the fact. While this is not uncommon 
in cross-examination, this is important as an additional demonstration of the fact 
that the role of the court in obtaining, possessing and discarding memories is 
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placing the narrative control of witnesses under strain, and questioning the way the 
witness-interrogator relationship is defined at the ICTY.  
 2.2 Chapter Five - Expressions of emotion in witness testimony: 
Reinforcing the victim struggle 
When looking at testimony concerning violence, emotion is something that is often 
described but is rarely studied. This chapter sought to ask what expressions of 
emotion on the stand might mean for the way experiences are recounted, and how 
emotion might impact the way these experiences are received by the court. 
Testimonies examined were from Edin Mrkalj (Kvočka et al), Amir Delić 
(Krajišnik), Sifeta Susić (Kvočka et al), Witness D (Stakić et al), and Witness P 
(Stakić et al). Results indicate the expressions of emotion, much like the references 
to memory discussed previously, are markers for struggles of power over narrative. 
What makes the results of this chapter slightly different from those of the chapter 
on memory is that these expressions are found within the language of the witness, 
while expressions on memory were more frequently found within the language of 
the interrogator. These two chapters together form the section analysing witness 
testimony, and demonstrate consistent results of linguistic indicators as evidence of 
struggles for power within the courtroom. 
Two types of in-court emotional expression were identified in this chapter – 
emotion relating to events occurring within the courtroom, and emotions expressed 
with reference to a past event. The most common among expressions of the first 
type found were expressions of frustration and confusion, and the testimony of Edin 
Mrkalj again contains within it issues of relinquishing control as a result of his 
frustration with the interrogator. He also defines the court as ‘witness’ to his 
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traumas experienced in testifying, displaying an interesting role reversal and 
evidence of potential re-victimisation through testimony. 
The testimony of Amir Delić contains expressions of fear related to the recounting 
of a past memory, leading to a struggle between himself and the interrogator as to 
the nature of his choices while being detained. This exchange, together with the 
testimony of Sifeta Susić, shows that fear could be a factor that bound people 
together while simultaneously existing for these witnesses as something to be 
overcome. The testimony of Witness D also contains expressions of fear, which he 
associates with groups (in particular, the Crisis Staff), but links this fear with the 
unknown (‘I can only imagine…’). The testimony of Witness D as expressed within 
the DST graph shows a movement of expressions of fear into multiple spaces of his 
memory, personalising then collectivising it within a hypothetical unknown. While 
the testimony of Sifeta Susić and Witness D are not outward examples of the same 
types of struggles over narrative control as demonstrated with Edin Mrkalj and 
Amir Delić, they are nonetheless important. They offer key insights into the way 
fear as an emotion functions within the courtroom, and reinforce the conclusions of 
the analysis that expressions of emotion may frequently be found alongside 
struggles for power over narrative, but are not present in every occurrence.  
Additional testimony from Witness P is analysed in the final sections of this 
chapter, and although the excerpts included seem to imply conclusions 
contradictory to earlier examples in the chapter, they offer further evidence to the 
fact that witnesses are determining for themselves what they think the court wants 
to hear (and are not always in agreement with this), and struggles can occur where 
agents of the court (in the case of witness P, this is the judge) try to impress upon 
the witness a more positive view of their agendas.  
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2.3 Chapter Six - Comparing Milošević and Šešelj: Power over 
narrative, power over court process 
The aim of comparing the opening statement of Slobodan Milošević with the 
closing statement of Vojislav Šešelj was to examine the specifics of court 
performance as it related to former political leaders who chose to defend 
themselves in court. Results of this comparison indicate that the speech of these 
individuals centres around two types of power: power over historical narrative, and 
power over court process. Each, however, attempts to exert this type of power in a 
different way, ultimately demonstrating that the evolution of the ICTY in the eight 
years between these two cases has had an impact. Additionally, these results give us 
two very distinct ways in which we might identify the personal power of the 
accused as tools of their ongoing political projects. Concepts of audience, the 
performative nature of the in-court speech of these individuals, and the placement 
of ‘self’ for the self-representer all interlink to reinforce these conclusions. 
DST analysis of statements reveals the shifts each accused attempted when 
discussing the past, demonstrating that each attempted power over historical 
narratives. But while Milošević did this with direct reference to historical narrative 
(relating cognitive framing in which he related the events in the former Yugoslavia 
to the second World War), Šešelj’s narrative was the story of his arrival at the 
ICTY, and the metaphoric battles hefought there. The differences in the ways each 
accused sees his platform are plain: Milošević leaves himself firmly out of the 
frame where possible, opting for his political ‘self’ to be embedded within the 
plight of the former Yugoslavia. Šešelj on the other hand, attempts to bring others 
within the courtroom (primarily the presiding judge), as close to his narrative as 
possible, using hypothetical scenarios to do so.  
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The differences between the ways the two accused attempt to exert power over 
court processes demonstrate plainly the shifting of the power behind the ICTY in 
the mind of the self-representing accused. Milošević was unrelenting in his attempts 
to undermine the reality of the Tribunal, using phrases like ‘the so-called 
prosecution’ and ‘this illegal Tribunal’ throughout his speech. Šešelj, however, 
speaks of the court in ways that bring about verbal violence, most notably about 
‘battles to be won.’ Both men bring about a discourse of circular ‘victimhood’ - 
they situate themselves as victims of the ICTY, but their behaviour in interrupting 
the processes of the court reaches outside the walls of the ICTY, and the ICTY’s 
difficulties in dealing with this leads it to become victims of the behaviours of 
Milošević and Šešelj. 
 2.4 Chapter Seven - Comparing high and low ranking accused 
This chapter sought to understand how concepts of accountability might be 
embedded in (or absent from) the speech of accused. Very little analysis has been 
done on how accused perceive their actions post-conflict, and my aim was to use 
their language in court as a primary source for examining this. The testimonies of 
six accused were compared, with three accused of low rank examined alongside 
three accused of high rank. The low ranking accused analysed were Duško Tadić, 
Esad Landžo, and Miroslav Kvočka. High ranking accused compared were Tihomir 
Blaškić, Momčilo Krajišnik, and Milorad Krnojelac. Results from this chapter 
demonstrate that the explanations of actions of accused occur in frames relative to 
the amount of influence each individual had during the events in question. 
Specifically, accused of low rank explain their actions in terms of themselves 
relative to others, while accused of high rank explain their actions within the frames 
of larger political ideas, very rarely referring to the self. The significance of these 
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comparisons demonstrate that the language of the accused is essential data in 
further understanding their cognitive frames, shedding light on a very overlooked 
aspect of the tribunals. 
The low-ranking accused - Tadić, Landžo, and Kvočka – all have categorisation 
embedded within their explanations of action, but each individual expresses these 
categories in different ways. Tadić’s speech uses three categories: himself relative 
to his Muslim neighbours, himself relative to his town, and his town as a separate 
entity. This demonstrates that conceiving spaces alongside ethnic lines is something 
that occurred within the minds of the accused, and gives new insight into 
understandings of separation explained alongside action. Landžo’s testimony 
focuses heavily on the diminishing of violent actions, and his categorisations are of 
types of violence, and he places value judgements on the lesser of these. His speech 
demonstrates a high detachment from the concept of accountability. Kvočka 
explains his actions through the lens of rank as a constraint, and speaks to the 
symbolic nature of positive action, framing his decisions as counteracting negative 
scenarios where possible. His categorisations, like Landžo’s, centre around action, 
but take a reversed approach (positive actions within negative scenarios, rather than 
negative actions that were not as bad as other negative actions).  
The high-ranking accused – Blaškić, Krajišnik, and Krnojelac – all frame speech 
within larger ideas, politically and militarily. Blaškić, like Kvočka, uses rank as a 
constraint to his choices, but focuses his military role as one that was ultimately 
separated from politics. His explanations therefore focus on what defines a soldier, 
and his personal choices are explained only through the lens of his profession. 
Krajišnik and Krnojelac both speak to international political events as constraints 
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for their actions, in effect creating a larger, less-definable force more powerful than 
them to shift accountability toward.  
2.5 Linking key ideas  
There are several key ideas that link these chapters together, allowing the research 
to sit as a unified project that tackles aspects of these ideas in more detailed ways. 
The first of these concerns power – within testimonies of victims and accused alike, 
there is evidence that issues of power underlie the patterns being analysed. In 
examining references to memories in chapter 4, these issues were found within the 
struggle between victim and interrogator over who could determine what should be 
remembered. In chapter 5, expressions of emotion were found to be markers of 
struggles over narrative power. Chapter 6 revealed that statements made by 
Slobodan Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj followed attempts to exert power over 
historical narrative and power over court process, to varying degrees of success. 
Finally, a more concrete definition of power was explored in chapter 7, in 
comparing how previous amounts of power held changed the nature of explanations 
of violent behaviours in court, with a final focus on accountability.  
Although one might argue that the methods applied to these transcripts made the 
project predisposed to conclude that issues of power were at the forefront of 
interactions in the courtroom – and indeed, the theories based on discourse, 
linguistics, and social psychology do prioritise their focus in terms of power 
relationships – this does not undermine findings in any way. Rather, it means that 
the methods employed to examine this data were the best fit for the approach, and 
least likely to force conclusions in directions that were less natural.  
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3 Limitations of the thesis 
As was stated earlier, the volume of transcripts that exist for possible analysis is the 
primary limitation of this thesis. Research had to be focused and logical, and taking 
on too large a volume of data would have compromised this greatly. As with all 
projects that offer analysis of selected portions of larger volumes of data, there are 
certainly findings that exist within this dataset that are yet to be fully explored. 
This, however, is more of an indication that there are gaps remaining for further 
study, and can be viewed as a call for more work to be done on this subject (as will 
be discussed below).  
There are, however, some theoretical limitations that need to be addressed, namely, 
how the project might have changed if methodology employed was of only one 
discipline. While it may seem to more traditional researchers that the combination 
of approaches used for this thesis might detract from findings, I argue that much of 
the analysis presented here would not have been possible using only a single 
approach. The DST analysis, in the first instance, is an excellent method designed 
to analyse political speech. I chose to stretch the boundaries of this method, as the 
potential for its use outside of singular speech events was high in terms of 
understanding not only the politics of in-court communications but the sociology of 
the speech of individuals of multiple roles in a specific (often political) 
environment. To properly place the results of this, however, and ensure engagement 
with the broader issues present in discussions on transitional justice, insights from 
social psychology and discourse analysis were not only necessary, but provided an 
opportunity for innovation in the way this type of research is undertaken.  
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3.1 Implications for research practice  
One aspect that the findings from this project demonstrate that was not touched 
upon during the previous chapters is the fact that undertaking transcript analysis of 
this type, while complex, is entirely feasible when approached responsibly. That 
being said, there were volumes of transcripts read for this project which were 
ultimately determined not to contain interactions significant to analysis of 
relationships between individuals and the court, and other excerpts highlighted 
initially as potentially significant that did not, in the end, prove relevant to the 
overall aims of the project.  
This is to be expected when working with large volumes of court transcripts, and to 
claim that every part of every trial contained exchanges of the types highlighted by 
this thesis would not be realistic. This, however, is part of what makes the research 
necessary, as the patterns themselves are not readily apparent upon general reading, 
and require specific approaches to properly locate and understand them. The 
practical implications stemming from this are therefore not unexpected – that these 
transcripts ultimately require innovative approaches and creativity of thought if new 
information within them is not to be overlooked. 
4 Avenues of further research 
The impending closure of the ICTY should not mark in any way a trend away from 
analysing what the tribunals have produced sociologically, and what this could 
mean for communities. Many of the cases that are yielding significant results, 
despite having finished several years ago, are still important in terms of what they 
can show us about the human processes of transitional justice, and will remain so as 
long as we remain committed to this type of attention. There is a large volume of 
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data related to the ICTY that has yet to be explored (at the time of writing, 
transcripts number over one million pages), and this research has demonstrated that 
doing so is not merely a fruitful direction of inquiry, but one that is important if we 
are to know more about courtroom interaction in the international legal arena.  
One chapter of this thesis was eliminated during the early stages because it was too 
large to undertake, and this was looking at in-court expressions of female witnesses 
in particular, to apply DST and discourse analysis to interactions to determine how 
the construction of the ICTY environment might be dealing with questions of 
gender. Though many studies exist exploring the treatment of rape as a weapon of 
war, this would be a project that looked at engendered language in the courtroom, 
and its impact on things already explored by this thesis, such as defining ‘witness’, 
power struggles over narrative, and issues of re-victimisation as embedded in 
language.  
This thesis refers frequently to court hierarchies, and there is strong potential for 
explorations into how these hierarchies are defined in language more directly. 
While this project focused more on how the subtle and symbolic aspects of 
hierarchies were made stronger through language, a study on the convergence 
between the legal and linguistic issues of hierarchies in court could build on 
conclusions made here.  
In addition to widening the transcripts analysed, there is potential for a comparative 
aspect to this type of approach. Transcripts from other international criminal 
tribunals, most notably the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
could benefit from similar analysis as a stand-alone project, but would ultimately 
give much needed insight when compared with research done for this project. Many 
282 
 
questions stem from this, the very beginnings of which are questions on whether the 
patterns highlighted in this thesis are present among other tribunal transcripts, how 
they might differ, why similarities or differences might exist, and what these might 
mean. Both tribunals are ad hoc tribunals, created to address a pressing need for 
action taken against perpetrators of ethnic violence. While the conflicts themselves 
were very different, and these differences are reflected within the tribunals, it is 
worth asking how these court environments compare under new analysis. Results 
from a comparative study could indicate whether the types of patterns identified 
and analysed here are indicative of international legal environments in general, 
rather than the ICTY specifically.  
5 Conclusion 
This research has, in many ways, pioneered a new approach to understanding court 
transcripts in general, and international criminal tribunal transcripts in particular. 
The approaches to analysing the transcripts already existed, and bringing together 
these methods was a natural and logical choice for what I hoped to achieve – 
namely, a greater understanding of how language functioned in the ICTY 
courtroom as evidence of social process. The most innovative aspect of this project 
is the combination of the way transcripts are perceived, the way they are analysed, 
and the conclusions themselves. While there is a basic platform of research that 
places importance on courtroom communications (most prominently in the 
discipline of forensic linguistics, discussed briefly in chapter 3), no research yet 
exists examining ICTY transcripts using the approaches here, and as yet very little 
has been done looking at transcript data sociolinguistically.  
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The main ideas this research brings to existing understandings of the ICTY 
environment lie in the emphasis on data that was previously considered to be less 
important. The ICTY has met with several big challenges in its lifetime, many of 
which have allowed serious questions into the nature of how transitional justice 
may or may not be working. Issues of self-representation, timely trials, jurisdiction, 
and controversial sentencing have plagued the Tribunal since its inception and have 
thus taken precedence over academic inquiries that may have been seen by many as 
less urgent. This is not to belittle the important and necessary research into the 
processes of international criminal justice, nor is it to claim that there must 
necessarily be competition into what avenues of focus should take precedence. It is, 
however, highlighting the fact that unexplored elements of the courtroom 
environment are part of the ways in which these trials function, and as such this is a 
point of focus that is quite relevant. Ultimately, the gap that exists is broader than 
this research has been able to tackle, making the first contributions to it all the more 
important.  
  
284 
 
Bibliography 
Agha, Asif. 2007. Language and Social Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Akhavan, Payam. 1998. Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A 
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal. Human Rights 
Quarterly 20 (4):737-816. 
Akhavan, Payam. 2008. Reconciling Crimes Against Humanity with the Laws of 
War: Human Rights, Armed Conflict, and the Limits of Progressive 
Jurisprudence. Journal of International Criminal Justice 6:21-37. 
Alfaro, Maria Jesus Martinez. 1996. Intertextuality: Origins and Development of 
the Concept. Atlantis 18 (1/2):268-285. 
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and 
Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. 
Anoya, Evelyn. 2013. In the Shadow of Nonrecognition: Milošević and the Self-
Represented Accused's Right to Justice. In The Milošević Trial: An Autopsy, 
edited by T. W. Waters. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Arendt, Hannah. 1994. Eichmann in Jereusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Armatta, Judith. 2010. Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan 
Milošević. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
Armatta, Judith. 2013. The Court and Public Opinion: Negotiating Tensions 
between Trial Process and Public Interest in Milošević. In The Milošević 
Trial: An Autopsy, edited by T. W. Waters. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
285 
 
Atkinson, J.M. and P. Drew. 1979. Order in Court: The Organisation of Verbal 
Interaction in Judicial Settings. London: Macmillan. 
Averill, J.R., ed. 1980. A Constructivist View of Emotion. Edited by R. Plutchnik, 
H. Kellerman, Emotion: Vol 1. Theory, Research, and Experience. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Bachmann, Klaus. 2013. Framing the Trial of the Century: Influences of, and on, 
International Media. In The Milošević Trial, edited by T. W. Waters. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ball, Karyn. 2003. Ex/propriating Survivor Experience, or Auschwitz "after" 
Lyotard. In Witness and Memory: The Discourse of Trauma, edited by A. 
Douglass, Thomas A. Vogler. New York: Routledge. 
Barahona de Brito, Alexandra. 2010. Transitional Justice and Memory: Exploring 
Perspectives. South European Society and Politics 15 (3):359-376. 
Barasin, Milorad. 2011. Long-term Accountability. In Assessing the Legacy of the 
ICTY, edited by R. H. Steinberg. Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishing. 
Barry, A. 1991. Narrative Style and Witness Testimony. Journal of Narrative Life 
and History 1:281-293. 
Bass, Gary J. 2000. Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes 
Tribunals. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Bass, Gary J. 2003. Milošević in the Hague. Foreign Affairs May/June:82-96. 
Baum, Steven K. 2008. The Psychology of Genocide: Perpetrators, Bystanders and 
Rescuers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bauman, Zygmunt. 1993. Modernity and the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity. 
286 
 
Baumeister, Roy F., W. Keith Campbell. 1999. The Intrinsic Appeal of Evil: 
Sadism, Sensational Thrills, and Threatened Egotism. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review 3 (3):210-221. 
Beim, Aaron. 2007. The Cognitive Aspects of Collective Memory. Symbolic 
Interaction 30 (1):7-26. 
Bell, Duncan, ed. 2006. Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the 
Relationship between Past and Present. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bennett, Christopher. 1995. Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse. London: Hurst and 
Company. 
Bennett, W. Lance and Martha S. Feldman. 1981. Reconstructing Reality in the 
Courtroom: Justice and Judgement in American Culture. New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press. 
Berliner, David C. 2005. The Abuses of Memory: Reflections on the Memory 
Boom in Anthropology. Anthopologial Quarterly 78 (1):197-211. 
Bevernage, Berber. 2010. Writing the Past Out of the Present: History and the 
Politics of Time in Transitional Justice. History Workshop Journal (69). 
Bieber, Florian. 2013. The Show and the Trial: The Political Death of Milošević. In 
The Milošević Trial: An Autopsy, edited by T. W. Waters. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bieber, Florian, Armina Galijaš, Rory Archer, ed. 2014. Debating the End of 
Yugoslavia. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Blaškić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Tihomir Blaškić) 4 May 1999: 20869.  
Blaškić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Tihomir Blaškić) 4 May 1999: 20876-
20877.  
287 
 
Boas, Gideon. 2007. The Milošević Trial: Lessons for the Conduct of Complex 
International Criminal Proceedings. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Boas, Gideon. 2011. Self-Representation before the ICTY: A Case for Reform. 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 9 (1):53-83. 
Bollingmo, Guri, Ellen Wessel, Dag Erik Eilertsen, Svein Magnussen. 2008. The 
Credibility of the Emotional Witness: A Study of Ratings by Police 
Investigators. Psychology, Crime and Law 1:61-71. 
Brants, Crisje and Katrien Klep. 2013. Transitional Justice: History-Telling, 
Collective Memory, and the Victim-Witness. International Journal of 
Conflict and Violence 7 (1):36-49. 
Browning, Christopher 1992. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the 
Final Solution in Poland New York: HarperCollins. 
Buckley-Zistel, Susanne. 2006. Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a 
Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Africa 76 
(2):131-150. 
Bülow-møller, Anne Marie. 1991. Trial Evidence: Overt and Covert 
Communication in Court. International Journal of Applied Linguistics 1 
(1):38-59. 
Byrne, Rosemary. 2013. Drawing the Missing Map: What Socio-legal Research 
Can Offer to International Criminal Trial Practice. Leiden Journal of 
International Law 26 (4):991-1007. 
Cairns, Rober B., Carlos Santoyo V., Keith A. Holly. 1994. Aggressive Escalation: 
Toward a Developmental Analysis. In The Dynamics of Aggression: 
288 
 
Biological and Social Perspectives in Dyads and Groups, edited by M. 
Potegal, John F. Knutson. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. 
Cammack, Mark. 1992. Evidence Rules and the Ritual Functions of Trials: Saying 
Something of Something. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 25:783-796. 
Campbell, Kirsten. 2012. The Laws of Memory: The ICTY, the Archive, and 
Transitional Justice. Social and Legal Studies 22 (2):247-269. 
Campbell, Kirsten, Sari Wastell. 2008. Consultation Report: Legacies of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. London: 
Goldsmiths College, University of London. 
Caruth, Cathy. 1996. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Caruth, Cathy, ed. 1995. Trauma: Explorations in Memory. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Chilton, Paul. 2004. Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice. London: 
Routledge. 
Chilton, Paul. 2005. Discourse Space Theory: Geometry, Brain and Shifting 
Viewpoints. Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics 3:78-116. 
Chilton, Paul. 2011. Language, Concepts and Eastern-Europe: Some Analytical 
Tools from Cognitive Linguistics. Paper read at Cognitive Linguistic 
Methods and Translation Strategies in Cultural and Media Analysis, June 
30, 2011, at Wolfson College, Oxford University. 
Chirot, Daniel and Clark McCauley. 2006. Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and 
Prevention of Mass Murder. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
289 
 
Christianson, S.A. and T. Engelberg. 1996. Remembering and Forgetting Traumatic 
Experiences: A Matter of Survival. In Recovered Memories and False 
Memories, edited by M. A. Conway. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Clark, Wesley K. 2001. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosova, and the Future of 
Combat. New York: PublicAffairs/Perseus. 
Claverie, Elisabeth. 2009. Ménager la Victime? Ménager le Coupable? Jugement, 
Révision et Histoire devant le Tribunal Pénal pour L'ex-Yugoslavie. Droit et 
Cultures 58:141-159. 
Cohen, Lenard J. 2002. Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan 
Milošević. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Conley, John M., William O'Barr. 1990. Rules vs Relationships: The Ethnography 
of Legal Discourse. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. 
Conley, John M., William O'Barr. 2005. Just Words: Law, Language and Power. 
Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. 
Converse, Philip E. 1962. Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes. 
Public Opinion Quarterly 26 (4):578-599. 
Côté, Luc. 2005. Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
International Criminal Law. Journal of International Criminal Justice 
3:162-186. 
Cotterill, Janet. 2003. Language and Power in the Court: A Linguistic Analysis of 
the O.J. Simpson Trial. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cotterill, Janet. 2004. Collocation, Connotation, and Courtroom Semantics: 
Lawyers' Control of Witness Testimony through Lexical Negotiation. 
Applied Linguistics 25 (4):513-537. 
290 
 
Cotterill, Janet, ed. 2002. Language in the Legal Process. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Coulter, Jeff. 1979. The Social Construction of Mind: Studies in Ethnomethodology 
and Linguistic Philosophy. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Crane, Susan A. 1997. Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory. The 
American Historical Review 102 (5):1372-1385. 
Croft, William, D. Alan Cruise. 2004. Cognitive Linguistics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Crosby, Faye. 1979. Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to Miller, Bolce 
and Halligan. The American Political Science Review 73 (1):103-112. 
Dahl, J and I Enemo, GCB Drevland, E Wessel, DE Eilertsen, S Magnussen. 2007. 
Displayed Emotions and Witness Credibility: A Comparison of Judgements 
by Individuals and Mock Juries. Applied Cognitive Psychology 21 (9):1145-
1155. 
Danet, Brenda. 1980. Language in the Legal Process. Law & Society Review 14 
(3):445-564. 
Danner, Alison and Jenny S. Martinez. 2005. Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International 
Criminal Law. California Law Review 93 (1):75-169. 
De Graff, Bob. 2006. The Difference between Legal Proof and Historical Evidence: 
The Trial of Slobodan Milošević and the Case of Srebrenica. European 
Review 14 (4):499-512. 
Dembour, Marie-Benedicte, Emily Haslam. 2004. Silencing Hearings? Victim-
Witnesses at War Crimes Trials. European Journal of International Law 15 
(1):151-177. 
291 
 
Denich, Bette 1994. Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the 
Symbolic Revival of Genocide. American Ethnologist 21 (2):367-390. 
Derrida, Jacques. 2004. The Global Theater of Forgiveness. In The Future of 
Values: 21st Century Talks edited by J. Bindé. New York/Paris: Berghan 
Books/UNESCO Publishing. 
Di Lellio, Anna, Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers. 2006. The Legendary 
Commander: The Construction of an Albanian Masternarrative in Post-war 
Kosovo. Nations and Nationalism 12 (3):513-529. 
Dickson, Tiphaine, Aleksandar Jokic. 2006. Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No 
Evil: The Unsightly Milošević Case. International Journal for the Semiotics 
of Law 19:355-387. 
Djordjevic, Ksenija. 2009. La Violence Verbale Après la Violence de Masse: Le 
Procès de Slobodan Milošević devant le Tribunal Pénal International. Mots: 
Les Langages du Politique 91:115-122. 
Dojčinović, Predrag. 2014. The Shifting of Grand Narratives in War Crimes Trials 
and International Law: History and Politics in the Courtroom. In Narratives 
of Justice In and Out of the Courtroom, edited by D. Zarkov, Marleis 
Glasius. London: Springer. 
Douglass, Ana and Thomas A. Vogler, ed. 2003. Witness and Memory: The 
Discourse of Trauma. New York: Routledge. 
Drakulić, Slavenka. 2004. They Would Never Hurt a Fly: War Criminals on Trial in 
The Hague. London: Abacus. 
DuPoux, Emmanuel, Pierre Jacob. 2007. Universal Moral Grammar: A Critical 
Appraisal. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (9):373-378. 
292 
 
Durkheim, Emile. 2001. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Translated by C. 
Cosman. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Edkins, Jenny. 2003. Trauma and the Memory of Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Edwards, Derek. 1999. Emotion Discourse. Culture and Psychology 5 (3):271-291. 
Ehrlich, Susan. 2001. Representing Rape: Language and Sexual Consent. London: 
Routledge. 
Elander, Maria. 2013. The Victim's Address: Expressivism and the Victim at the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. International Journal 
of Transnational Justice 7:95-115. 
Eltringham, Nigel. 2012. Spectators to the Spectacle of Law: The Formation of a 
'Validating Public' at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology 77 (3):425-445. 
Erikson, Bonnie, E. Alan Lind, Bruce C. Johnson, William M. O'Barr. 1978. 
Speech Style and Impression Formation in a Court Setting: The Effects of 
"Powerful" and "Powerless" Speech. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 14:266-279. 
Evans, Vyvyan, Melanie Green. 2006. Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Ewick, Patricia, Susan S. Silbey. 1995. Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: 
Toward a Sociology of Narrative. Law and Society Review 29 (2):197-226. 
Fairclough, Norman. 1989, 2001. Language and Power. New York: Routledge. 
Fauconnier, Giles. 1994. Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in 
Natural Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
293 
 
Fauconnier, Giles. 1997. Mappings in Thought and Language. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Festinger, Leon. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Fillmore, Charles. 1985. Linguistics as a Tool for Discourse Analysis. In Handbook 
of Discourse Analysis, Volume One: Disciplines of Discourse, edited by T. 
A. Van Dijk. London: Academic Press. 
Foucault, Michel. 1972. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Translated by A. M. S. 
Smith. London: Tavistock Publications. 
Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London: 
Allen Lane. 
Fujii, Lee Ann. 2010. Shades of Truth and Lies: Interpreting Testimonies of War 
and Violence. Journal of Peace Research 47 (2):231-241. 
Galatolo, R. and P. Drew. 2006. Narrative Expansions as Defensive Practices in 
Courtroom Testimony. Text and Talk 26:661-698. 
Garafolo, James. 1979. Victimization and the Fear of Crime. Journal of Research in 
Crime and Delinquency 16:80-97. 
Gardenfors, Peter. 2000. Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gedi, Noa and Yigal Elam. 1996. Collective Memory - What Is It? History and 
Memory 8 (1):30-50. 
Gibbons, John. 2003. Forensic Linguistics: An Introduction to Language in the 
Justice System. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Gibson, Catherine H. 2008. Testing the Legitimacy of the Joint Criminal Enterprise 
Doctrine in the ICTY: A Comparison of Individual Liability for Group 
294 
 
Conduct in International and Domestic Law. Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law 18 (2):521-548. 
Gnisci, Augusto, Clotilde Pontecorvo. 2004. The Organization of Questions and 
Answers in the Thematic Phases of Hostile Examination: Turn-by-Turn 
Manipulation of Meaning. Journal of Pragmatics 36:965–995. 
Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis. New York: Harper and Row. 
Gordy, Eric. 2003. Accounting for a Violent Past by Other than Legal Means. 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 3 (1):1-24. 
Gordy, Eric. 2012. The Blaškić Trial: Politics, the Control of Information and 
Command Responsibility. Southeastern Europe 36 (1):60-86. 
Gordy, Eric. 2013. Guilt, Responsibility, and Denial: The Past at Stake in Post-
Milošević Serbia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Gourevitch, Philip, E. Morris. 2008. Standard Operating Procedure. New York: 
Penguin. 
Gow, James, Ivan Zveržhanovski. 2004. The Milošević Trial: Purpose and 
Performance. Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and 
Ethnicity 32 (4):897-919. 
Gow, James, Rachel Kerr, Zoran Pajić, ed. 2014. Prosecuting War Crimes: Lessons 
and Legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. Oxon: Routledge. 
Graubart, Jonathan. 2010. Rendering Global Criminal Law an Instrument of Power: 
Pragmatic Legalism and Global Tribunals. Journal of Human Rights 9:409-
26. 
295 
 
Gülich, Elisabeth, Uta M. Quasthoff. 1985. Narrative Analysis. In Handbook of 
Discourse Analysis, Volume Two: Dimensions of Discourse, edited by T. A. 
Van Dijk. London: Academic Press. 
Gumperz, John J. 1982. Fact and Inference in Courtroom Testimony. InLanguage 
and Social Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gurney, Joan Neff, Kathleen J. Tierney. 1982. Relative Deprivation and Social 
Movements: A Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research. The 
Sociological Quarterly 23 (1):33-47. 
Guzina, Dejan 2003. Socialist Serbia's Narratives: From Yugoslavia to a Greater 
Serbia. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 17 (1):91-
111. 
Hagan, John. 2003. Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War Crimes in The Hague 
Tribunal. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hagan, John, Ron Levi. 2005. Crimes of War and the Force of Law. Social Forces 
83 (4):1499-1534. 
Halbwachs, Maurice. 1992. The Social Framework of Memory. In On Collective 
Memory, edited by L. A. Coser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Halbwachs, Maurice. (1950) 1997. La Mémoire Collective. Paris: Albin Michel. 
Hamilton, V. Lee. 1978. Who is Responsible? Towards a Social Psychology of 
Responsibility Attribution. Social Psychology 41 (4):316-328. 
Haslam, Emily. 2004. Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A 
Triumph of Hope Over Experience? In The Permanent International 
Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues, edited by D. MacGoldrick, Peter 
Rowe, Eric Donnelly. Oxford: Hart. 
296 
 
Hayden, Robert M. 1996. Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-
Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia. American Ethnologist 
23 (4):783-801. 
Hibbs, D. 1973. Mass Political Violence: Cross-National Causal Analysis. New 
York: Wiley. 
Hirsh, David 2003. Law Against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials. London: 
Glasshouse Press. 
Hodžić, Refik. 2010. Living the Legacy of Mass Atrocities: Victims' Perspectives 
on War Crimes Trials. Journal of International Criminal Justice 8 (1):113-
136. 
Hogg, Michael A. 2006. Social Identity Theory. In Contemporary Social 
Psychological Theories, edited by P. J. Burke. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Holmberg, Ulf. 2004. Crime Victims' Experiences of Police Interviews and their 
Inclination to Provide or Omit Information. International Journal of Police 
Science & Management 6 (3):155-170. 
Horn, Rebecca and Simon Charters, Saleem Vahidy. 2009. The Victim-Witness 
Experience in the Special Court for Sierra Leone. International Review of 
Victimology 15:277-298. 
Howard, Judith. 2000. Social Psychology of Identities. Annual Review of Sociology 
26:367-393. 
Hunt, Alan, Gary Wickham. 1994. Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law 
as Governance. Boulder: Pluto Press. 
Ingrao, Charles. 2009. Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: The Scholars' 
Initiative. American Historical Review 114 (4):947-962. 
297 
 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
Ivković, Sanja Kutnjak, John Hagan. 2006. The Politics of Punishment and the 
Siege of Sarajevo: Toward a Conflict Theory of Perceived International 
(In)Justice. Law and Society Review 40 (2):369-410. 
Izard, C.E. 1992. Basic Emotions, Relations Among Emotions, and Emotion-
Cognition Relations. Psychological Review 99:561-565. 
Jakoljevic, Branislav. 2008. From Mastermind to Body Artist: Political 
Performances of Slobodan Milošević. The Dramatic Review 52 (1):51-74. 
James, W. 1884. What is an Emotion? Mind 9:188-205. 
Jelisić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Bernard Patrick O’Donnell) 1 Sept 1999: 
2085-2086. Emphasis added. 
Jorgensen, Nina H.B. 2004. The Right of the Accused to Self-Representation before 
International Criminal Tribunals. The American Journal of International 
Law 98 (4):711-726. 
Jorgensen, Nina H.B. 2006. The Problem of Self-Representation at International 
Criminal Trials. Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (1):64-77. 
Kant, Immanuel. 1787. The Critique of Pure Reason. London: MacMillan. 
Kaplan, Robert. 1993. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 
Karemaker, Ruben, B. Don Taylor, Thomas Wayde Pittman. 2008. Witness 
Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: A Critical Analysis of 
Widening Procedural Divergence. Leiden Journal of International Law 21 
(3):683-698. 
298 
 
Kaufman, G., Guri Drevland, Ellen Wessel, Geir Overskeid and Svein Magnussen. 
2003. The Importance of Being Earnest: Displayed Emotion and Witness 
Credibility. Applied Cognitive Psychology 17 (1):21-34. 
Kerr, Rachel 2004. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics and Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Krajišnik Trial Transcript (Testimony of Momčilo Krajišnik) 27 April 2006: 
23191-23193.  
Krajišnik Trial Transcripts (Testimony of Amir Delić) 27 June 2006: 26397.  
Kristeva, Julia. 1986. Word, Dialogue and Novel. In The Kristeva Reader, edited by 
T. Moi. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Krog, Antjie. 1998. Country of my Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of 
Forgiveness in the New South Africa. New York: Three Rivers Press. 
Krondorfer, Bjorn. 2008. Is Forgetting Reprehensible? Holocaust Remembrance 
and the Task of Oblivion. Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (2):233-267. 
Krnojelac Trial Transcript (Testimony of Milorad Krnojelac) 25 June 2001: 7578-
7579. 
Krnojelac Trial Transcript (Testimony of Milorad Krnojelac) 25 June 2001: 7579.  
Kunarac et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness 87) 4 April 2000: 1683.  
Kunarac et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness 87) 23 October, 2000: 6120-
6123.  
Kvale, Steinar. 1974. The Temporality of Memory. Journal of Phenomenological 
Psychology 5 (1). 
299 
 
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness B) 19 May 2000: 2403.  
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness B) 19 May 2000: 2407-2408. 
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Edin Mrklaj) 9 June 2000: 2902.  
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Edin Mrkalj) June 9 2000: 2912-1914.  
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Edin Mrkalj) June 9 2000: 2918-2919.  
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Edin Mrkalj) 23 August 2011: 2933. 
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Edin Mrkalj) June 9 2000: 2959-2960.  
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Sifeta Susić) 9 June 2000: 2988-2989.  
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Sifeta Susić) 9 June 2000: 2994.  
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Sifeta Susić) 9 June 2000: 3000.  
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Jasminka Kvočka) 12 February 2001: 
7969-7970.  
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Miroslav Kvočka) 13 February 2001: 
8050. 
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Miroslav Kvočka) 13 February 2001: 
8108. 
Kvočka et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness DC4) 8 March 2001: 8867 
Labov, William. 1972. Sociolinguistic Patterns. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
300 
 
Lake, David and Donald Rothchild, ed. 1998. The International Spread of Ethnic 
Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories 
Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, George, Mark Johnson. 1989. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Laney, C. and E.F. Loftus. 2008. Emotional Content of True and False Memories. 
Memory 16 (5):500-516. 
Laney, C. and E.F. Loftus. 2010. Truth in Emotional Memories. Nebraska 
Symposium on Motivation 56:1457-183. 
Laughland, John. 2007. Travesty: The Trial of Slobodan Milošević and the 
Corruption of International Justice. London: Pluto. 
LeBor, Adan. 2002. Milošević: A Biography. London: Bloomsbury. 
Leebaw, Bronwyn Anne. 2008. The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice. 
Human Rights Quarterly 30 (1):95-118. 
Lefebvre, Henri. 1974. The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Levine, Robert A., Donald T. Campbell. 1972. Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, 
Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc  
Loftus, Elizabeth. 1981. Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Research and Legal 
Thought. Crime and Justice 3:105-151. 
Maček, Ivana, ed. 2014. Engaging Violence: Trauma, Memory and Representation. 
London: Routledge. 
Mann, Michael. 2005. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
301 
 
Matoesian, G. 1993. Reproducing Rape: Dominion Through Talk in the Courtroom. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Matoesian, G. 2005. Review of Language and Power in Court by Janet Cotterill. 
Journal of Sociolinguistics 9:619-22. 
McGoldrick, Dominic, Peter Rowe, Eric Donnelly, ed. 2004. The Permanent 
International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing. 
Meernik, James. 2003. Victor's Justice or the Law? Judging and Punishing at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 47 (2):140-162. 
Meernik, James, Kimi King. 2003. The Sentencing Determinants of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: An Empirical 
and Doctrinal Analysis. Leiden Journal of International Law 16 (4):717-
750. 
Mendeloff, David. 2009. Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological and 
Emotional Effects of Post-Conflict Justice. Human Rights Quarterly 31 
(3):592-623. 
Mertz, Elizabeth. 1994. Legal Language: Pragmatics, Poetics, and Social Power. 
Annual Review of Anthropology 23:435-455. 
Mestrovic, Stjepan, Rachel Romero. 2012. Poisoned Social Climate, Collective 
Responsibility, and the Abuse at Abu Ghraib - Or, the Establishment of 
“Rule that is Lack of Rule”. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 
35:62-69. 
302 
 
Mihai, Mihaela. 2011. Socializing Negative Emotions: Transitional Criminal Trials 
in the Service of Democracy. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (1):111-
131. 
Mikhail, John. 2007. Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the Future. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):143-152. 
Milanović, Marko. 2009. The Arrest and Impending Trial of Radovan Karadžić. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 58 (1):212-219. 
Milgram, Stanley. 1963. Behavioral Study of Obedience. Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology 67:371-378. 
Milošević Trial Transcript (Opening statement of Slobodan Milošević) 31 August 
2004: 32169-32170.  
Milošević Trial Transcript (Opening statement of Slobodan Milošević) 31 August 
2004: 32159.  
Milošević Trial Transcript (Opening statement of Slobodan Milošević) 31 August 
2004: 32171.  
Milošević Trial Transcript (Testimony of Vojislav Šešelj) 24 August 2004: 43096.  
Milošević Trial Transcript (Testimony of Vojislav Šešelj) 24 August 2005: 43179-
43180.  
Milošević Trial Transcript (Testimony of Vojislav Šešelj) 24 August 2005: 43100-
43101.  
 
Minow, Martha. 1998. Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after 
Genocide and Mass Violence. Boston MA: Beacon Press. 
303 
 
Mišković-Luković, Mirjana and Mirjana Dedaić 2012. The Discourse Marker 
Odnosno at the ICTY: A Case of Disputed Translation in War Crime Trials. 
Journal of Pragmatics 44:1355-1377. 
Misztal, Barbara. 2003. Theories of Social Remembering. Maidenhead: Open 
University Press. 
Moffett, L. 2012. The Role of Victims in the International Criminal Tribunals of the 
Second World War. International Criminal Law Review 12 (2):245-270. 
Monroe, Kristen Renwick. 2009. The Ethical Perspective: An Identity Theory of 
the Psychological Influences on Moral Choice. Political Psychology 30 
(3):419-444. 
Mueller, John. 2000. The Banality of "Ethnic War". International Security 25 
(1):42-70. 
Mucić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Esad Landžo) 29 July 1998: 15257-
15258.  
Mucić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Esad Landžo) 29 July 1998: 15258-
15259.  
Mucić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Esad Landžo) 29 July 1998: 15260.  
Myers, B, S.J. Lynn, and J. Arbuthnot. 2002. Victim Impact Testimony and Juror 
Judgements: The Effects of Harm Information and Witness Demeanor. 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 32 (11):2393-2412. 
Newcomb, Theodore M, Ralph H. Turner and Philip E. Converse. 1952. Social 
Psychology: The Study of Human Interaction. London: Tavistock 
Publications. 
304 
 
Ng, Sik Hung. 2001. Influencing through the Power of Language. In Social 
Influence: Direct and Indirect Processes, edited by J. P. Forgas, Kipling D. 
Williams. Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis. 
O'Barr, William M. 2001. Language, Law and Power. In The New Handbook of 
Language and Social Psychology, edited by W. P. Robinson, Howard Giles. 
Chichester: John Wiley and Sons. 
O'Connell, Mary Ellen. 1999. New International Legal Process. The American 
Journal of International Law 93 (2):334-351. 
Oberschall, Anthony 2000. The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic 
Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia. Ethnic and Racial Studies 
23 (6):982-1000. 
Olusanya, Olaoluwa. 2005. Sentencing War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 
under the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
Amsterdam: Europa Law Publishing. 
Orbell, John M. 1970. An Information Flow Theory of Community Influence. The 
Journal of Politics 32 (2):322-338. 
Osiel, Mark. 1997. Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Oxburgh, Gavin E., Trond Myklebust and Tim Grant 2010. The Question of 
Question Types in Police Interviews: A Review of the Literature from a 
Psychological and Linguistic Perspective. The International Journal of 
Speech, Language and the Law 17 (1):45-66. 
Pena, Mariana and Gayelle Carayon. 2013. Is the ICC Making the Most of Victim 
Participation? International Journal of Transnational Justice 7:518-535. 
305 
 
Penman, Robyn. 1987. Discourse in Courts: Cooperation, Coersion, and Coherence. 
Discourse Processes 10:201-218. 
Peskin, Victor 2006. Beyond Victor's Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the 
Winners at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda. Journal of Human Rights 4 (2):213-231. 
Pettigrew, Thomas F, Allport, Gordon W, Barnett, Eric O. 1958. Binocular 
Resolution and Perception of Race in South Africa. British Journal of 
Psychology 49 (4):265-278. 
Philips, Susan U. 1998. Ideology and the Language of Judges: How Judges 
Practice Law, Politics and Courtroom Control. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Post, Jerrold M., Laura K. Panis. 2005. Tyranny on Trial: Personality and 
Courtroom Conduct of Defendant Slobodan Milošević and Saddam 
Hussein. Cornell International Law Journal 38:823-836. 
Pynchon, Marisa Reddy and Randy Borum. 1999. Assessing Threats of Targeted 
Group Violence: Contributions from Social Psychology. Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law 17:339-355. 
Raab, Dominic. 2005. Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy - Efforts to 
Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and their Tribunals. Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 3 (1):82-105. 
Ramet, S.P. 2004. Martyr in His Own Mind: The Trial and Tribulations of 
Slobodan Milošević. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 5 
(1):112-138. 
Ramet, S.P. 2012. The ICTY: Controversies, Successes, Failures, Lessons. 
Southeastern Europe 36 (1):1-9. 
306 
 
Reicher, Stephen. 2004. The Context of Social Identity: Domination, Resistance 
and Change. Political Psychology 25 (6):921-945. 
Renan, Ernst. (1882) 1990. What is a Nation? In Nation and Narration, edited by 
H. K. Bhabha. London: Routhledge. 
Resende, Erica and Dovil Budryte, ed. 2014. Memory and Trauma in International 
Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates. London: Routledge. 
Ricoeur, Paul. 1984, 1985, 1988. Time and Narrative. Vol. 1-3. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Ricoeur, Paul. 2004. Memory, History, Forgetting. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Ringer, Fritz. 1997. Max Weber's Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and 
Social Sciences. Boston: Harvard University Press. 
Robinson, Patrick L. 2000. Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. European Journal of 
International Law 11 (3):569-589. 
Roht-Arriaza, Naomi and Javier Mariezcurrena, ed. 2006. Transnational Justice in 
the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice. Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rosch, Eleanor. 1973. Natural Categories. Cognitive Psychology 4 (3):328-350. 
Rosch, Eleanor. 1975. Cognitive Reference Points. Cognitive Psychology 7 (4):532-
547. 
Ross, Marc Howard. 1986. A Cross-Cultural Theory of Political Conflict and 
Violence. Political Psychology 7 (3):427-469. 
307 
 
Rousseau, David, A. Maurits Van der Veen. 2005. The Emergence of a Shared 
Identity: An Agent-Based Computer Simulation of Idea Diffusion. Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 49 (5):686-712. 
Rubin, Alfred P. 2006. Milošević on Trial. International Journal for the Semiotics 
of Law 19:347-354. 
Russel, J.A. 1991. Culture and the Categorization of Emotions. Psychological 
Bulletin 110:426-50. 
Savelsberg, Joachim J. and Ryan D. King. 2007. Law and Collective Memory. 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 3:189–211. 
Schabas, William A. 2001. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Scharf, Michael P. 1997. Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International 
War Crimes Trial Since Nuremburg. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic 
Press. 
Scharf, Michael P. 2006. Self-Representation versus Assignment of Defense 
Counsel before International Criminal Tribunals. Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 4 (1):31-46. 
Scherer, K. R. 1982. Emotion as a Process, Function, Origin and Regulation. Social 
Science Information 21:555-570. 
Scherer, K. R. 2005. What are Emotions? And How Can They be Measured? Social 
Science Information 44 (4):695-729. 
Schomburg, Wolfgang. 2011. Some Reflections on the Right to Self-Representation 
Before International Tribunals. ERA Forum 12:189-195. 
308 
 
Schwendiman, David. 2009. Primacy and the Accountability Gap: A View from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
Society of International Law) 103:207-210. 
Sedgwick, James. 2011. A People's Court: Emotion, Participant Experiences, and 
the Shaping of Postwar Justice at the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East,1946–1948. Diplomacy and Statecraft 22 (3):480-499. 
Sell, Louis. 2002. Slobodan Milošević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. Durham 
and London: Duke University Press. 
Šešelj Trial Transcript (Closing statement of Vojislav Šešelj) 14 March 2012: 
17330.  
Šešelj Trial Transcript (Closing statement of Vojislav Šešelj) 14 March 2012: 
17361.  
 
Sherif, Muzafer. 1966. Group Conflict and Co-operation: Their Social Psychology. 
London: Routledge. 
Sherif, Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif. 1961. Psychological Harmony and Conflict in 
Minority Group Ties. The American Catholic Sociological Review 22 
(3):207-222. 
Sidanius, Jim and Felicia Pratto, Colette van Laar, Shana Levin. 2004. Social 
Dominance Theory: Its Agenda and Method. Political Psychology 25 
(6):845-880. 
Silber, Laura, Alan Little. 1996. The Death of Yugoslavia. London: Penguin. 
Simpson, Gerry. 2004. Politics, Sovereignty, Remembrance. In The Permanent 
International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues, edited by D. 
McGoldrick, Peter Rowe, Eric Donnelly. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
309 
 
Sjöcrona, Jan M. 1995. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia: Some Intoductory Remarks from a Defence Point of View. 
Leiden Journal of International Law 8 (2):463-474. 
Skogan, Wesley. 1987. The Impact of Victimisation on Fear. Crime and 
Delinquincy 33:135-154. 
Slater, Mel, Aitor Rovira, Richard Southern, David Swapp, Jian J. Zhang, Claire 
Campbell, Mark Levine. 2013. Bystander Responses to a Violent Incident in 
an Immersive Virtual Environment. PLOS ONE 8 (1):1-13. 
Sloan, James. 1996. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
and Fair Trial Rights: A Closer Look. Leiden Journal of International Law 
9 (2):479-501. 
Sluiter, Goran. 2007. Compromising the Authority of International Criminal 
Justice: How Vojislav Šešelj Runs his Trial. Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 5:529-536. 
Snow, Nancy E. 2009. How Ethical Theory Can Improve Practice: Lessons from 
Abu Ghraib. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):555-568. 
Stakić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness D) 2 May 2002: 2486.  
Stakić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness D) 2 May 2002: 2487.  
Stakić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness D) 2 May 2002: 2529.  
Stakić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness P) 22 May 2002: 3363.  
Stakić et al Trial Transcript (Testimony of Witness P) 22 May 2002: 3365.  
Stanton, Gregory. 1996. The 8 Stages of Genocide. Washington, DC, USA. 
310 
 
Staub, Ervin. 1985. The Psychology of Perpetrators and Bystanders. Political 
Psychology 6 (1):61-85. 
Staub, Ervin 1989. The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group 
Violence. Cambridge Cambridge University Press. 
Staub, Ervin 2000. Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and 
Reconciliation. Political Psychology 21 (2):367-382. 
Steflja, Izabela. 2010. Identity Crisis in Post-conflict Societies: The ICTY's Role in 
Defensive Nationalism among the Serbs. Global Change, Peace and 
Security 22 (2):231-248. 
Stoddard, S. 1991. Text and Texture: Patterns of Cohesion. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Stone, Jeff, Joel Cooper. 2001. A Self-Standards Model of Cognitive Dissonance. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 37:228-243. 
Stouffer, S.A., E.A. Suchman, L.C. DeVinney, S.A. Star, & R.M. Williams. 1949. 
The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life (Vol. 1). Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Stover, Eric. 2005. The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in the 
Hague. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Sumner, William. 1906. Folkways. Boston: Ginn. 
Surroi, Veton. 2013. Conversations with Milošević: Two Meetings, Bloody Hands. 
In The Milošević Trial: An Autopsy, edited by T. W. Waters. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Svongoro, Paul, Josephat Mutangadura, Lameck Gonzo, George Mavunga. 2012. 
Language and the Legal Process: A Linguistic Analysis of Courtroom 
Discourse Involving Selected Cases of Alleged Rape in Mutare, Zimbabwe. 
South African Journal of African Languages 32 (2):117-128. 
311 
 
Tadić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Emir Beganović) 19 July 1996: 1562.   
Tadić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Emir Beganović) 19 July 1996: 3814-3815.  
Tadić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Duško Tadić) 28 October 1996: 7831.  
Tadić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Duško Tadić) 28 October 1996: 7836-7837.  
Tadić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Duško Tadić) 28 October 1996: 7838-7839.  
Tadić Trial Transcript (Testimony of Duško Tadić) 29 October 1996: 7949.  
Tajfel, Henri. 1978. Differentiation between Social Groups. London: Academic 
Press. 
Tajfel, Henri. 1981. Human Groups and Social Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tajfel, Henri 1982. Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. The Annual Review 
of Psychology 33:1-39. 
Tajfel, Henri, Wilkes, A.L. 1963. Classification and Quantitative Judgement. 
British Journal of Psychology 54:101-113. 
Taylor, Donald M., Fathali M. Moghddam. 1994. Theories of Intergroup Relations: 
International Social Psychological Perspectives. 2nd ed. Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers. 
Tedeschi, James T. 2001. Social Power, Influence and Aggression. In Social 
Influences: Direct and Indirect Processes, edited by J. P. Forgas, Kipling D. 
Williams. Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis. 
Thomas, Raju G.C. 2003. Yugoslavia Unravelled. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Thomas, Robert. 1999. Serbia Under Milošević: Politics in the 1990s. London: 
Hurst and Company. 
312 
 
Timasheff, N.S. 1943. On Propaganda. The American Catholic Sociological Review 
4 (1):10-15. 
Tournaye, Cecile 2003. Genocidal Intent Before the ICTY. The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 52 (2):447-462. 
Trezise, Thomas. 2001. Unspeakable. Yale Journal of Criticism 14 (1):39-66. 
Trinch, Shonna 2010. Risky Subjects: Narrative, Literary Testimonio, and Legal 
Testimony. Dialect Anthropol 34:179-204. 
Tsoudis, Olga and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 1998. How Bad Was It? The Effects of 
Victim and Perpetraoror Emotion on Responses to Criminal Court 
Vignettes. Social Forces 77 (2):695-722. 
Turner, J.C. 1987. Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Updated Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
25 May, 1993. 
Valentino, Benjamin A. 2004. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 
20th Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Walker, A.G. 1987. Linguistic Manipulation, Power and the Legal Setting. In 
Power Through Discourse, edited by L. Kedar. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Waller, James. 2002. Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and 
Mass Killing. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Walton, Douglas. 1997. What is Propaganda and What Exactly is Wrong With It? 
Public Affairs Quarterly 11 (4):383-413. 
Waters, Timothy William, ed. 2013. The Milošević Trial: An Autopsy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
313 
 
Weigend, Thomas. 2012. Kill or Be Killed. Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 10 (5):1219-1237. 
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wessel, Ellen, Guri C. Bollingmo, Carina Sønsteby, Linda M. Nielsen , Dag E. 
Eliersten and Svein Magnussen. 2012. The Emotional Witness Effect: Story 
Content, Emotional Valence and Credibility of a Male Suspect. Psychology, 
Crime and Law 18 (5):417-430. 
White, Graham. 2008. Witnessing Proceedings: The Hague War Crimes Tribunal, 
Narrative Indeterminacy, and the Public Audience. TDR: The Dramatic 
Review 52 (1):75-87. 
White, Hayden. 1987. The Content of the Form. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Wilber, K. 2001. Sex, Ecology and Spirituality. Boston: Shambala. 
Williams, Kristen P. 2004. Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans: 
The Breakup of Yugoslavia. In Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: 
Explaining Diffusion and Escalation, edited by P. M. Steven E. Lobell. New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Williams, Paul R. and Michael P. Scharf. 2002. Peace with Justice? War Crimes 
and Accountability in the Former Yugoslavia. Oxford: Rowman and 
Littlefield. 
Wodak, Ruth. 1981. Discourse Analysis in Courtroom Interaction. Discourse 
Processes 3:369-80. 
Woodbury, Hanni. 1984. The Strategic use of Questions in Court. Semiotica 
48:197-228. 
314 
 
Wright, W. 1959. Mass Communication. New York: Random House. 
Yabuuchi, Akio. 2004. Discource Structures: Some Suggestions for Vizualization 
and Quantification. Tokyo: Liber Press. 
Zahar, Alexander. 2008. Legal Aid, Self-Representation, and the Crisis at the 
Hague Tribunal. Criminal Law Forum 19:241-263. 
Zappala, Salvatore. 2010. The Rights of the Victim v. the Rights of the Accused. 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 8 (1):137-164. 
Zehfuss, Maja. 2006. Remembering to Forget/Forgetting to Remember. In Memory, 
Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past 
and Present, edited by D. Bell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Zimbardo, Philip. 2009. The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil. London: 
Rider. 
Zlatev, Jordan. 2007. Spatial Semantics. In Oxford Handbook of Cognitive 
Linguistics, edited by D. Geeraerts, Hubert Cuyckens. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Zoglin, Katie. 2005. The Future of War Crimes Prosecutions in the Former 
Yugoslavia: Accountability or Junk Justice? Human Rights Quarterly 27 
(1):41-77. 
 
 
  
315 
 
Appendix 1: Translations 
 
Momčilo Krajišnik B/C/S excerpt: 
 
P: Da li se, u to vreme, razmatrala mogućnost da to bude zasebna odluka, koja će 
uskoro biti doneta, ili je pak kompleksnost pitanja Sarajeva iziskivalo, verovatno, 
puno vremena kako bi se to pitanje rešilo? 
 
O: Sarajevo je od početka krize bio poseban problem. I do kraja rata je stalno bio na 
dnevnom redu. Ja mogu reći da u najvećem broju predloga je bio predlog da se 
transformiše Sarajevo u dva, da kažem, u dve cjeline - ne da se podijeli kako neko 
s… imputira - u kome bi bile opštine sa srpskom većinom i opštine sa 
muslimanskom većinom. Dve trećine bi pripale muslimansko-hrvatskom dijelu a 
jedna trećina srpskom dijelu, užeg dijela Sarajeva. I ovo je bilo, zato je navedeno da 
će se naknadno riješiti… naknadno riješiti pitanje Sarajeva, koje je bilo najbolnije. 
Svaki sporazum je to predvinao kasnije. (…) Ovo sve govorim o svim planovima 
gdje je bilo predvineno rješenje za Sarajevo, da dvije trećine toga - bez Pala - 
Sarajeva pripadne entitetu muslimanko… a… muslimansko-hrvatskoj, da kažem, 
strani. A jedna trećina će biti… pripašće srpskoj strani. I to imate, naročito, u 
svakom dogovoru koji je postignut. Dok se to ne postigne – zašto sam ovo govorio? 
– predvinena je bila UN, znači Ujedinjenih nacija administracija, dok se ne nane 
nekakvo rešenje. Jer je n…nemoguće bilo riješiti tada Sarajevo zajedno sa cijelom 
Bosnom i Hercegovinom. (p 23191-23193, 27 April 2006, Prosecutor vs Momčilo 
Krajišnik, IT-00-39) 
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Momčilo Krajišnik English excerpt: 
Q. Was it contemplated at that time that that was a separate decision which would 
follow quite soon, or was it that the complexities affecting Sarajevo would probably 
require a very considerable time to sort out? 
A. Sarajevo, from the very outbreak of the crisis, was a separate problem. And to 
the end of the war it was always on the agenda, so to speak. I can say that in most 
proposals there was the proposal to transform Sarajevo into two wholes, not to 
divide it as some people have imputed, but two parts where there would be 
municipalities with a Serb majority and a territory with a Muslim majority. Two-
thirds would belong to the Muslim majority municipalities and one-third to the Serb 
majority municipalities. And that is why it was stated here that the question of 
Sarajevo would be resolved in due course because that was the most painful issue 
of all. Every agreement envisaged that later. (…)I'm talking about all plans where it 
had been envisaged to have a solution for Sarajevo that two-thirds of this Sarajevo 
without Pale should belong to the Muslim/Croat entity, the Muslim/Croat side, so to 
speak, and one-third would belong to the Serb side. And you have that in every 
agreement that was reached. Until that is reached -- now, why was I saying all of 
this? The UN, the United Nations, administration was supposed to be there until a 
solution is solved because it was impossible to resolve the issue of Sarajevo 
together with all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (p 23191-23193, 27 April 2006, 
Prosecutor vs Momčilo Krajišnik, IT-00-39.) 
Amir Delić B/C/S excerpt: 
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P: Opisali ste da je odreneni broj ljudi, zapravo, kad to tako gledamo, pristao na to 
da bude zatvoren na tom ili zatočen na tom stadiomu... stadionu, zato jer zapravo 
nisu imali drugu mogućnosti ili je to bilo najsigurnije što im... što su mogli uraditi. 
Da li sam Vas dobro razumio? Da li ste to rekli? 
 
O: Gledajte, ljudi su se bojali biti u kući, to sam niz puta rekao, jel jednostavno u 
toku noći taj famozni crveni kombi done i odvedu čovjeka.50 Ako si u grupi, uvijek 
si računao da si nekako sigurniji, da nisi sam.51 I vjerovao sam da je bolje biti tu 
nego da budem negdje sam i da me nanu i odvedu. Ovako će barem neko znati da 
sam odveden. 
 
P: Zbog čega ste onda pristali da Vas puste? Zar niste imali drugu mogućnost? Da li 
ste morali otići sa stadiona kada su Vas pustili? 
 
O: Pa šta da napravim? 
 
P: Ono što bih zapravo htio saznati od Vas je sljedeće: neki su ljudi na stadion došli 
dobrovoljno, prihvatili da tamo budu zatvoreni. To je bilo 
najbolje od svega što... što su imali kao mogućnosti na raspolaganju. 
 
                                                          
50
 There is a slight discrepancy in the translation here.  What is translated as ‘this infamous red van 
would pull up and a man who was in the house would be taken away’ can actually read as ‘the 
famous red van would come and take the person away’.  This, however, does not affect findings. 
51
 The discrepancy here is more noticeable.  What is translated as ‘that was why we felt safer when 
we were together with other people’ can actually read as ‘if you are in a group, you always figure 
you are somehow safer, you are not alone’.  This discrepancy is potentially problematic for this 
project, as it puts what was initially said in conditional, referring not to ‘we’ but to ‘you’, into past 
tense and firmly referring to ‘we’.  This would place it differently on the DST graph, and indicate 
that this could have happened elsewhere in translations.  However, the discussion in section 5 of 
Chapter 2 addresses discrepancies from a discourse perspective, arguing that the simultaneous nature 
of translation in the courtroom makes these discrepancies part of the discourse itself, and are carried 
forward through the uses the institution (in this case, the ICTY) makes of them. 
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O: Pa mislim, čudno je. Gledajte, ako mene neko odvede sa puškom uperenom u 
lena na stadion i nakon odrenenog vremena kaže da idem kući, šta da ja kažem - ne, 
ja ću ostati tu, je l'? Mislim, ne znam šta želite s tim reći. (p 26397, 27 June 2006, 
Prosecutor vs Momčilo Krajišnik, IT-00-39) 
 
Amir Delić English excerpt: 
 
Q. You have described a number of people effectively agreeing to be incarcerated 
in the stadium because presumably they had no other option, or it was their best 
option. Did I understand your evidence correctly in that regard? 
A. (Delić) Look, people were afraid of staying in houses, I said that several times, 
because during the night, this infamous red van would pull up and a man who was 
in the house would be taken away. That was why we felt safer when we were 
together with other people, and that's why I believed I was safer to be there with 
others rather than stay at home. At least this way there would be people who would 
know that I had been taken away. 
Q. Why, then, do you agree to be released? Did you have no option? Did you have 
to leave the stadium at the point of release? 
A. What else could I have done? 
Q. Well, what I'm trying to explore with you is this: Some people, some men, came 
to the stadium voluntarily and agreed to be locked up there because it was the worst 
-- I beg your pardon, it was the best of a number of bad options. 
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A. Well, you see, if someone takes me to the stadium at gunpoint and then, after a 
while, tells me that I ought to go home, what am I to say to this person? No, I'm 
going to stay here? I don't know what you mean by that. (p 26397, 27 June 2006, 
Prosecutor vs Momčilo Krajišnik, IT-00-39) 
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Appendix 2: Article 7 of the Updated Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
Article 7  
Individual criminal responsibility  
 
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 
to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.  
 
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or 
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person 
of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.  
 
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute 
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal 
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.  
 
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of 
a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal determines that justice so 
requires. 
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Appendix 3: Selections from Rules of Procedure and Evidence concerning 
witness testimony 
 
Rule 65 ter 
Pre-Trial Judge 
(Adopted 10 July 1998, amended 17 Nov 1999) 
 
(E) Once any existing preliminary motions filed within the time-limit provided 
by Rule 72 are disposed of, the pre-trial Judge shall order the Prosecutor, 
upon the report of the Senior Legal Officer, and within a time-limit set by 
the pre-trial Judge and not less than six weeks before the Pre-Trial 
Conference required by Rule 73 bis, to file the following: 
 
(i)  the final version of the Prosecutor’s pre-trial brief including, 
for each count, a summary of the evidence which the 
Prosecutor intends to bring regarding the commission of the 
alleged crime and the form of responsibility incurred by the 
accused; this brief shall include any admissions by the parties 
and a statement of matters which are not in dispute; as well 
as a statement of contested matters of fact and law; 
(Amended 12 Apr 2001) 
 
(ii)  the list of witnesses the Prosecutor intends to call with : 
 
(a) the name or pseudonym of each witness; 
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(b)  a summary of the facts on which each witness will 
testify; 
(c) the points in the indictment as to which each witness 
will testify, including specific references to counts 
and relevant paragraphs in the indictment; 
(Amended 12 Apr 2001) 
(d)  the total number of witnesses and the number of 
witnesses who will testify against each accused and 
on each count; 
 (Amended 12 Apr 2001) 
(e)  an indication of whether the witness will testify in 
person or pursuant to Rule 92 bis or Rule 92 quater 
by way of written statement or use of a transcript of 
testimony from other proceedings before the 
Tribunal; and 
(Amended 12 Apr 2001, amended 13 Sept 2006) 
(f)  the estimated length of time required for each witness 
and the total time estimated for presentation of the 
Prosecutor’s case. 
(Amended 12 Apr 2001) 
 
(iii)  the list of exhibits the Prosecutor intends to offer stating 
where possible whether the defence has any objection as to 
authenticity. The Prosecutor shall serve on the defence copies 
of the exhibits so listed. 
(Amended 12 Apr 2001, amended 13 Dec 2001) 
(Amended 17 Nov 1999, amended 12 Apr 2001, amended 12 July 2001) 
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(G) After the close of the Prosecutor’s case and before the commencement of 
the defence case, the pre-trial Judge shall order the defence to file the 
following: 
 
(i)  a list of witnesses the defence intends to call with: 
 
(a)  the name or pseudonym of each witness; 
(b)  a summary of the facts on which each witness will 
testify; 
(c) the points in the indictment as to which each witness 
will testify; 
(Amended 12 Apr 2001) 
(d)  the total number of witnesses and the number of 
witnesses who will testify for each accused and on 
each count; 
(Amended 12 Apr 2001) 
(e)  an indication of whether the witness will testify in 
person or pursuant to Rule 92 bis or Rule 92 quater 
by way of written statement or use of a transcript of 
testimony from other proceedings before the 
Tribunal; and 
(Amended 12 Apr 2001, amended 13 Sept 2006) 
(f) the estimated length of time required for each witness 
and the total time estimated for presentation of the 
defence case; and 
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(Amended 12 Apr 2001) 
Rule 92 ter 
Other Admission of Written Statements and Transcripts 
(Adopted 13 Sept 2006) 
 
(A) A Trial Chamber may admit, in whole or in part, the evidence of a witness 
in the form of a written statement or transcript of evidence given by a 
witness in proceedings before the Tribunal, under the following conditions: 
 
(i)  the witness is present in court; 
 
(ii)  the witness is available for cross-examination and any questioning 
by 
the Judges; and 
 
(iii)  the witness attests that the written statement or transcript accurately 
reflects that witness’ declaration and what the witness would say if 
examined. 
 
(B)  Evidence admitted under paragraph (A) may include evidence that goes to 
proof of the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment. 
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Appendix 4 - Tadić excerpts 
28 Oct 1996 
P 7831 
Q. Do you know why it was that the citizens forum approached you to join them 
and take a part in their discussions? 
 
A. The reason was a simple one. They said, Kemal Susic explained, I had contact 
and we talked and, first of all, they knew who my father was, that he was a well-
known person in the municipality and they thought that I could help as his son. 
Also they said that they would also invite Bosko Dragicevic. His son was the first 
President of the Kozara municipality earlier, and so they were talking about the 
possibility of creating a mutual trust. They said that they would also invite several 
other people who were non-Muslims in Kozarac. I agreed with that but, frankly 
speaking, at first I was not sure. I did not know about the real goals of this forum. I 
was afraid that all people would be manipulated by any which party. It was risky to 
get involved because you did not know what was behind it. We did not know what 
was going on at the very top. We did not know about the previous negotiations. We 
just knew that there were ultimatums, that there was something going on in that 
respect. So we went to Prijedor with quite a bit of – with many unknowns. We 
knew one thing. We wanted to quiet down the situation, to improve relationships 
with Prijedor and Banja Luka and we thought of no other things. 
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P 7832 
 
Q. In both of these meetings that took place, did you play any active role? 
 
A. Yes, I did. I took Kemal Susic's invitation very seriously. Then when I saw who 
the other members were, I really started believing the good intentions. Those were 
people who were not involved in the war. They were interested in business or 
sports, the communal living, so these were the people with whom we lived. They 
were my neighbours or my brothers, the people from the centre of Kozarac, 
who were considered to be the natives.  
 
P 7836-7837  
Q. At this stage, it was obviously well-known that it had been a Serb takeover of 
power in Prijedor, and you referred to your difficulties in being able to attend that 
meeting. Was that because lines were being drawn now between Serbs and the 
Muslims far clearer than they had been in the previous time? 
 
A. Well, the takeover in the municipality of Prijedor did create a certain animosity 
towards us who were living in the centre of Kozarac, a certain mistrust, because 
it all took place quite unexpectedly in Prijedor. It was a shock for everybody, 
because the local government was in the hands of the SDA, a Muslim party in 
Prijedor, and something like a coup had happened. Of course, people no longer 
believed anyone. They would simply turn their heads away because it was difficult 
to believe, to trust, someone, they identified the power with someone who had done 
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something terrible. They sided us somehow with them, identified us with them. 
So what I was trying to do, I was just trying to help, as far as it was possible for me, 
because I was from the centre of Kozarac because my parents had been living 
there and I thought that I could do something, and it was my duty to do 
something. But, as I say, there were many groups of people who were spreading 
lies. I don’t know if it was all on purpose, but simple people were disappointed. 
Power had been taken away and, on the other hand, everybody was acquiring 
weapons in Kozarac. The weapons were being openly sold and you no longer knew 
whom to trust. There was a general feeling of insecurity, and those who were not 
organised in some units, paramilitary units, or police units, they simply turned away 
to their own families and they just cared about that.  
 
P 7838-7839  
Q. The second meeting that took place in Prijedor, can you tell us what was 
discussed at that meeting and what the atmosphere was like on the 20th May? 
 
A. Well, that meeting did bring some hope that things would be solved at the level 
of the Kozarac Local Commune, because Drljaca said, although he had already said 
that ultimata that had been issued came from Banja Luka, from the centre of 
security services, but he denounced that because he said at the second meeting, 
"OK, well, you do not have to change insignia but you have to sign loyalty". So 
there was some kind of progress and we said, "Well,OK, when it comes to insignia, 
then the police in Kozarac don’t have to wear hats either". So you had a possibility 
of putting the insignia on other parts of the uniform. But, anyhow, we managed to 
obtain for those insignia not to be changed. But there was a compromise because 
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hats were no longer worn. That was some kind of progress. But the municipal staff, 
there was always someone -- there was a representative of the military who 
mentioned the problem of paramilitary units in Kozarac, because in the area of 
Kozarac there had been several incidents, mostly on the Prijedor/Banja Luka road. 
People would stop columns of soldiers that were coming back from the front in 
Croatia, and sometimes a Serbian reserve soldier would be arrested by a group of, I 
do not know, Suljo Kosuran or someone else, and they would be detained. So it was 
very unsafe to walk around Kozarac for everyone, everybody who belonged to 
either the JNA or the Krajina army. So, as I say, some steps had been made, but the 
problem was the signing of loyalty. Drljaca did say that if the chief of the Banja 
Luka police allows, then loyalty would not have to be signed. So those were the 
discussions that we had, and we wanted to go to Banja Luka around 20th, 21st May, 
in order to reach any kind of agreement. So, aside from that ultimatum, there was 
an agreement also that people who were not allowed to carry weapons and who 
were walking around with weapons had to store their weapons at home. So there 
was a kind of agreement but, as I say, our group was not allowed to do anything. 
We could just listen to the proposal and propose something, but we were not in 
charge. We could not say, "OK, it is going to be implemented" because there was a 
very strict group of people in Kozarac, people with criminal records, such as Suljo 
Kusuran who had a group of people under weapons. That was this Cirkin person, I 
do not know his name, but he was in Kozarusa, who also had a criminal record. 
They just organised some groups themselves and they were doing everything they 
pleased. So that created an image of Kozarac. Well, whether the official 
authorities of Kozarac could prevent such kind of organising of people, that was a 
question. 
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P 7843-7844  
Q. Did you remain in Kozarac? 
 
A. Yes, I did, but that evening I said to myself, "I should leave, I should flee this 
town", because I realised that evening in case there is a conflict, I would stand no 
chance. I would have no chance to flee. So that evening I stayed in a cafe of my 
neighbour until midnight, with my neighbour Jakupovic, and then I went back 
home and that evening I slept in my cafe on a chair. I actually slept on the floor and 
I fell asleep. I do not remember whether I was really sleeping or not. Anyhow, that 
is how. Morning came and I did not know what had happened, but I heard that 
everything had been taken care of, and weapons that had caused the incident had 
been returned. But you never know, you never know whether something similar 
could happen once again. It was in the air. It was difficult to understand that such 
an incident over two rifles could bring about a war. But, anyhow, that evening I 
realised that it was possible. 
 
P 7852 
Q. When you arrived in Banja Luka where did you go? 
 
A. I only remember that at the exit I greeted Esad Tadzic who is a school friend of 
my brother. He used to be the President of the municipality in Prijedor. So he was 
with his wife. We greeted each other. We knew each other well. The families knew 
each other from before. We just shook hands. We said nothing that is interesting. 
There was silence, some apprehension and a very strange feeling. He grew up in 
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Kozarac and lived in Prijedor, and I was born and grew up in Kozarac and we both 
ended up in Banja Luka. I assumed also that he had fled. 
 
P 7863-7864 
Q. At what time did you get to the Tadic family house? 
 
A. Well, it could have been about 3.00 o'clock, 3.00 p.m. I know that we had been, 
that we were travelling for about one hour, hour and a half. We just drove through 
Kozarac, the three of us. We went to -- I remember we went in the direction of the 
fire station. Then we went back when we saw what was happening there, what had 
happened there, that a lot of it had been destroyed. So we went back to the 
factory, Jela factory, and that is where I saw an acquaintance of mine. It all lasted 
very short because when we went back Kozarac was in a pitiful shape. It was not 
so much destroyed, but there was a stench in the air. There was no electricity at 
that time. So later on in my house I saw in my freezer that all the food that I had 
had been spoiled, there was some cattle around. It was difficult to explain such a 
feeling, but you could feel something in the air, you could feel that something 
was unhealthy in the air. We did not see many soldiers. I saw several people, that 
was all. All along the road I just saw that unofficial control near Lamovita and later 
I did not see anyone when we were going there or when we were coming back. 
 
Q. For how long did you stay in the area of Kozarac on this visit? 
 
A. Well, one hour, an hour and a half. We wanted to do something useful. My 
brother wanted to do something about his business premises. He wanted to protect 
331 
 
something. I tried to shut down the area because everything was laying open and 
things were scattered around. So I first established the situation. So during that first 
visit to our family house we realised that the house had not been really destroyed 
but the front part of the house where there were business premises of my brother, 
there was a huge opening, a huge hole of maybe a shell. The part of the house 
where I had been sleeping for several months, that is the part of the house that 
belongs to my brother Mladen, there was a hole in the roof which had been made by 
a shell, and a shell had fallen in front of the house and damaged the terrace. So it 
was quite a pitiful shape. My cafe was damaged. Everything was more or less 
damaged. It was a rather sophisticated kind of interior in the cafe. So when 
windows were smashed and doors were smashed, everything was just laying open. 
The town itself was ghostly. 
 
P 7909-7910 
Q. When did you start to become involved then with the return to Kozarac and the 
revival of the town of Kozarac? 
 
A. First, activities in relation to the return to Kozarac were launched by a certain 
number of residents of Kozarac who at that time were living in Prijedor as refugees, 
displaced persons. 
 
Q. Who were those people? 
 
A. Well, what happened at the beginning, at first, we did not know what kind of 
perspective my native town had, the town where I wanted to return very soon, 
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but at the beginning of August 1992 an information was made public that the 
municipal Crisis Staff has reached a decision that Kozarac would not be resettled 
and that no one would return there. So, in view of those circumstances, I met with 
many people from Kozarac there. I first met with Bosko Dragicevic and then I 
also met with Ivo Rajkovic and many others who were living in Kozarac. I also 
met some neighbours of mine of Muslim nationality. I used to run into them 
throughout that summer, and I talked to them, we exchanged opinions, we 
consulted with each other, and I also talked to Meho Beslagic about that. 
 
29 Oct 1996 
 
P 7949 
 
Q. You indicated in your testimony that the plebiscite itself was conducted in the 
churchyard of the Serbian Orthodox church because, you said, you did not want the 
plebiscite conducted in a private home and "there were no other communal 
objects". In fact, there were a variety of communal objects and buildings in 
Kozarac, but the Orthodox church was the only exclusively Serbian communal 
object, isn't that right? 
 
A. No, the Orthodox church in Kozarac is over 120 years old, and all people 
visited, not only the church but also the churchyard, Muslims, Croats and others. I 
remember. I grew up there. We used to play football there. We spent a lot of time 
there in the churchyard, not only of the Orthodox church, but of the mosque 
as well -- me and my neighbours. 
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Q. So the mosque was a communal object or building, the Mjesna Zajednica was a 
communal building, the post office was a communal building? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. But the Serbian Orthodox church was the only Serbian communal building? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
P 7953-7954 
 
Q. Did you not denounce Serbs for failing to vote in the Plebiscite as being disloyal 
to the Serbian cause? 
 
A. No, I did not denounce them, but until the end of 1993 some things were such 
that you could realise that those who did not know, who had not known, whether to 
take part in public gatherings or not, that those were people whom you could not 
trust for anything. They could not be trusted when it comes to the plebiscite in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina or other things. Those people probably took part in all 
kinds of plebiscites and referendums that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It 
was strange because it was difficult to understand, because someone who would 
vote for a plebiscite for Yugoslavia could later vote for Bosnia and Herzegovina. I 
think that one should know what he really wants, whether you want a sovereign 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Yugoslavia, whether you want to live in Bosnia, in 
334 
 
Herzegovina or not. At least, such were the circumstances in which we were at 
that time. 
 
 
